Emphasis added Sample Clauses

Emphasis added. [89] It is evident that at the time payment was made to LCaribbean GOSL was fully seized of the assignment of the receivables payable from the Project and such these receivables could only have been categorized as a payable to KCL. [90] In First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R the question for the court was whether a factor was entitled to recover monies paid to the Minister of National Revenue from receivables which were purchased prior to the Minister issuing a request for statutory garnishment, in connection with these receivables. The court ruled that monies owing on accounts factored prior to the date of the request for garnishment were not subject to the garnishment, however accounts factored after that date were effectively intercepted by it. In other words once the receivables were factored before the Minister issued a request to garnish, the National Revenue was prevented from asserting an interest in these invoices. Consequently, a declaration was made confirming the factor’s entitlement to the funds already paid to the Minister. [91] On this point I conclude that the funds paid to LCaribbean were indeed the property of KCL, which ought not to have been utilized as if it were the property of AMSL. Therefore GOSL is liable to pay to KCL the remaining sums under the Notices.

Emphasis added. The SME notes that the three aforementioned BSS documents contain helpful information, consistent with the Agreement, to increase BSS workers’ awareness of the shift from residential, and how to access the HCBS to support that redirection. The SME notes one error in the Pathway to Children’s Mental Health document, specific to CMCR in the sub header 3.2 Children’s Crisis and Referral Line and Mobile Mental Health Crisis:

Emphasis added. The Court has found that the Brusers violated the CCD by not paying the Trustee Fee as determined by the state court. Under the CCD, therefore, BOH, as Lessor, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.10 BOH may also be entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest. “The general rule is that ‘[i]n diversity actions, state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest is governed by 10 Given the 7/21/15 Order and the Stipulation, the instant decision addresses a claim brought only by BOH. To the extent that any other parties to this action believe that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, each must file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Rule 54.3 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). federal law.’” Xxx x. Adalian, Civil No. 09-00226 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 477268, at *7 n.7 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 5, 2015) (alteration in Jou) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Court, however, need not address these issues, or the specific amount of attorneys’ fees, until BOH files the appropriate motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3. Likewise, the Court need not address any taxable costs unless and until BOH files the appropriate motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54.2.

Emphasis added. The contract documents affirmatively indicate that shore protection structures consisting of rubble and riprap would be present near the Oxy-Chemical Dock. By employing the very dredging practice that the Specifications advised against—“[e]xcessive[ly] cutting outside the side slope lines and grades,” JX 2 (Specs) at 118, ¶ 3.5.2—plaintiff did not act as a reasonably prudent contractor. Further, when preparing the bid estimate for the Upper Bayou Project, Xx. Xxxxxx anticipated that the Millennium would encounter “rock, . . . ri[p]ra[p] from shore protection projects,” and other “common types” of obstructions. JX 98A (Xxxxxx Dep.), at 222:22–24. Thus, the conditions encountered by the dredge at the Oxy-Chemical Dock, were not reasonably unforeseeable. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish that the conditions at the Oxy-Chemical Dock constitute a differing site condition.

Emphasis added. 95 Ibid., 15. An additional philosophical conundrum arises from Xxxxxxxx’x distinction between truth and effectiveness. Even as Xxxxxxxx himself is considered one of the twelve “most effective” preachers in the English-speaking world, he insists that he has no concern for listener response. He writes, “Next Sunday, if once again my congregation appears to be unmoved and unimpressed by my homiletical efforts, I intend to ascribe their lack of response to God! Our job as preachers is to stand up and speak the truth as God gives it to us; congregational response is God’s business.”96 Such a statement, even if hyperbolic, proceeds upon the a priori decision to separate truth from effectiveness. Might not an ineffective sermon point just as clearly to truth as falsehood? Compare Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxx preaching during the 1st Great Awakening with the “Word of Faith” prosperity preaching; both are effective by their own standards. Rather than drawing proclamation closer to theology (the Word of God preached is the Word of God), binary commitments unintentionally enforce the very same anthropology that Xxxxxxxx wishes to overcome. He writes, “We preachers are to worry more about what is being said and how well we can replicate that word than we are to worry about whether or not what is being said in the Gospel is being heard in the world.”97 Whatever the cause of our worry, is not such an effort a human effort? Would it not be more theological to bear witness to God’s Word in the biblical text and in the world, to preach God’s Word and trust God to communicate the truth to be found therein as well as any human response? Neither truth nor effectiveness ought to guide preaching because neither is within the confines of human agency.

Emphasis added. It is the parties’ joint understanding that the words “separate from” and “not related in any way to” in the two clauses italicized above mean “separate from and not physically related to.” 2. Paragraph 2.7 of the Settlement Agreement defines the term “Claim” to include a claim for “contribution” or “indemnity.” Such a Claim is released only to the extent that it is within the definition of “Release” or “Released Claims” in Paragraph 12.1 of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, a Claim for contribution or indemnity that relates to matters that are excluded from the definition of Release or Released Claims (e.g., a Claim that falls within the exceptions in Paragraph 12.1.2 of the Settlement Agreement) is not released. 3. Paragraph 2.55(c) of the Settlement Agreement defines the term “Releasing Parties” to include, among others, “any past, present, or future administrators, agents, attorneys,

Emphasis added. That demand is acceded to by point 3 of Section C. The period allowed for the transmission of reasoned opinions is increased, in this instance, from the eight weeks provided for by Article 6 of Protocol (No 2) to 12 weeks. Under the procedure, where reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a draft legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represent more than 55 per cent of the votes allocated to national Parliaments,6 the item will be included on the Council agenda for a comprehensive discussion; following which “the representatives of the Member States acting in their capacity as members of the Council will discontinue their consideration of the draft legislative act in question unless the draft is amended to accommodate the concerns expressed in the reasoned opinions”. The implementation technique, therefore, entails a Council conduct agreement: the members of the Council would, in the prescribed circumstances, discontinue discussion of the proposal and refrain from voting on it. The envisaged obligation appears to me to be fully compatible with EU law, and hence legally binding, since there is nothing in the Treaties that requires the Council to proceed to the adoption of a given proposal, supposing that the requisite majority is available. In my opinion, it is arguable that once the HSG Decision is in force, the adoption of a legislative measure in defiance of the red card procedure will constitute an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, and hence grounds for the annulment of the measure under Article 263 TFEU.

Emphasis added. Xx. Xxxx’x final report dated December 31, 1999

Emphasis added. See also J.

Emphasis added. Several years after the original ruling, and an appeal to the District Court which was referred back to the Jerusalem Circuit Court, the eight- year legal battle ended in a compromise agreement that the state would pay one-third of the sum due and the other two defendants, the Tsomet party and Minister Eitan, the balance. In addition all defendants agreed to bear an equal share of the legal costs. Ha’aretz, 8.10.1998.