Main conclusions. The large decrease in parrotfish biomass between 2015 and 2018 was caused by reductions in both their density and sizes. Although team-specific differences regarding transect depths and fish size discriminations may be contributing factors, fishing pressures have probably increased since 2015, especially along the fringing reef. Herbivores were prominent in a xxxx net observed at the most easterly survey site (PA3B-28) in 2018. Coral recruit density was somewhat reduced in 2018 (4 vs. 10/m2 in 2015). A decrease since 2015 of about half of the PA3B’s live coral cover, especially on the eastern sites, is troubling; some mortality may have followed the bleaching event seen in fall 2015. Newly dead coral tissues seen in the 2018 photos of massive corals in the eastern, fringing reefs may portend an outbreak of stony coral tissue loss disease, which elsewhere is proving very lethal to important species of reef constructors. Sargassum and other tall (~4 cm in 2018), fleshy macroalgae are conspicuous at most fore-reef sites, and attest to the scarcity of key herbivores (Diadema, parrotfishes and surgeonfishes) on the PA3B. Sediment and nutrients in runoff and groundwater may be stimulating the growth of these smothering algae and some cyanobacteria. The health of corals and other reef organisms may also be compromised by any synthetic chemicals (e.g., pesticides, herbicides, pharmaceuticals) or pathogens (e.g., enteric bacteria, viruses) as may be present in the ambient seawater. Local successes at improving habitat and water quality, and in enforcing the new fishing regulations, would enhance the ability of the PA3B reef communities to resist and/or recover from the expected detrimental effects of ongoing climate change. Herbivores caught in a xxxx net on the fringing reef. Left: a terminal phase redband parrotfish; Right: an ocean surgeonfish ~8 m, PA3B-28, F-2018 Diseased corals. Left: Orbicella annularis, ~7 m, PA3B-18; Right: Diploria labyrinthiformis, ~8m, PA3B-28, F-2018 Sargassum and other fleshy macroalgae overgrowing coral spurs and sand channels on the barrier reef, ~5 m, PA3B-19, F-2018 Benthos surveyor on the fringing fore reef, ~5 m, PA3B-11, F-2018
Main conclusions. The objective of this research was to compare two different interface agreements, the Min- max interface agreement and the Lead-time interface agreement. For both interface agree- ments, models were developed and simulated in order to answer the research questions. The generate results input data of the repair group Electric at the repair shop of NedTrain is used. The main conclusions of the research are itemized below. • Research question 1: The performance of the Min-max interface agreement can be improved by changing the parameters of the turn-around stock and the minimum levels. The performance can be improved for all KPIs; EBO, fill rate, minrate and investment costs. There is a parameter setting obtained, which results in an investment costs decrease from €9,119,108.38 to €3,436,193.45, an increase in fill rate from 0.84 to 0.92, an increase in minrate (percentage of the time the repair shop is able to adhere to the interface agreement) from 0.82 to 0.90 and a decrease in EBO from 13 to 2.5. Depending on the preferences, other parameters settings can be obtained using the optimization model developed. The optimization model works well in case of the Min-max interface agreement. • Research question 2: The Min-max mechanism hold more promise for further implementation than the Lead-time interface agreement in case the utilization is higher than 0.86. The Min-max interface agreement, has a better performance with respect to the EBO and fill rate. When the utilization is lower than 0.86, there is no significant difference between the two interface agreements in the EBO and fill rate. In this case the Lead-time interface agreement is better able to adhere to the agreements made. •
Main conclusions. Based on the modelling and simulation work carried out in task 6.6, it can be observed that each of the three evaluated applications from a techno-economic point might be interesting under certain conditions. Off-grid hydrogen may represent benefits compared to competing technologies: ✓ For electrification of isolated site with high seasonality of renewable power is observed; ✓ For gas grid injection when renewable power factor is high and gas grid constraints are limited; ✓ For mobility when renewable power factor is high and low carbon mobility is valued. Main purpose is to analyse literature and other H2 projects to identify what seems most promising based on studies at European levels. Table 1 identifies main public studies that were consulted to contribute to the identification of most promising business cases for off-grid hydrogen. Study Who realizes Information and comments SCB Study (2014) Schlumber ger xxxx://xxx.0xx-xxxx.xxx/feasability/doc-added-4-2014/SBC- Energy-Institute_Hydrogen-based-energy- conversion_Presentation.pdf SBC institute Main outlook: “the value of energy-based hydrogen solutions lies predominantly in their ability to convert renewable power into green chemical energy carriers” The deployment of hydrogen systems requires cost reduction and public support. AT Xxxxxxx study (2015) AT Xxxxxxx Energy transition institute xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx-xxxxxxxxxx- xxxxxxxxx.xxx/Xxxxxxxx/Xxxxxxxx.xxxx idem SBC study, both studies are probably the same although it is not explicitly mentioned. Certifhy study (2015) Hinicio and partners Funded by FCH-JU xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxx.xx/publications-and-deliverables.html Compilation of all the literature and resources that have been reviewed for preparing a market analysis and providing some estimations on the long-term market outlook for green hydrogen. Illustration of how the hydrogen market is segmented today, and which are the main applications and users in the various sectors. Estimation on the potential market for hydrogen and green hydrogen in Europe until 2030. The estimations are based on an analysis of current regulatory frameworks and the suggestions of possible policy-driven scenarios. IEA technology Roadmap Hydrogen and fuel cell IEA KEY POINT: Hydrogen can link different energy sectors and energy T&D networks and thus increase the operational flexibility of future low-carbon energy systems.
