EDITORIAL NOTE. On January 23, 1970, the NSC Review Group met to discuss a pa- per drafted by the NSC staff on X.X. xxxxxx toward Europe. The paper, intended as the basis for further discussion by the NSC on January 28, was divided into two parts, the first on alternative structures and the second on specific policy issues, including the recent emergence of Ost- politik as an important factor in European affairs. The section on Ger- many began as follows: “German issues are, of course, the basic East-West problems in Eu- rope, and thus closely linked to European security, including negoti- ated force reductions. The Eastern policy (Ostpolitik) which the new Xxxxxx government apparently intends to pursue could introduce a po- tentially troublesome and disruptive element in East-West relations and within the Alliance. Bonn apparently intends to put primary emphasis on direct and parallel negotiations with the USSR, East Germany and Poland on a wide range of issues. Provided the USSR, after consider- ing East German interests, continues to encourage these efforts, Bonn may become less inclined to defer to Western interests and views. This could lead to some disagreement and discord between West Germany on the one hand and its allies, particularly the US and France, on the other. “As it applies to East Germany the new Ostpolitik assumes that the cumulative effect of agreements on functional problems will lower the barrier to increased contacts. In these efforts, however, Bonn may agree to most East German demands short of de jure recognition. “Thus, certain specific problems will arise in terms of our own interests: —the four power responsibility we bear for a final German set- tlement may gradually be subsumed in German negotiations with Moscow and East Germany; —the special responsibilities we bear in Berlin may become com- plicated by the upgrading of East German sovereignty, or by the in- troduction of the Berlin question in all-German negotiations; —our ability to influence and control the evolution of a German settlement may decline or come into conflict with Bonn; —the US could be caught in a position between Bonn and Paris, if German Ostpolitik seems to be dictating the overall Western ap- proach to the USSR. “A final consideration is the fact that the internal power base of the Xxxxxx government is by no means secure. Each step of the way in developing a new Eastern policy the government will face major op- position. Thus, we could find ourselves confronted with choo...
EDITORIAL NOTE. On February 23, 1970, French President Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx arrived in the United States for 1 week of high-level consultations, including discussion with President Xxxxx, on matters relating to Germany and Berlin. The morning of his arrival, the National Security Council met to consider the role of France in the “Post-De Gaulle” era. The formal minutes of the meeting record the following conversation on the French attitude toward Germany: “R[ichard] N[ixon]—I would like to hear some comment on French/ German relations. “[Xxxxxx] Xxxxxxxxxxx—There is a growing resentment of Ger- many, especially among the Gaullists. There is a fear of German ex- pansionism. There is more and more thinking of the UK as a counter- weight in the Common Market. There is also concern over Germany’s Eastern policy. The French see that the Germans have more to offer than they do. “The French are worried that the Socialists will be led down the gar- den path by the Russians. They basically resent the German socialists. “[Xxxxx] Xxxxxxxxx—I agree. The more actively the Germans go to- xxxx the East, the more the French will countermove. The French are also worried about our Berlin overtures. This could lead to the French moving closer to the UK, and even to France/UK nuclear collaboration. “[Xxxxxx] Xxxxxxx—Could this also move them more toward the United States? “Xxxxxxxxxxx—I don’t think so. There is a growing acceptance of the removal of the U.S. They are hedging their bets and they foresee a weakened NATO.” (National Security Council, Minutes Files, Box 119, NSC Minutes, 1970 Originals) Xxxxxxxxx also raised the German question in a meeting with Pom- pidou on February 21 in Paris where Xxxxxxxxx was conducting secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese. According to the memoran- dum of conversation, Pompidou stated his belief that “Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxx was sincere and that he dominated the Government by his per- sonality. He did not believe that Xxxxxx would ever betray the West.” (National Archives, Xxxxx Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1024, Presidential/HAK Memcons, The President and President Pompidou (Paris), 12 November 1970 [1 of 2]) In a briefing memorandum for the President’s meeting with Pompidou, Xxxxxxxxx doubted, however, that such confidence extended to Xxxxxx’x policy: “The French are concerned that Xxxxxx may be moving too fast in his Eastern policy (to some extent they resent that the Soviets now find the Germans more interesting to talk to than the French); ...
