Emphasis added. [89] It is evident that at the time payment was made to LCaribbean GOSL was fully seized of the assignment of the receivables payable from the Project and such these receivables could only have been categorized as a payable to KCL. [90] In First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R the question for the court was whether a factor was entitled to recover monies paid to the Minister of National Revenue from receivables which were purchased prior to the Minister issuing a request for statutory garnishment, in connection with these receivables. The court ruled that monies owing on accounts factored prior to the date of the request for garnishment were not subject to the garnishment, however accounts factored after that date were effectively intercepted by it. In other words once the receivables were factored before the Minister issued a request to garnish, the National Revenue was prevented from asserting an interest in these invoices. Consequently, a declaration was made confirming the factor’s entitlement to the funds already paid to the Minister. [91] On this point I conclude that the funds paid to LCaribbean were indeed the property of KCL, which ought not to have been utilized as if it were the property of AMSL. Therefore GOSL is liable to pay to KCL the remaining sums under the Notices.
Emphasis added. The Court has found that the Brusers violated the CCD by not paying the Trustee Fee as determined by the state court. Under the CCD, therefore, BOH, as Lessor, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.10 BOH may also be entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest. “The general rule is that ‘[i]n diversity actions, state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest is governed by 10 Given the 7/21/15 Order and the Stipulation, the instant decision addresses a claim brought only by BOH. To the extent that any other parties to this action believe that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, each must file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Rule 54.3 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). federal law.’” Xxx x. Adalian, Civil No. 09-00226 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 477268, at *7 n.7 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 5, 2015) (alteration in Jou) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Court, however, need not address these issues, or the specific amount of attorneys’ fees, until BOH files the appropriate motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3. Likewise, the Court need not address any taxable costs unless and until BOH files the appropriate motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54.2.
Emphasis added. It is the parties’ joint understanding that the words “separate from” and “not related in any way to” in the two clauses italicized above mean “separate from and not physically related to.”
Emphasis added. 19.3. It saves costs to make one amendment to the pleadings than several if the findings of the JCPC requires it;
Emphasis added books make a more explicitly anti-economic and civic-minded argument. In Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxx challenges the notion that higher learning can best be understood in terms of technical job training and the growth of national economies. Xxxxxxxx sees higher learning as a form of “human development,” a creative pursuit that must be protected on its own terms. “From early on,” Xxxxxxxx writes, “leading U.S. educators connected the liberal arts to the preparation of informed, independent, and sympathetic democratic citizens. The liberal arts model is still relatively strong, but it is under severe stress now in this time of economic hardship.”46 In Not For Profit Xxxxxxxx highlights “another aspect of the U.S. educational tradition that stubbornly refuses assimilation into the [economic] growth-directed model.” The tradition of “active learning,” which implies “participation of the child in inquiry and questioning,” according to Xxxxxxxx, refuses to conceive education solely in terms of markets and money. Active learning is part of “a long Western philosophical tradition of education theory, ranging from Xxxx-Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx in the eighteenth century to Xxxx Xxxxx in the twentieth.” The tradition of active learning “includes such eminent educators as Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxx in Germany, Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx in Switzerland, Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx in the United States, and Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx in Italy.” The Concord writers approach to education comes out of the same philosophical context. Xxxxxxxx does not mention Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxx, but she does discuss Xxxxxx’x innovations at the Temple School, and Xxxxxxxxxx — though Xxxxxxxx does not make the connection — deeply influenced the thinking of both Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx. Active learning
Emphasis added. 10 – As compared to the former Article 133 EC (post Nice), Article 207 TFEU differs by specifically including ‘the commercial aspects of intellectual property’ among the subject-matters in respect of which ‘[t]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles’, whereas Article 133(5) EC, simply provided that Paragraphs 1 to 4 were also to apply ‘to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements [we] re not covered by the said paragraphs’, the first of which required that the common commercial policy was to be based on uniform principles. Article 113 EC therefore already covered, in that field and as a matter of principle, the external dimension of the commercial aspects of intellectual property. Article 207 TFEU simply includes them in a direct and comprehensive manner, beyond the mere external dimension. In line with this, Advocate General Xxxxxx considered, in point 63 of her Opinion in Case C-13/07 Commission v Council, that pursuant to Article 133(5) EC the Community had not acquired ‘exclusive competence … in the field of trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property’, but rather that ‘that step [was] completed only in the Treaty of Lisbon: Article 207(1) TFEU henceforward expressly places the “new” fields of commercial policy on the same footing as the conventional fields, and the common commercial policy as a whole is expressly assigned to the exclusive competence of the Union (Article 3(1)(e) TFEU)’. This does not mean, however, that Article 207 TFEU has conferred on the European Union exclusive competence for intellectual property law. 11 –See, inter xxxx, Xxxxxxxx, P, EU External Relations Law, cited above, p. 285; Xxxxxxxxxx, A., ‘The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between internal and external economic relations?’, in Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, vol. 4 (2008), pp. 108 and 109; Xxxx, M., ‘Art. 207’, in: Xxxxxxx, C and Xxxxxxx, M., EUV/AEUV, 4th ed., X. X. Xxxx, Munich, 2011, marginal note 2 and 16. 12 – Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267.
