The EU Sample Clauses
The clause titled "[The EU]" typically serves to define the European Union as a relevant entity within the context of the agreement. It may specify how references to the EU are to be interpreted, such as including all current and future member states, or clarifying the scope of obligations or rights that pertain to the EU as a whole. This ensures that all parties have a clear and consistent understanding of what is meant by "the EU" throughout the contract, thereby preventing ambiguity and potential disputes regarding the application of the agreement to EU-related matters.
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The EU. On 1 May 2004, the new EU Regulation on Technology Transfer Agreements en- tered into force.96 This Regulation is the result of the EU’s overhauling and “mod- ernizing” its entire enforcement system as well as reconsidering its policies vis- a`-vis horizontal and vertical cooperation, and, in particular, its policy vis-a`-vis licensing agreements.97 By a “more economic approach” the Regulation clearly 91 See ▇▇▇, Newberg, U.S. Enforcement Approaches to the Antitrust-Intellectual Property Interface, in Anderson, Gallini, at 343, 347 et seq. 92 See Section 5.2. 93 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises – Revision 2000–, Paris 2000, at 26 (text), 53 et seq. (commentary). 94 For the various approaches within the WTO see ▇▇▇▇▇, Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Issues and Challenges, in Za¨ ch, 3, 25 et seq.; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Competition-oriented Reforms of the WTO World Trade System – Proposals and Policy Options, ibid. at 43 et seq. 95 See WTO, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council of December 8, 1998 (WT/WGTCP/2); WTO, Annual Report 1997, 72; Heinemann, Problems of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy – The Approach of the WTO Working Group on Trade and Competition, in Za¨ ch, at 299 et seq. 96 See Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 2004 L 123/11. See also above, under Section 3 of this Chapter. 97 See European Commission, Commission Evaluation Report of 20.12.2001 on the Transfer of Technology Block Exemption Regulation No. 240/96 (Technology Transfer Agreements under Article 81) (COM(2001) 786 final). See <▇▇▇▇://▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇.▇▇▇/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2001/com2001 0786en01.pdf>. distinguishes between licensing agreements concluded between competitors and those between non-competitors. A broadly defined (automatic) block exemption is granted, for competing undertakings, where the combined market share of the un- dertakings party to an agreement does not exceed 20% of the affected relevant tech- nology and product market. For non-competing undertakings, the automatic block exemption is granted where the market share of each of the parties to the agree- ment does not exceed 30% of the affected relevant technology and product mar- ket.98 Above these market shares even horizontal agreements would still benefit from a broad rule of reason analysis of each individual case,99 the more economic approach being oriented toward an efficiency test similar to that appl...
The EU. Civilian Operations Commander shall assume responsibility for and exercise command and control of EUAM Ukraine at strategic level.
The EU. The distribution of competences across the EU and its Member States was, as we alluded to supra, uncertain at the moment the Uruguay Round was launched. It was clarified at the end of the round, when the EU jointly requested an opinion from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on this matter. Although sitting in the driver’s seat, and act- ing as if it was fully competent, throughout the round the EU agent, the Commission, was on a tight leash: its negotiating positions were not only ex ante decided but also ex post scrutinized by the EU Member States. De facto, however, this does not seem to have been a major impediment.92 Moreover, a positive external effect stemmed from the intra-EU distribution of competences: the common agent, the Commission, had to report back to 12 Member States with divergent interests. The EU kept very compre- hensive and detailed records of each and every discussion, participated in practically all meetings, and emerged as a key player in the negotiations.
The EU. In summary, the EU’s case is that the safeguard measure is not in compliance with the EPA. This case is predicated upon five claims, divided into seven distinct arguments, as follows:
The EU. At the outset, the EU contended that SACU has failed to identify a legal basis for its request that the Arbitration Panel rule as a preliminary matter on the objections,185 and concluded that this request was therefore inadmissible.186 100. In any event, according to the EU, no such legal basis exists: the EU pointed to Article 82(2) EPA, which allows arbitration panels to issue a preliminary ruling “[i]n cases of urgency”, and contends that this is no such case.187 The EU further disputed that ▇▇▇▇’s request could be granted by way of a procedural ruling, which the Arbitration Panel may issue in line with Articles 5, 7(5), and 7(6) of the Rules of Procedure.188 101. Turning to the merits of the preliminary objections, the EU argued that they stem from a “fundamental misunderstanding”,189 i.e., a confusion between the “measure at issue”, and the claims arising from that measure.190 For the EU, ITAC’s investigation and the safeguard duty are “two parts (or elements) of the same” measure (namely, the bilateral safeguard measure).191 The EU next contended that ITAC’s investigation was mentioned several times in its REP, and was “extensively discussed” during the consultations with SACU.192
The EU. EOM and its members shall uphold the principles of impartiality, objectivity and strict independence in carrying out the EU/EOM mandate. EU/EOM observers shall respect the 1998 Code of Conduct for European Union Election Observers. The EU/EOM shall be guided by the principles adopted in the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers.
The EU. (a) the European Commission having adopted and formally notified the Distributor of (or having been deemed to have adopted) all decisions and approvals necessary pursuant to the EU Merger Regulation to allow completion of the Proposed Transaction;
(b) and if the Proposed Transaction has been referred back (or deemed to have been referred back) in part to the Competition Authority of any Country under Article 4(4) or Article 9 of the EU Merger Regulation, the European Commission having adopted the decision or decisions referred to in either Paragraphs (i) or (ii) above in respect of any and all parts of the Proposed Transaction not so referred to a Competition Authority of any Country; and
(c) to the extent that the European Commission refers (or is deemed to have referred) the Proposed Transaction in whole or in part to any such Competition Authority under Article 4(4) or Article 9 of the EU Merger Regulation:
The EU. Angola Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (SIFA) (adopted 17 Novembre 2023, entered into force 1 September 2024) • It is the first IIA concluded by the EU with an African country, and the first explicitly framed as a “sustainable investment facilitation agreement.” • The EU-Angola SIFA also fits within the EU’s broader strategy to promote sustainable investment, diversify value chains, and advance trade in sustainable goods, particularly in support of the green and energy transition. • Following the CJEU’s Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore FTA, by focusing exclusively on investment facilitation, the EU-Angola SIFA allows the EU to bypass Member States’ ratification hurdles and operate entirely within the scope of its exclusive competence under the common commercial policy.
The EU. Civilian Operation Commander shall assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the EU civilian crisis management operation at strategic level.