Evaluation of Positions. The joint University and Union evaluation committee will meet to evaluate job fact sheets using a formal job evaluation system. Committee members will be trained in the use of the job evaluation system.
Evaluation of Positions. Amending the Settlement to allow additional entities to become parties is broadly supported both by parties to the Settlement and by entities that are not parties. No entity expressed opposition. With the issuance of this Record of Decision, all parties are now on notice of BPA’s position as to the legal viability of the Settlement. Through the exhaustive analysis provided in this ROD, BPA hopes parties will see the value that the Settlement provides to the region in general and, more importantly, the way the Settlement satisfies the requirements of the Northwest Power Act, particularly in the manner in which it protects the position of the COUs. As a party to the Settlement, BPA is in favor of allowing additional entities to sign the Settlement. BPA believes that an amendment to allow additional parties to the Settlement is reasonable, within BPA's contracting authority, and does not conflict with any applicable laws. Several parties indicated giving additional entities until approximately October 1, 2011, to execute the Settlement. BPA is concerned that this may not allow for sufficient time to craft the amendment with representatives of the parties, get the amendment to all parties and for parties to act on the amendment. BPA’s concern stems from the fact that there is a very substantial amount of work, including decisions by its COU customers in particular, between now and October 1, 2011 in order to implement service under the new Regional Dialogue contracts, implement the Settlement, and implement the new BPA power rates that are effective October 1. A number of COU utilities are also considering retail rate changes that may need to be implemented between now and the end of the calendar year. BPA believes parties should be given ample time to consider and approve the amendment given that all current parties to the Settlement must agree to such amendment. While the specifics of the amendment need to be negotiated among current parties, BPA believes giving current parties until the end of November to sign the amendment and giving entities not currently parties until December 31, 2011 to sign the amended Settlement may be appropriate. BPA believes it is highly unlikely a court will issue any opinion between now and the end of the calendar year that would provide entities that are not currently parties to the Settlement new information on the pros and cons of signing the Settlement. Obviously, the possibility of court action prior to any new signing dead...
Evaluation of Positions. APAC argues that due to the “inherent uncertainty” embedded in long-term forecasts, “the conclusion of BPA Staff as to the reasonableness of the [S]ettlement is also defective because Staff’s analysis used projected costs over a 17-year period; all parties agreed that projections over such a period have inherent uncertainty.” APAC Br., REP-12-B-AP-01, at 15. APAC refers in the abstract to WPAG’s testimony, where WPAG states “[f]orecasts of this nature are not capable of providing reliable predictions of the precise future outcomes, such as the amount of REP cost protection that preference customers will or will not receive from the statutory provisions over the next 17 years.” Saleba et al., REP-12-E-WG-01, at 19. BPA disagrees that uncertainty in future projections means that BPA cannot rely on such projections to determine whether the Settlement complies with the Northwest Power Act. There is uncertainly in forecasting the future; forecasts rarely are “precise.” Yet, BPA continues to set rates based upon projections of future loads, resources, costs, and revenues, all of which vary significantly from year to year and forecast to forecast. Xxxxxxxx et al., REP-12-E-BPA-13, at 7. In fact, this approach is statutorily mandated by the Northwest Power Act, and as such, ratesetting on a forecast basis is inherently unavoidable. JP02 Br., REP-12-B-JP02-01, at 11-12. Arguments against using long-term projections to evaluate the Settlement pose two questions: first, whether the long-term projections produce unreliable and unreasonable results, and second, whether the results of the long-term analysis are the same as those that would be provided through coetaneous rate tests. The parties in this proceeding debate whether the long-term projections produce unreliable and unreasonable results. JP02 notes that the long-term forecasts are both necessary and sufficient: “forecasts extending for longer than 17 years are frequently used to inform important decisions.” JP02 Br., REP-12-B-JP02-01, at 11. JP02 notes that ratesetting on a forecast basis is both “statutorily mandated by the Northwest Power Act” and “inherently unavoidable” and that the proper question from a ratemaking perspective is not speculation as to whether any forecast can be perfectly accurate in hindsight, but rather whether the projection is reasonable and based upon the best available information. Id. at 12. Recognizing inherent hurdles with forecasting, Staff takes great effort in developing a rang...
Evaluation of Positions. In its comments, Avista notes that its long-standing xxxxxx dispute arises from a provision in a bilateral contract between BPA and The Washington Water Power Company (“WWP”) (now Avista). (Avista, XXX000000, at 1-2.) Specifically, WWP’s 1981 RPSA with BPA included a provision that allowed WWP to deem its ASC equal to the PF rate. (Id.) In the event WWP made such election, BPA debited to a separate account any net exchange payment to BPA, and credited to that separate account any net exchange payment to the utility, that would have been required if the utility had not made such election. (Id.) Any debit balance that existed at the time the 1981 RPSA was terminated would not be a cash obligation. (Id.) This provision of the 1981 RPSA is commonly referred to as the xxxxxx provision. (Id.) Avista notes that the xxxxxx provision is clearly not a requirement of the Northwest Power Act and, consequently, has no statutory link to the REP; rather, the xxxxxx provision is a purely contractual term created by BPA that was included as part of the 1981 RPSA. (Avista, XXX000000, at 2.) Avista states the parties intended the xxxxxx provision to provide a mechanism to account for short-term fluctuations that may cause WWP’s ASC to temporarily fall below the PF rate. (Id.) Although the xxxxxx provision contemplated that xxxxxx amounts would be carried forward to subsequent exchange agreements, the parties expected any such amounts to be small and for the deeming utility to quickly pay off such amounts from future positive REP benefits. (Id.) At the time the parties executed the 1981 RPSA, the parties did not expect, or intend, the xxxxxx provision to cause WWP (and later Avista) to accrue substantial xxxxxx amounts that would effectively wipe Avista out of the REP and require future generations of Avista’s customers to forego benefits. (Id.) Avista states that at the time that WWP entered into the 1981 RPSA, BPA used the 1981 ASCM to calculate the REP benefits that utilities would receive. (Avista, XXX000000, at 2.) In 1984, over WWP’s and other IOUs’ objections, BPA adopted a new 1984 ASCM, which eliminated some of the legitimate costs of WWP’s, and other utilities’ resources—costs commonly charged to wholesale and retail customers. (Id.) Two of those costs—return on equity and income taxes—pertained solely to IOUs. (Id.) The 1984 ASCM was challenged. (Id.) Avista claims the Ninth Circuit found that BPA’s justifications had no logical support: Petitions correctly observe...
Evaluation of Positions. The evaluation of positions will be conducted as follows: Step one: The manager and the Corporation will forward all necessary documentation to the Facilitator. Step two: The Facilitator will review all available documentation and if necessary, will request additional clarification of duties and supporting documentation. The evaluation process of the position by the will be initiated. Step three: The will conduct the evaluation of the position and communicate its recommendations to the Executive Committee Step four: If the recommendation of the is approved by the Executive Committee, the decision to implement it as is will be communicated to the manager, the employee, the union representative, and the regional Human Resources Advisor. If the recommendation of the is not supported by the Executive Committee, the decision to implement a different job class will also be communicated to the manager, the employee, the union representative and to the regional Human Resources Advisor.
Evaluation of Positions. Throughout this case, Alcoa has maintained that it has been excluded from the negotiations on the Settlement. For example, Alcoa argues that the DSIs were “precluded from participating in the COU and IOU negotiations that gave rise to the proposed Settlement.” Alcoa Br., REP-12- B-AL-02, at 4. Alcoa made similar representations in its direct case and at oral argument. Xxxxx, REP-12-E-AL-01, at 6; Till, Oral Tr. at 70.
Evaluation of Positions. As noted earlier, discussions on the Settlement concluded in early March of 2011, and a final Settlement was submitted to regional parties for signature on or about March 3, 2011. Xxxxxxxxxx, XXX-00-X-XXX-00. In order for the Settlement to become effective, the March 3, 2011, version of the Settlement contained a condition precedent that required the following parties (excluding BPA) to sign by April 15, 2011:
Evaluation of Positions. APAC contends that Staff’s analysis is “fundamentally flawed” because it declines to apply subjective probabilities to each of the scenarios tested (as well as those combinations untested). APAC Br., REP-12-B-AP-01, at 14. BPA disagrees that presenting subjective probabilities on the likelihood of success of the various issues in litigation would have been a useful exercise for the record in this case. In developing the quantitative analysis of the issues in litigation, Staff did not assign any probabilities to the IOUs’ and COUs’ respective cases. Xxxxxxxx et al., REP-12-E-BPA-13, at 13-14. This was done with good reason.
Evaluation of Positions. Throughout this case, Xxxxx has maintained that it has been excluded from the negotiations on the Settlement. For example, Xxxxx argues that the DSIs were “precluded from participating in the COU and IOU negotiations that gave rise to the proposed Settlement.” Alcoa Br., REP-12- B-AL-02, at 4. Alcoa made similar representations in its direct case and at oral argument. Xxxxx, REP-12-E-AL-01, at 6; Till, Oral Tr. at 70.
Evaluation of Positions. The OPUC suggests that all BPA customers should have access to BPA’s conservation and renewables discount program, or “C&RDP”. (OPUC, RPS0005, at 2.) The OPUC disagrees with BPA’s position taken in other forums that IOUs participating in the REP should not have access to the C&RDP because conservation paid for by BPA would not reduce the level of loads placed on BPA. Id. The OPUC contends that, for example, pursuant to any in-lieu transaction BPA would be purchasing power and selling such power to serve the exchanging utility’s residential loads. Id. The amount of In-Lieu Power purchased by BPA would directly depend on the level of residential loads. Id. With conservation, residential loads would decrease, and correspondingly, BPA’s supply obligations would decrease as well. Id. BPA is not persuaded by the OPUC’s argument. BPA replaced the Conservation and Renewables Discount – a line item credit provided to BPA’s customers on their monthly power bills from BPA – in the 2007 wholesale power rate case with the Conservation Rate Credit (“CRC”). The CRC, like its predecessor the C&RD, is included in customers’ monthly power bills. These credits have not been included under the PF Exchange rate. The reason for this is that BPA is obligated to acquire conservation as a resource to meet its load obligations. Exchanging utilities have access to the CRC under their section 5(b) requirements contracts with BPA, if any, but BPA does not have an actual load serving obligation under the RPSAs or section 5(c) of the Act. In addition, it is unclear whether BPA will be physically delivering any power under the RPSAs as part of an in-lieu transaction. Whether a utility will have the option to take physical receipt of In-Lieu PF Power (if any is even offered by BPA), or whether in lieu- transactions will be monetized, will be determined in the In-Lieu Policy. The OPUC argues that even under the traditional exchange, the level of residential loads directly affects the costs of the exchange since costs equal the utility’s ASC multiplied by qualifying loads. (OPUC, RPS0005, at 2.) Therefore, OPUC reasons, all of BPA’s customers would benefit from lower exchange costs if IOU loads were reduced through conservation. Id. However, OPUC fails to acknowledge the purpose of BPA’s conservation program is to pursue conservation equivalent to all cost-effective conservation in the service territories of those public utilities that BPA is obligatd to serve under section 5(b) of the Act....
