Reasoning Sample Clauses

Reasoning. “When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his powers but also those delegated by Congress.” In August 1972, President Xxxxxxx Xxxxx signed the Case Act (Pub. L. 92–404), which requires that international agreements, other than treaties, there- after entered into by the United States should be transmitted to Congress within 60 days after the agreements have been executed (i.e., concluded).6 The act came in response to congressional irritation over secret agreements that generated com- mitments that might potentially require action by the legislature. The law did not question the right of the president to make executive agreements. It sought to restore a proper balance between the branches. Perhaps the Far Eastern Agreement (signed at Yalta on February 11, 1945) stands as the most famous and controversial modern executive agreement post World War II. President Roosevelt clearly regarded the document as an executive agreement, yet did not admit this in his actual verbal report to Congress on March 1, 1945.7 The circum- stances surrounding the Yalta Agreement illustrate the circumstances the Case Act sought to correct. President Roosevelt requested Congress to “concur in the general conclusions” reached at Yalta; yet Congress could take no such action because the text of the agreement was not released by the Department of State until February 1946. In the meantime, however, the U.S. government, through the executive branch, undertook to carry out the measures called for in the agreement. GENERAL PRINCIPLES First, the validity of treaties rests upon a principle of customary law, pacta sunt ser- vanda, or treaties must be observed.8 We should add here the corollary that states must act in good faith in performing treaty obligations. Without this principle, we cannot speak of international agreements as instruments that create binding legal obligations. Skeptics may question this precept. We ask the reader to review the material in Chapter 1 on “why states obey international law” as an answer to the skepticism. Keep in mind that states make agreements because the agreements reflect mutual interests,9 but states also have a vital interest in protecting the general principle of pacta sunt servanda. 6Text of the law in 11 International Legal Materials 1117 (1972); see also the statement by the legal adviser, Department of State (May 18, 1972), excerpted in 66 AJIL 845 (1972); and letters from the ac...
Reasoning. NTSA Parties may request a small percentage of their non-Treaty storage purposely to assure that their release was not spilled. If another NTSA Party then requests a much larger percentage of its non-Treaty storage that does cause spill, the NTSA Party making the large percentage request should be responsible for the excess spill caused by their request. For this reason, the unspilled portion of a NTSA release is allocated equally between the U.S. and B.C. Hydro and the U.S. Parties will be divided Pro Rata among releasing U.S. Parties, which automatically assigns the spill to the NTSA Parties requesting the largest percentage of their non-Treaty storage. This allocation will be done based on the day average values resulting from the usability determination. If two or more NTSA Parties are releasing and spill occurs, the determination of whose release was converted to energy and whose release was spilled will be determined as follows:
Reasoning. The court’s ruling is governed by the FAA which “enumerates limited grounds on which a federal court may va- cate, modify, or correct an arbitral award.” The FAA states four grounds on which an arbitration award can be vacated by the district court. The
Reasoning. The court organized the opinion around ques- tions of arbitrability, which arise in two circumstances 1) when there is a threshold dispute over “whether the parties have a val- id arbitration agreement at all,” and 2) when the parties are in dispute as to “whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.” Procedural questions that grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are large amount signified a bias or a disregard of public policy. The arbitrators were not shown to be more partial to the insured. To show partiality, evidence needs to show “actual bias toward or against a party.” Failing to disclose a matter that occurred more than a decade ago that would be of interest to some party is not enough to show bias. Arbitrators do not “exceed their powers” when they merely misinterpret or apply the governing law incorrectly. The award needs to be “completely irrational,” or demonstrate a “man- ifest disregard of the law.” This case shows neither. The large size of the award did not demonstrate a manifest disregard of the law. In order for the award to be vacated on this ground, it would have to be shown that the arbitrators had recognized the applicable law, but chose to ignore it. No applicable law was cited in this presumptively for the arbitrator. By contending that one or more of the arbitration agreement’s terms is unconscionable, a party challenges the validity of the agreement itself. Thus, an uncon- scionability challenge to the class action waiver is a question of arbitrability for the court to decide. Unless there is a question of arbitrability, the FAA re- quires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbi- trate in accordance with their terms. In order to present their class claims to an arbitrator, the Puleos needed to obtain a court order that invalidated the waiver and that compelled class arbitra- tion. This ignored the explicit terms of the agreement and the FAA. The class action waiver designates a clear boundary of arbi- tral authority, which arbitrators are neither well suited, nor gener- ally permitted to assess the existence and scope of his or her own jurisdiction. A challenge to this provision necessarily calls into question the very authority of the arbitrator to preside over the dispute and the validity of the agreement itself. Further, because the terms explicitly restrict class arbitration, the contracting par- ties would likely have expected a court to decid...
Reasoning. Huuuge argued that Xxxxxx had actual or constructive notice of the Terms due to the Terms’ availability for access. The court rejected Huuuge’s argument, holding that Xxxxxx had neither actual nor constructive notice of the Terms. The court agreed with the trial court’s determination that actual notice was not at issue because Huuuge did not present any evidence of Xxxxxx’x actual knowledge. Regarding constructive notice, the court explained that users are put on constructive notice based on the conspicuousness and placement of the terms SEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATES A NEW STANDARD FOR CLASS ACTION NOTICE WHEN ARBITRATION CLAUSE MAY EXIST. Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., F.3d (7th Cir. 2020). xxxx://xxxxx.xx0.xxxxxx ts.go v/cgi-bin/rssE x ec. pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2020/D01-24/C:19-1944:J:Xxxxx:a ut:T:fnOp:N:2464184:S:0 FACTS: Plaintiff-Appellee Suzie Bigger, an employee of Defendant-Appellant Facebook, Inc., worked in a position that was classified by Facebook as ineligible for overtime pay. Bigger filed suit against Facebook on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees for violating FLSA overtime pay requirements. The trial court authorized the sending of notice of the action to a group of employees proposed by Bigger. Facebook filed a motion objecting to the notice. The trial court denied Facebook’s motion. Facebook filed an interlocutory appeal. HOLDING: Vacated and remanded. REASONING: Facebook argued that sending notice to the whole group would be improper because several of the members of the proposed group had entered into prior arbitration agreements with Facebook. The court accepted Facebook’s argument, holding that, in order to protect the neutrality of the court and not signal that it favors a plaintiff’s case, a court must follow certain steps before giving notice. The court stated that the trial court must first determine if a plaintiff contests the defendant’s assertions about the existence of a valid arbitration agreement entered by proposed notice recipients. The court further stated that, if a plaintiff contests the defendant’s assertions, the parties must be permitted to submit additional evidence on the agreement’s existence and validity. The The terms for Huuuge’s app were not just submerged, — they were “buried twenty thousand leagues under the sea.” and conditions, as well as the content and overall design of the app. The court further explained that such agreements will not be enforced where terms are buried at the bottom of a page or...
Reasoning. Gas welding of piping is no longer a primary job function. In the past twenty years process control systems have migrated to electronic control. Therefore pneumatic systems are no longer in demand. Without a continuous volume of welding work, Tech's do not get OJT or enough practice ofthe craft to maintain proficiency.
Reasoning. The term “debt relief agency” under the Bank- ruptcy Code, applies to attorneys, but only those assisting con- sumer debtors who are contemplating bankruptcy. The Code defines a debt relief agency as any person who provides any bank- ruptcy assistance to an assisted person in return for payment. An assisted person does not include all attorneys who provide bank- ruptcy assistance, but it applies to attorneys who as professionals offer bankruptcy related services to consumer debtors. Milavetz foreclosed this issue. This court went on to repeat what the Supreme Court stated in Milavetz regarding the “in contemplation of” provision of the Code. The Circuit court directed the district court to dis- miss plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to the “in contemplation of” provision of 526(a)(4) that prohibits advising an assisted per- son to incur more debt in contemplation of bankruptcy, because this conduct is abusive per se. This provision refers to a specific type of misconduct and its proscription is not unconstitutionally broad. This kind of conduct is also designed to manipulate the protections of the bankruptcy system. The standard of review for advertising requirements for professionals who offer bankruptcy-related services to consumer debtors is the rational basis test because this reasonably relates to the government’s interests in preventing deception of consumer debtors contemplating bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code has disclosure requirements rather than an affirmative limitation on commercial speech. Commercial speech has only limited protec- tion with regards to First Amendment free speech rights. Commercial speech also is regulated because commer- cial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the market and their products, so they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of their messages. Also, commercial speech is more durable and less central to the interests of the First Amendment. Commercial speech also relates to the economic interest of the speakers and their audience. The Supreme Court in Milavetz determined that the Code’s statutory provisions regulate only commercial speech. The contract requirements of 528(a)(1)-(2) also qualify as com- mercial speech. The disclosure requirement of the Code that pro- vides consumer debtors with basic information about bankruptcy is also commercial speech. The challenged statutes mandate dis- closure, but do not suppress speech; therefore the rational basis test is the appropriate standard of review. T...
Reasoning. Amazon argued that the Children should be compelled to arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which requires a nonsignatory to arbitrate if the personknowingly exploits” the contract with the arbitration clause. Amazon claimed that COURT REFUSES TO ENFORCE ARBITRATION PROVISION WHEN PLAINTIFF CLAIMS HE NEVER VISITED THE WEBSITE Xxxxx v. Apollo Interactive, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___ (M.D. Ga. 2019). xxxxx://xxxxxxxx.xxx/case/xxxxx-v-apollo-interactive-inc FACTS: Plaintiff Xxxxx alleged that Defendant Apollo Interactive, Inc., made automated telemarketing calls to him without his consent, in violation of the Telephone Consumer Amazon argued that the Children should be compelled to arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. the “knowingly exploittest should be broadly interpreted to include individuals who “directly benefit” from the contract. Amazon also argued that under the “intertwined/ close relationship” test, the Children should be compelled to arbitrate their claim. The court rejected Amazon’s argument and agreed with the magistrate judge’s Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss in favor of arbitration, arguing that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate his claims. HOLDING: Motion denied.
Reasoning. The Ad-hoc committee poled many of the Tech's and all thought that the course was redundant due to the amount of math required to pass the ACT and the entry exam. However, It is optional, if a tech wants to take more math the course is available upon request.