Main conclusions. As of today, very few demo projects can be considered real off-grid projects as there have a connection to electric grid. This is because the current status of electrification in off-grid location with hydrogen is facing the challenge of managing the unpredictability and volubility of the renewable sources rather than demonstrating a totally off-grid operation. In other words, it is needed to analyze the electrolyzer behavior and its production ratios whit renewable sources before to be totally isolated. However, it is expected to create replicability with the few real off-grid projects, pushing demonstration facilities all over EU in order to meet the future standards of decarbonization. The only real off grid configurations are for electrification of isolated sites or isolated villages. From the previous analysis of (i) ELY4OFF deliverables, (ii) public literature and (iii) on-going hydrogen demonstration projects, opportunities and most promising business cases for off-grid hydrogen may be identified. The critical elements for opportunities identifications are of different nature: • Off-grid justification: o Real isolated areas 🡪 rural areas, mountains in Europe, developing countries o Grid not sized to absorb and transport renewable power potential • High value Hydrogen market • High value for low carbon content of hydrogen • Limited or poor competition Table 5 identifies selected promising business cases associated to the 4 main market applications. Application Localization Country Renewable source Main Driver 1 Electrification Mountain hut in alps France Solar Seasonal storage Island Denmark Solar Large storage capacity 2 Gas grid injection Transport network Scotland Wind Renewable storage with limited access to grid Distribution network Italy PV Renewable storage with limited access to grid 3 Mobility Green H2 dedicated to mobility Sweden PV Green H2 for mobility / public support Spain PV Green H2 for mobility / public support 4 Industrial Away from other H2 prod France Hydro Low carbon H2 - regulation Isolated area Greece PV No easy access to hydrogen production center Table 5. Business cases identification From this table, it was decided between partners to select 4 business cases to be analysed from RCS barriers point of view using HyLAW web database. (xxxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xx/database). Countries are selected according to the main criteria of the utility of implementing a certain application, in addition to other considerations. The 4 selected busi...
Main conclusions. The main conclusions from this chapter about the multilateral climate change negotiation process are: • The United Nations has set up a negotiation process that has led climate change discussions to many parts of the world. Starting with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol has set for the first time binding emission reduction obligations for industrialised countries and economies in transition. 49 Xxxxx, Xxxxx xxx, From Kyoto to Copenhagen – Towards an International Climate Change Regime beyond 2012 pp. 199- Xxxxxxxx, X. (ed.) (2008) The Climate Change Challenge – International, European and Belgian Aspects. Studia Diplomatica Vol LXI, 2008, nr 1 50Summary of the Hokkaido Toyako summit, July, 9, 2008, xxxx://xxx.x0xxxxxx.xx.xx/eng/news/summary.html 51 ibid. 52 US Department of State, Major Economies Process on Energy Security and Climate Change, xxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xxx/g/oes/climate/mem/ 53 Xxxxx, Xxxxx xxx, From Kyoto to Copenhagen – Towards an International Climate Change Regime beyond 2012 pp. 199- Xxxxxxxx, X. (ed.) (2008) The Climate Change Challenge – International, European and Belgian Aspects. Studia Diplomatica Vol LXI, 2008, nr 1 54 Asia Pacific Partnership website, xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxx/ • Although many industrialised countries are presently struggling to meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, it has become clear that global emission reductions for the future would require even further action from these countries, as well as from developing countries. • In December 2009 parties will meet in a Copenhagen Climate Change Conference to agree about such emission reductions for the future after the end of the Kyoto commitment period in 2012. As a result of the United States opt-out to the Kyoto Protocol, the discussions so far have taken place under three tracks: A “Convention Track” including the United States, a “Protocol Track” including only parties to the Kyoto Protocol, and a third track outside the United Nations context in which the United States again play an important role. In the run-up to the Copenhagen conference, a series of meetings under the first two tracks will be organised. • The three discussion tracks address a large array of topics, including long-term commitments, intermediary targets, carbon markets and ‘flexible mechanisms’, forestry and land-use change, technology transfer, mitigation, adaptation, finance. Many technical issues sti...
