Hypothetical Clause Samples

Hypothetical. (member months and expenditures for these children are only reported if XXI funds are exhausted) CommonHealth The CommonHealth program was in existence prior to the separate XXI Children’s Health Insurance Program and was not affected by the maintenance of effort date. The CommonHealth program is contained in the separate XXI state plan and as authorized under this demonstration. Certain children derive eligibility from both the authority granted under this demonstration and via the separate XXI program, but expenditures are OVERVIEW OF CHILDREN’S ELIGIBLITY IN MASSHEALTH Children Aged 1 through 18 and Disabled Above 300% Any Yes XXI via demonstratio n authority only CommonHealth Hypothetical CommonHealt h/ Premium Assistance With wraparound to OVERVIEW OF CHILDREN’S ELIGIBLITY IN MASSHEALTH CommonHealth Children Aged 19 and 20 Non-disabled 0 through 133% Any Yes XIX via Medicaid state plan Base Childless Benchmark 1 Medicaid Expansion Children Ages 19 and 20: Any Yes XIX via Medicaid state plan 1902(r)(2) Children Without waiver Standard Children Aged 19 and 20 and 0 through 150% Any Yes XIX via Medicaid state plan Base Disabled Without Waiver Standard ATTACHMENT B COST SHARING Cost-sharing imposed upon individuals enrolled in the demonstration varies across coverage types and by FPL. However, in general, no co-payments are charged for any benefits rendered to individuals under age 21 or pregnant women. Additionally, no premiums are charged to any individual enrolled in the demonstration whose gross income is less than 150 percent of the FPL. In the event a family group contains at least two members who are eligible for different coverage types and who would otherwise be assessed two different premiums, the family shall be assessed only the highest applicable premium. Family group will be determined using MassHealth rules for the purposes of assessing premiums as described in section IV of the STC. Demonstration Program Premiums (only for persons with family income above 150 percent of the FPL) Co-payments MassHealth Standard/Standard ABP $0 All co-payments and co-payment caps are specified in the Medicaid state plan. MassHealth CarePlus $0 MassHealth Standard co-payments apply. MassHealth Breast and Cervical Cancer Treatment Program $15-$72 depending on income MassHealth Standard co-payments apply. MassHealth CommonHealth $15 and above depending on income and family group size MassHealth Standard co-payments apply. CommonHealth Children through 300% FPL ...

Hypothetical. Vice President X makes a salary of $210,000 and has, under the annual cash incentive plan, a 40% target ($84,000) if Cray makes $30 million of adjusted pre-award operating income (for 50% of his total award) and X meets five defined individual goals (10% each or 50% together of his total award). (X’s target award for the prior year was 35%, or $73,500, with the prior year’s plan structured similarly to the current year’s plan.) If Cray’s adjusted pre-award operating income is $20 million, the plan award is 50% of target; if it is $26 million, the plan award is 75% of target; and if it is $34 million, it is 125% of target. Cray must be profitable for any payment to be made under the cash incentive plan, and a condition to payment is that the officer must be an employee on the date of payment. X has been a Vice President for 30 months and does not accrue any vacation. X has 16,000 options for Cray common stock, of which 4,000 options are vested, and 5,000 shares of restricted stock, of which 2,500 shares are vested.

Hypothetical. Imagine this scenario: ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ is a new adjunct professor at Springfield University. After a successful first semester of teaching Creative Writing, she is excited to return to campus and continue working with students. One week before the semester commences, she receives a call from the head of the English department notifying her that only three students have signed up for her 50-person Intro to Creative Writing class. ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ is shocked by the news, considering the popularity of the course the previous semester. The department head suggests the cause for such low registration is an extremely defamatory post circulating about her teaching style and Creative Writing class on ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇. ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ frantically googles herself on ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇ to find a page filled with comments about her, most of which are positive. However, the top comment that has been rated the most helpful comment by users says: "▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇'▇ Creative Writing Class is the most failed course at Springfield University. She goes out of her way to make her students fail. Do NOT take this class unless you want an F on your transcript." ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, appalled by the demonstrably false comment, immediately flags the post and puts in a request for it to be deleted by content moderators. She looks up RateMyProfessors' policies for third-party content regulation. She finds that content moderators will review the content and remove the post only if it violates site guidelines. ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ reaches out to RateMyProfessors and asks them to take down the comment. When she finally connects with a representative, they assure her that the comment will be taken down. However, three weeks pass, and the comment is still on the website. ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, outraged by RateMyProfessors's failure to take down a patently false and harmful comment that was clearly in violation of the community guidelines, wants to sue the company for defamation. After consulting legal counsel, she discovers that the current law explicitly prohibits any such legal action from being taken. Under subsection (c)1 of Section 230, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." In other words, ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ cannot sue RateMyProfessors for the defamatory comment that was distributed on its platform because doing so would treat the company as the author of the defamatory post.

Hypothetical. ▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ have been shareholders in ABC Corporation for several years and they are parties to a shareholders agreement. ▇▇▇▇▇ would like to exit the business and move on to a new venture. ▇▇▇▇▇ has told ▇▇▇▇▇ that she would like to buy his shares in ABC for $1,000 cash. Before ▇▇▇▇▇ can sell to ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ must offer ▇▇▇ the opportunity to buy the shares for $1,000 cash. ▇▇▇ determines that he does not want ▇▇▇▇▇ to be an owner in the business, and ▇▇▇ exercises his right of first refusal and buys ▇▇▇▇▇’s shares for $1,000. Drafting considerations:

Hypothetical. 12 Month With Pay Deferred Interest Promotion

Hypothetical. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ complied with order to pay $300/month to wife ▇▇▇▇▇ for support of child Carlo. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ lost employment at the mill and receives unemployment compensation. Looks for job. Unemployment runs out and can only find odd jobs. Carlo spends more time with ▇▇▇▇▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ stops paying child support. ▇▇▇▇▇=s hours at work have been cut down and demands 5 months in arrears. She says he could find a job if he really tried. ▇▇▇▇▇ says ▇▇▇▇▇▇ can=t see Carlo until he pays, although ▇▇▇▇▇▇ has a visitation order. O served motion to show cause why he failed to pay support payments and P wants contempt. The second ▇▇▇▇▇▇ lost his job, he should have asked for a modification especially since the kid was overnighting with him. It is not always a good thing to stay out of the courts. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ should have paid at least small amounts. VI CHILD CUSTODY

Hypothetical. Assume that the purchase price for the Tranche II LSL Property is $2,000,000, the amount of the First Mortgage Loan is $1,200,000, the amount of the Tranche II LSL Loan is $700,000, the amount of the LXP Tranche II LSL Contribution is $100,000 and the projected annual Net Cash Flow is $96,000 or $8,000 monthly (there are no increases or decreases in projected Net Cash Flow). With the amount of the Tranche II LSL Loan at $700,000 and the LXP Tranche II LSL Contribution at $100,000, the lenders of the Tranche II LSL Loan have provided 7/8ths or 87.5% of the non-mortgage capitalization and the LXP LLC has provided 1/8ths or 12.5% of the non-mortgage capitalization. The total amount of each installment of interest for a month (the "Total Interest Amount" or "TIA") will be equal to a percentage (the "Participation Percentage" or "PP%") of projected Net Cash Flow ("NCF") for that month. The Participation Percentage is derived by dividing (A) the principal amount of the Tranche II LSL Loan by (B) the sum of the principal amount of the Tranche II LSL Loan plus the amount of the LXP Tranche II LSL Contribution. The Total Interest Amount or TIA will have two components: (1) an amount of Base Interest (the "Base Interest Amount" or "BIA") calculated by multiplying the Net Cash Flow by the Base Interest Rate (the "Base Interest Rate" or "BI%"); and (2) an amount of Cash Flow Interest (the "Cash Flow Interest Amount" or "CFI Amount") calculated by subtracting the Base Interest Amount from the Net Cash Flow and then multiplying that result by 50%. The Base Interest Rate or BI% is determined by first calculating the percentage of Net Cash Flow that is attributable to Base Interest (the "Base Interest Amount Percentage" or "BIA%") and then solving for the Base Interest Rate. The TIA can be expressed by the following formula: Total Interest Amount equals the sum of the Base Interest Amount plus the Cash Flow Interest Amount. NCF x PP% = (NCF x BIA%) + (0.5 x (NCF -[NCF x BIA%]) 8,000 x .875 = (8,000 x BIA%) + (0.5 x (8,000 - [8,000 x BIA%])

Hypothetical. Fundamental right to divorce? W files for a separation (doesn=t want a divorce b/c she wants H=s pension benefits). She says that H beat her & spent family funds illicitly. H counter files asking for a divorce (says he never beat W or spent $ foolishly). He claims that they lived apart for 13 months; Now he is living with girlfriend who he want to marry. The pension plan code says that if H and W get divorced, W gets nothing. W seeks judgment that code is illegal b/c it makes distinctions based on suspect class & violates fundamental right to divorce (she would suffer tremendous loss by termination of rights.). i. May a state court in a no fault system deny motion for divorce? WI Statute 767.12 (2) (a): proof of separation is evidence of irretrievable breakdown. W here would lose. ii. Supreme Court hasn=t yet said that there is a fundamental right to divorce: Wife argues that the statute discriminates based on married status (EP). ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇/Loving suggest married people are suspect class, but facts of those cases are different b/c this case is talking in rights you have based on divorce. Courts may be hesitant to apply right to marry cases to right of divorce; (ii) violates her fundamental right to divorce; she would suffer loss by termination of pension rights. Broddie (US, 1971):It is a violation for states to deny indigent people access to ct to obtain divorce. Due process prohibits a state from denying solely b/c of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution to their marriages. Also, Sup. Ct said it=s open to argument that there=s right to Aunmarry@ which is inherent in right to marry -right not to procreate has followed from right to procreate (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇); by analogy, inherent in right to marry is right to be unmarried. (iii) If divorce is fundamental, does state have any interest in curtailing it? Enactment of no-fault system suggests state=s interest/role isn=t strong enough to interfere w/right, except where kids are involved

Hypothetical. You have an original order out of Nebraska, Custodial parent and kid move to TX. Non-custodial parent (obligor) moves to WI. Under UIFSA, if the custodial parent petitioned for modification, WI has jurisdiction, b/c the respondent lives there. If the non-custodial parent moved for modification (reduction), TX has jurisdiction. Must have PJ over the person who will suffer economic consequences. Most modifications come from petitioners who want an upward modification, then the custodial parent and the state of the obligor gets jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction has been switched, the substantive law of the new state will be used to set the formulas for child support payments. The issuing state holds on to the nature, extent, and duration of the award, but the new state=s guidelines will be used to set the amount of child support. There is a home-court advantage to these proceedings.