Emphasis added. In summary, the terms of reciprocal compensation only apply to intra-MTA traffic and not to inter-MTA traffic. Paragraph 1034 of the FCC’s August 8 Order concludes that “reciprocal compensation provisions of section 251(b)(5) for transport and termination of traffic do not apply to the transport and termination of interstate or intrastate interexchange traffic.” Inter-MTA traffic is not local service area traffic. Inter- MTA traffic is interexchange traffic subject to charges under the framework of “access.” Your concession about the lack of clarity arises because the terms and conditions of CMRS-LEC interconnection with Bell companies, about which CMRS providers are most familiar, have masked these issues. Bell companies are toll providers (i.e., intraLATA interexchange carriers) and have obtained terms and conditions with CMRS providers under which the Bell company terminates its toll traffic to the CMRS provider at reciprocal compensation rates. The Bell companies have apparently been willing to disregard the inter-MTA issue in return for this approach to termination of toll traffic. The “compromise” is advantageous to the Bell company for purposes of termination of toll calls. However, this “compromise” is not applicable to Duo County. No changes to Section 1.15 are warranted because the terms and conditions are consistent with the controlling rules and requirements.
Emphasis added. 5. Two specific provisions concern the position of Member States. On the one hand, pursuant to point 15, "the register does not apply to Member States' government services, third countries' governments, international intergovernmental organisations and their diplomatic missions". On the other hand, pursuant to point 19, "the activities to be taken into account for assessing eligibility to register are those aimed (directly or indirectly) at all EU institutions, agencies and bodies, and their Members and their assistants, officials and other staff. Such activities do not include activities directed at Member States, in particular those directed at their permanent representations to the European Union."
Emphasis added. Part of the problem of incorporating recipient perspectives into studies of security cooperation is that, unlike governments in supplier states, which issue public policy documents regarding how they will pursue military aid, the arms import policies of recipient states are not as widely available outside of their boundaries. Thus, although defence dependence theorists provide a good starting point for understanding a recipient’s demand for foreign military aid, hey do not properly incorporate empirical evidence of recipient policies on arms imports. As Phebe Marr points out, “although there is undeniable truth in dependency analysis, it has limitations [and] must be modified to take account of [the recipient’s] national leadership, the ability to use and mobilise existing resources, and skill in negotiating with outside forces, all of which can mitigate dependency.”162 162 Marr, “Iraqi Foreign Policy,” in Brown (editor), Diplomacy in the Middle East, 181. CHAPTER THREE: THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
Emphasis added. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the effect of rejection is defined by reference to the breach status. As explained in Xxxxxxxxx, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 244 (1989), [T]he trustee inherits from the pre-bankruptcy debtor a contract created by nonbankruptcy law. The statutory option to "assume or reject" means exactly what the Code says it means: the option to perform or breach the contract, the same option every contract party has under nonbankruptcy law. It follows that the trustee is prima facie in the same position as any nonbankruptcy contract party, except when specific bankruptcy principles and rules require a different result. Thus, a breach of contract does not automatically result in the contract's termination.6 Instead, the contract remains 6 The trustee contends that under Sea Harvest v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1o77, 1o8o (9th Cir. 1989), the effect of re¡ection is always termination. In Sea Harvest, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the re¡ection of a lease of nonresidential real property under § 365 was the same as termination of the lease. In support of its ruling, the Sea Harvest court noted that § 365(d)(4) required that upon re¡ection, the trustee immediately surrender the leased premises. The court stated that "surrender of property ... has the effect of terminating the enterprise that operates there." There is no analogous surrender provision in § 365 regarding contracts, and Sea Harvest is distinguishable on that basis. I believe Sea Harvest should be narrowly construed. A broad reading would be inconsistent with the express language of the Code defining the effect of re¡ection as a breach, as well as state law defining the consequences of a breach. The trustee argues that the final clause of § 365(d) is not intended to treat leases differently from contracts, but merely makes explicit that termination of a lease requires surrender of the premises. He reasons that three subsections of § 365 [(h), (i) and (n)] give the non-debtor party certain options which are inconsistent with termination, and therefore concludes that in all other cases the effect of re¡ection is termination. I disagree regarding the inference that should be drawn from the inclusion of those subsections. I believe that the subsections referred to by the trustee are intended as exceptions to the rule that state law defines the effect of a breach. The exceptions are intended to assure that the no...
