FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. On August 8, 2008, Xxxxxxx went to Valencia‘s Mercedes-Benz dealership to shop for a certified preowned car. In response to his inquiry, a sales representative showed him a 2006 Mercedes-Benz S500V with an advertised price of approximately $48,000. After negotiations regarding various terms of the purchase, Xxxxxxx signed a contract entitled ―RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALE CONTRACT — SIMPLE FINANCE CHARGE,‖ which specified the total amount financed as $47,032.99. This amount included a price for the car of approximately $39,800, sales tax of approximately $3,330, a service contract price of $3,700, a cash down payment of $15,000, and a net trade-in amount for Xxxxxxx‘s 2004 Cadillac of -$14,800 (reflecting the amount Xxxxxxx still owed on the car ($20,800) offset by its value ($6,000)). Xxxxxxx later filed a class action against Valencia asserting violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, §§ 1750–1784), the Automobile Sales Finance Act (Civ. Code, §§ 2981–2984.6), the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200–17210), the Song-Xxxxxxx Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, §§ 1790–1795.8), and Public Resources Code section 42885. He alleged that Valencia had (1) made false representations about the car‘s condition, (2) failed separately to itemize the amount of the down payment that was deferred, (3) failed to distinguish registration, transfer, and titling fees from license fees, (4) charged an optional electronic filing fee without discussing it with him, (5) charged new tire fees for used tires, and (6) required payment of $3,700 to have the car certified so he could qualify for a 4.99 percent interest rate, when that payment was actually for an optional extended warranty unrelated to the interest rate. Xxxxxxxx moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a provision in the contract that provided in relevant part: ―Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise . . . between you and us . . . which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship . . . shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action Any claim or dispute is to be arbitrated by a single arbitrator on an individual basis and not as a class action. You expressly waive any right you may have to arbitrate a class action.‖ Xxxxxxx opposed the motion, principally asserting that the arbitration prov...
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. The parties were divorced by a judgment entered on December 14, 2011. That judgment incorporated, but did not merge, the parties’ Separation and Property Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) dated December 9, 2011. The Agreement provided that Xxxxxxxx would pay non-modifiable alimony for a term of eight years beginning January 1, 2012, and ending December 31, 2019. The Agreement further provided that Xxxxxxxx’s alimony obligation would terminate “upon the earlier of (a) Xxxxxxxx’s death; (b) Xxxxxx’s death; (c) Xxxxxx’s remarriage; (d) Xxxxxx’s cohabitation (as defined by Xxxxxx x. Xxxxxx, 675 A.2d 540 (1996)), or [(e)] December 31, 2019.” In June 2016, Xxxxxxxx filed a “Motion to Confirm Termination of Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx to the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement.” In his motion, Xxxxxxxx alleged that Xxxxxx “is and/or has been cohabitating (as defined by the Settlement Agreement) with Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx since at least August 2015.” Xxxxxxxx therefore sought termination of his alimony obligation as well as reimbursement from Xxxxxx for any alimony payments Xxxxxxxx made while she was cohabiting with Xx. Xxxxxx. The circuit court received evidence on Xxxxxxxx’s motion to terminate alimony on October 27, 2016, and November 3, 2016. Because their Agreement expressly incorporated Xxxxxx’x definition of cohabitation as a terminating event for the payment of alimony, both parties produced evidence concerning Xxxxxx’x non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to determining cohabitation. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court evaluated each of the five factors enumerated in Xxxxxx and determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish cohabitation between Xxxxxx and Xx. Xxxxxx. Accordingly, the court denied Xxxxxxxx’s request to terminate alimony. The circuit court also heard Xxxxxx’s motions concerning her request to recalculate child support pursuant to the Agreement, as well as her claim for reimbursement of “shared expenses” related to the children’s education, health care, and extracurricular activities. As to child support, the Agreement provided that, beginning in 2013, the parties would annually “recalculate Xxxxxxxx’s child support obligation based upon the Maryland Child Support Guidelines[.]” The parties disagreed whether Xxxxxxxx’s child support obligation should be calculated based on the “shared” or “sole” custody formula contained in the Guidelines. Xxxxxxxx contended that because the Consent Custody Order, agreed to by the part...