EDITORIAL NOTE. On February 10, 1970, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Xxxxxxx met Ambassador Xxxx in Moscow to deliver the Soviet response to the Western proposal of December 16 for talks on Berlin. (Telegram 715 from Moscow, February 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) The text of the Soviet aide-mémoire, Febru- ary 10, reads: “The Government of the USSR has acquainted itself with the United States Government aide-mémoire, which was the answer to its (Soviet) statement of September 12, 1969. It confirms the readiness ex- pressed in this statement for an exchange of views for the purpose of improving the situation in West Berlin and of eliminating frictions in this region. The Soviet Government is also guided by the fact that it is necessary to approach this question in the context of the tasks of nor- malizing the situation and of ensuring security in Europe. “Bearing in mind the purpose of the exchange of opinions, as it is formulated by the parties, the Soviet Government considers it impor- tant, first of all, to reach agreement on excluding activity incompatible with the international situation of West Berlin, which was and remains a source of tension existing here. In the conditions of the continuing occupation of West Berlin and the absence of other joint settlements, only the Potsdam and other quadripartite agreements and decisions can be the basis in principle during an examination, in particular, of practical questions regarding this city. It is self-evident, moreover, that questions of the communications of West Berlin and of access to it can- not be settled in isolation from the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic within which West Berlin is situated and whose lines of communications it uses for its external ties. “Corresponding to the subject of an exchange of views, the Soviet Government would agree that meetings of the representatives of the Four Powers should take place in West Berlin in the former Control Council Building. It appoints as its representative for conducting ne- gotiations P.A. Abrasimov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipo- tentiary, who will be ready to enter into contact with the U.S. Repre- sentative empowered to do so, beginning in the second half of February 1970. Organizational and technical questions could be clarified through the usual channels.” (Attached to memorandum from Xxxxxxxxxx to Xxxxx, February 13; ibid., POL 38–6) In a February 13 memorandum to the Presi...
EDITORIAL NOTE. On March 19, 1970, West German Chancellor Xxxxx Xxxxxx and East German Premier Xxxxx Xxxxx met in Erfurt (East Germany) to dis- cuss the status of inner-German relations. The discussion was incon- clusive, leading only to agreement on holding a second meeting in Kas- sel (West Germany) on May 21. The significance of the meeting, the first between leaders of the two countries, was reflected rather in the tumultuous response Xxxxxx received from the East German citizenry, who first chanted “Willy” and then “Xxxxx Xxxxxx” to differentiate him from “Xxxxx,” his East German counterpart. The next morning, President Xxxxx read a staff report on U.S. television coverage the previous evening and underlined the passage: “All networks had footage from
EDITORIAL NOTE. The Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice of waiver regarding the requirements set forth in part 46, relating to protection of human subjects, as they pertain to dem- onstration projects, approved under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, which test the use of cost—sharing, such as deductibles, copayment and coinsurance, in the Medicaid program. For further information see 47 FR 9208, Mar. 4, 1982. Subpart A—Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects SOURCE: 82 FR 7259, 7273, Jan. 19, 2017, un- less otherwise noted.
EDITORIAL NOTE. The Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, adopted on 30 June 1982, on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure is reproduced on p. 865 of Volume I.
EDITORIAL NOTE. Text of the heading as supplemented by the Single Article of the Council Decision of 21 February 1983 adding a number of products to the list in Annex I to the ECSC Treaty (OJ L 56, 3.3.1983).
EDITORIAL NOTE. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 3 of the SEA, and for historical reasons, the term 'Assembly' has not been replaced by the terms 'European Parliament'.
EDITORIAL NOTE. The reader will find below a complete amended version of the Treaty establishing the European Community as it results from Title IV of the TEU: Provisions amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [Article I(1) to (29)].
EDITORIAL NOTE. The College has a zero tolerance policy for failing to maintain professional boundaries and/or committing acts constituting sexual abuse as defined in the Health Professions Procedural Code. Whether or not complaints of sexual abuse are referred to the police, the College will take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that members who engage in this kind of behavior will be subject to lengthy suspensions; required to repay the College’s investigative, administrative and legal costs; pay for the costs of therapy or counseling for victims of sexual abuse; and, in appropriate cases, will have their Certificates of Registration revoked.