Main conclusions findings and limitations In chapter one, I explained my interest in a view of African identities as actually experienced and built by Africans – not as constructs that have been engineered by the various state-building and nation-building initiatives. This means that I am interested in looking at culture. I aligned myself with the vision of Xxxx, who sees language as a central element of culture. I criticized the over-confidence in social engineering and its possibilities of ‘nation-building’ in Africa (or elsewhere). I took issue with the tendency by Marxists to downplay the importance of culture. I mentioned the tendency of scientists to fall into the trap of taking one of two pre-scientific myths as their starting point: the ‘Africa as a country’ and the ‘Tower of Babel’ myths, either describing Africa as a cultural whole or, on the other hand, as infinitely fragmented. I criticized both myths for being disempowering, obscuring an appreciation and understanding of the different African cultural identities that form part of the full spectrum of human cultural identities. I then turned to Xxxxxxx, who predicted the emergence of neo-African traditions, carried by African languages. I again pointed to Xxxx, who has drawn attention to the central role of education in African 214 Language, Education and Identity in Africa languages for African development. These insights combined led to my three main research questions, formulated in chapter two: • How can we describe large-scale cultural differences and similarities in Africa? • Why are African languages not being used more in higher education? • What possibilities are there for rational language in education policies? In terms of method, I restricted myself to using methods and approaches that have already been used in other continents as well and to using data that are in the public domain and based on African self- representations. My interest is in documenting long-term trends and showing Africa in its dynamism and diversity. The starting point of my research on culture was the definition of a culture as a value system that serves as common point of reference to a people. This definition is at the group level – not at the individual level. It accepts that within any cultural whole, there is a large amount of diversity. The key element is that individuals who know or consider themselves to be part of a specific culture know its values, even though they may not themselves subscribe to them on a personal le...
Main conclusions. Main conclusions from this chapter outlining the steel sector are: • Nine countries and regions dominate the world steel markets. These are China, Russia, Ukraine, the EU-27, the United States, Japan, Brazil and South Korea. China is by far the largest steel producer, with 36% of world production in 2007 and a five fold increase of production in recent years. The EU-27 covers nearly 16% of world steel production and is as a region world’s second largest producer. • Steel is traded globally, although most steel trade takes place within geographical regions. This also holds for the European Union. However, 22% of EU imports and 24% of EU exports were extra-regional in 2006, thus signalling a significant influence of external trade on the position of the EU steel sector37. 32 Speech by Xxxxxxxx Xxxxx - CEO of Corus Group and Chairman of the World Steel Association Climate Change Policy Group - at the 2008 annual conference of the World Steel Association in Washington DC., 5-7 October 2008, xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/index.php?action=storypages&id=306 33 Eurofer Annual Report 2007, xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxx.xxx/index.php/eng/News-Publications/Annual-Report/2007-Annual- Report 34 Corus Group website, xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/en/responsibility/climate_change/strategy/ 35 Corus Netherlands website, xxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xx/Issues/CO2%20Emissiehandel 36 Corus Corporate Responsibility Report 2007/08, xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/file_source/StaticFiles/Functions/HSE/CorusCRR0708.pdf 37 World Steel Association, World steel in figures 2008, second edition, 2008, xxxx://xxx.xxxxxxxxxx.xxx/?action=programs&id=64
Main conclusions. The European steel industry together with other energy- and carbon-intensive industries is presently engaged in a fierce debate with the European institutions about ‘carbon leakage’. In this debate about the proposed EU climate measures and the competitiveness of European industry several issues are discussed, with most attention paid to the extent to which industries qualify and to what extent for the free allocation of emission rights after 2012. In December 2008, European Council and Parliament reached an agreement on this issue, stating that in sectors exposed to carbon leakage 100% of allowances will be allocated free of charge “at the level of the benchmark of the best available technology”. It was also decided that the list of exposed sectors shall be determined after taking into account the extent to which third countries also engage in climate measures “to an extent comparable to that of the EU” and “the extent to which carbon efficiency of installations located in these countries is comparable to that of the EU”. On 31 December 2009 the latest it will be decided what sectors are supposed to be exposed to carbon leakage and on 30 June 2010 the latest the Commission will hand it a report reviewing the proposed measures in the light of the outcomes of the December 2009 Kopenhagen negotiations.
Main conclusions. 1. Resource efficiency innovations can be incremental, radical or systemic. They can be technological and social or a combination thereof. They can disrupt or sustain value chains and user practices.
Main conclusions. D4.3 is a revised version of the document in response to the Xxxxxx0X.xxx 2nd Interim Review (July 2019). Specifically, it sets out to make the section on the outputs and collaborations more concise with dedicated sections only on the new Mapping Tool (available in mid-June) and Performance KPI tracker. It also includes detailed sections on the KPIs and qualitative metrics, as well as examples of the impacts from the SMART campaigns. These campaigns are now a regular feature of the strategy for broadcasting outputs and key findings. D4.3 also includes the plans for the final six months of the project. Impacts from the action plan will be reported in D4.5 (December 2019) along with a sustainability plan for the online tools and collaborations.