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. The Xxxxxxx Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of their prior motion for preliminary approval of the original proposed settlement set forth the factual background for Plaintiffs’ claims. See Dkt. No. 3-1, at 3-4. Plaintiffs briefly recount this background for the Court’s convenience. Plaintiffs, along with the Settlement Class Members they seek to represent, and Chesapeake are parties to gas and oil leases in Pennsylvania. Chesapeake’s leases with Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members include a “Market Enhancement Clause” (hereinafter “MEC”), a provision that Plaintiffs allege precludes Chesapeake, as the lessee, from deducting so-called “post- production costs” that are incurred to transform gas into marketable form or make the gas ready for sale or use. (An MEC does permit Chesapeake to deduct a pro rata share of costs incurred after the gas is marketable or ready for sale or use.) Plaintiffs allege that Chesapeake underpaid royalties due to Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members by deducting costs that were incurred prior to the Gas entering the interconnect point of a transmission pipeline, in breach of the MEC provisions of the leases. Plaintiffs contend that Chesapeake’s Gas is not in marketable form until it meets the quality and pressure specifications of the interstate pipeline into which it is delivered. Plaintiffs contend, therefore, that the raw Gas produced by Chesapeake is not marketable at the well and that Chesapeake’s deductions for gathering, dehydration and compression are improper and in breach of the Pennsylvania Leases, i.e., the deductions are for activities that are necessary to transform the Gas into marketable form. Chesapeake, on the other hand, contends that the Gas produced or to be produced under Plaintiffs’ and Settlement Class Members’ leases is marketable at the wellhead, the post- production costs were reasonable, and that Chesapeake is entitled to deduct the costs at issue. The Xxxxxxx Plaintiffs’ memorandum in support of the prior motion for preliminary approval also detailed Class Counsel’s factual investigation, over the course of more than a year, into potential claims regarding royalty underpayments by Chesapeake. Those investigations led to extended discussions with Chesapeake’s counsel, which in turn led to Chesapeake’s provision of substantial amounts of information to Class Counsel, including interviews of Chesapeake’s internal revenue accounting personnel, as well as production of documents (including the gath...
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. The underlying litigation is a suit to recover under-paid carbon dioxide royal- ties. The appellees are: Xxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxx Xxxxxxxx, and Xxxxx Xxxxxx, in their representative capacities as co-trustees of the Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx Trust (collectively the ‘‘Xxxxxx Trust’’); Xxxxxxx X. Xxxx and Xxxxx X. Bench, in their representative capacities as co-trustees of the Xxxxxxx X. Bench Family Trust (collectively the ‘‘Bench Family Trust’’); Xxxxxx Xxxx Xxxxxxx; and Xxxxxxx X. Armor, Jr. (here- inafter also referred to collectively as ‘‘ap- pellees’’). Appellees brought suit in the probate court of Xxxxxx County, Texas against appellants Mobil Oil Corporation, Mobil Producing Texas & New Mexico, Inc., and Mobil Xxxxxx Pipeline, Inc. (the ‘‘Mobil appellants’’), the Shell appellants, and Xxxxxx Pipeline Company (hereinafter also referred to collectively as ‘‘xxxxx- xxxxx’’).2 Appellees are overriding royalty interest owners of a unitized carbon diox- ide pool, the McElmo Dome Unit, in Colo- rado and claim that since 1982 appellants have under-paid royalties for carbon diox- ide produced from that pool. The Xxxxxx Trust is a Texas inter vivos trust with its principal place of business and situs of administration in Xxxxxx County, Texas. The Bench Family Trust is a Colorado inter vivos and charitable trust with its principal office located in Denver County, Colorado. Xxxxxxx is a Texas citizen who resides in Wichita Coun- ty, Texas. Armor is a citizen of Florida who resides in Xxxxxx County, Florida. Xxxxxx County is not the location of any appellant’s principal Texas office. Appellants filed pleas to the probate court’s jurisdiction and motions to transfer venue to Xxxxxx County asserting, among other complaints, that the Bench Family Trust, Xxxxxxx, and Armor were improper- ly joined in the lawsuit under former sec- tion 15.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. After a hearing, the probate court signed a November 30, 2000 order denying appellants’ pleas to the jurisdiction and their motions to transfer venue. The court did not specify the basis for its rul- ing. Appellants then perfected their inter- locutory appeals to this court.3 er have jurisdiction to reconsider our judg- ments denying relators’ petitions for writ of mandamus.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 1. In February 2008, the Bernsteins and eleven other Wayland residents (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed an appeal of the Wayland Planning Board’s special permit decision approving the Town Center Project. That appeal was Xxxxxxxxx, et al. x. Xxxxxxx Planning Board, et al., Civil Action No. 2008-0552 (Middlesex Superior Court) (“the Lawsuit”).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 2 Plaintiffs1 Xxxxx Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxx Xxxxx (“Plaintiffs”) bring this class action 4 Ametek, Inc. (“Ametek”), Xxxxxx Xxxxxx (“Xxxxxx”) and Senior Operations, LLC 5 (“Senior”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for Negligence, Gross Negligence, Private 6 Nuisance, Public Nuisance, and Trespass. 7 Additionally, Defendants filed Third-Party Complaints against Greenfield MHP 8 Associates, L.P., Starlight MHP, LLC, Kort & Xxxxx Financial Group, LLC, Tustin Ranch 9 Partners, Inc., Sierra Corporate Management, Inc. (collectively “Greenfield/Starlight 10 Third-Party Defendants”), KMC CA Management, LLC, Xxxxxxxx Management Corp., 11 and Villa Cajon MHC, L.P. (collectively “Villa Cajon Third-Party Defendants”)(the 12 Greenfield/Starlight Third-Party Defendants and Villa Cajon Third-Party Defendants 13 shall be collectively referred to as “Third-Party Defendants”), alleging that the Third- 14 Party Defendants were partially or wholly responsible and liable for the damages arising 15 from Plaintiffs’ claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 18. On September 15, 2015, Xxxxx Xxxxxx filed this Action as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. On September 22, 2015, the Complaint was amended to include Representative Plaintiffs Xxxxx Xxxxxx and Xxxxx Xxxx as named Plaintiffs. On October 29, 2015, by stipulation of the Parties, the Complaint was amended to dismiss Xxxxx Xxxxxx. Xxxxx Xxxxxx and Xxxxx Xxxx remain Representative Plaintiffs.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. The parties’ dispute concerns a lease agreement entered into on November 14, 2008, for a term of twenty years for the rental of commercial space in Upper Providence Township, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. (Docket No. 1, Ex. A-2.) Under the terms of the Lease, Raymours was to construct the building and pay for the costs of construction, and Providence, as the landlord, was required to obtain the township’s approval of the proposed building, façade, and signage. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, Docket No. 1, Ex. A-1.) On March 17, 2009, Providence alleges that Raymours demanded that Providence demonstrate that it had obtained the necessary permits and approval. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Two days later, Xxxxxxxxxx informed Raymours that Providence had obtained a permit for the building’s accompanying signage. (Compl. ¶ 11.) On March 24, 2009, Raymours’s counsel sent Providence a letter stating that Raymours intended to terminate the Lease unless Providence obtained “‘final and unappealable approval’ of the [relevant permits] as required by the Lease.” (Compl. ¶ 14; Def.’s Mot. to Strike 2.) On March 31, 2009, Xxxxxxxxxx responded to “address Xxxxxx’s alleged concern” by indicating that Providence had obtained the building plan and façade permits and attaching such permits. (Compl. ¶ 18.) On April 1, 2009, the parties’ representatives “met in person and by phone” “to discuss the dispute between plaintiff and Raymours and possible settlement thereof.” (Def.’s
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 1. On April 10, 2012, Complainants filed a complaint against Xxxxx Fargo & Company and Xxxxx Fargo Bank, N.A. pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3610. Complainants later amended their complaint to add as Respondents Xxxxx Fargo Home Mortgage and Premiere Asset Services (collectively, "Respondent"). By agreement of the parties, Complainants hereby amend their complaint to identify the Respondents in their proper corporate capacity, being Xxxxx Fargo Bank, N.A., d/b/a Xxxxx Fargo Home Mortgage and Xxxxx Fargo Bank, N.A., d/b/a Premiere Asset Services (collectively, "Respondent") and do hereby dismiss the named parent company, Xxxxx Fargo & Company. Complainants and the Aggrieved Persons listed above (hereinafter referred to as "Complainants") assert that Respondent has violated the Fair Housing Act by maintaining and marketing Real Estate Owned ("REO") properties in predominantly White areas in materially better condition than REO properties in neighborhoods that are predominantly African-American, Latino, and non-White communities ("communities of color"). For the purpose of this Agreement, “
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. A. The Policies There are two policies at issue in this case: a Directors, Officers and Private Company Liability Insurance Policy issued to Acosta by National Union (“the National Union Policy”); and an Excess Directors and Officers Liability and Company Reimbursement Coverage Policy issued to Acosta by Xxxxxxxx (“the Xxxxxxxx Policy”). The effective period of the National Union Policy was November 1, 2002, to November 1, 2003. The Xxxxxxxx Policy provided for liability coverage in excess of the limits of the National Union Policy, and by its 1 Although the trial court had not entered final judgment as to National Union at the time this appeal was filed, National Union participated as an appellee under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g)(2). terms, it was subject to the same warranties, terms, conditions, and exclusions as the National Union Policy. The prior litigation exclusion of the National Union Policy (“Exclusion 4(e)”), which is incorporated by reference into the Xxxxxxxx Policy,2 provides as follows: The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection with a Claim made against an Insured:
