FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. Dun-Ridge Subdivision No. 1 {¶4} The Dun-Ridge Subdivision No. 1 (Dun-Ridge) is located in Harlem Township, Delaware County, Ohio. Ridgeview Drive is a private road recorded as such with the Delaware County Recorder and situated within Dun-Ridge. Lot owners within Dun-Ridge are obligated to maintain and repair the private roadway at their own cost and expense. Dun-Ridge is composed of four total lots. White and Xxxxxx own Lot No. 226, the Lewises own Lot No. 225, appellant owns Lot No. 227 and Xxxxxxx, Trustee owns Lot No. 228. The original deeds to the lots were recorded in 1969 along with the restrictions, easements and conditions. Delaware County Recorder, Vol. 343, pages 301- 303. Dun-Ridge and Ridgeview Drive were formed prior to the enactment of the Harlem Township’s Zoning Regulations in 1998. {¶5} The original deeds for Dun-Ridge contained a restrictive covenant stating, in part: “No building shall be located on any lot nearer than 50 feet to the front lot line ...” In 2021, three of the four lot owners (75%) of Dun-Ridge amended the restrictive covenant to read 40 feet instead of 50 feet. “No building shall be located on any lot nearer than 40 feet to the front line, or nearer than 35 feet to any side lot line.” The Amendment was recorded with the Delaware County Recorder on December 9, 2021. {¶6} The record contains an email from appellant that she was advised of the amendment, did not oppose it, but did not sign the agreement amending the restrictive covenant to 40 feet front line. Due to the fact that the remaining owners composed seventy five percent of Dun-Ridge which is a majority of the subdivision, the signing lot owners did not seek out appellant’s signature on the Amendment to the Restrictive Covenant as it was not required pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the original Restrictive Covenant. Construction of Accessory Building by adjoining property owners {¶7} In September 2021, appellant’s adjoining property owners, White and Xxxxxx, through their builder, applied to the Zoning Inspector of Harlem Township for a permit to construct an accessory building on their property – a “16’ by 24’ stand-alone garage”. The permit was approved on September 21, 2021. Revisions were submitted to the building plans and the final building permit was approved. {¶8} On October 4, 2021, Xxxxxxx Xxxx, spouse of Xxxxxxxx Xxxx, sent an email to the Zoning Inspector inquiring about the setback requirements for buildings constructed in Harlem Township and how they migh...
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. After Hurricanes Xxxxxxx and Xxxx, Xx. Xxxxxx, along with numerous other local residents, obtained a grant from the Louisiana State Hazard Mitigation Program to elevate his home. Crescent Shoring, LLC, (“Crescent”), was one of the contractors performing home elevation for homeowners that received grant money to elevate their homes. On January 30, 2009, Mr. Rodney1 entered into a contract with Crescent Shoring, LLC, (hereinafter “Crescent”), to elevate his home located at 0000 Xxxxxxxx Xxxxx, Xxxxxx, Xxxxxxxxx. Xx January 26, 2012, Crescent entered into a contract with Roubion as a subcontractor to assist in performing the work under the contract. Roubion performed services under the subcontractor agreement and although Crescent was paid for much of the work performed by Roubion, Crescent did not pay Roubion. On April 4, 2013, Roubion filed and recorded liens against several homeowners, including Xx. Xxxxxx, for services rendered by Roubion in connection with elevating the homes. On April 3, 2014, Roubion filed a Petition to Enforce Liens against these homeowners, including Xx. Xxxxxx, in a suit bearing 24th Judicial District Court number 737-093. On August 4, 2014, Xx. Xxxxxx filed Exceptions of No Right of Action, No Cause of Action, and Prescription, Improper Cumulation of Actions, and Failure to Include Indispensable Parties. Before all of 1 Other nonaffiliated homeowners also entered into contracts with Crescent to elevate their individual homes. these exceptions could be heard,2 this matter was transferred to another division of the 24th Judicial District Court, where it was consolidated with a suit entitled Roubion v. Crescent Shoring, LLC, bearing 24th Judicial District Court number 729-195. On December 8, 2015, Xx. Xxxxxx filed a second pleading entitled Exceptions of No Right of Action, No Cause of Action, and Prescription, Improper Cumulation of Actions, and Failure to Include Indispensable Parties. Following a hearing on these motions, in a judgment dated March 16, 2016, the trial court sustained the Exceptions of No Cause of Action, No Right of Action and Prescription, denied the Exception of Improper Cumulation of Actions,3 and found the Exception of Failure to Include Indispensable Parties to be moot. On March 30, 2016, Roubion filed a Motion for New Trial, arguing that the March 16, 2016 judgment was contrary to law and evidence. Following a hearing, by judgment dated May 18, 2016, the trial court denied the Motion for New Trial. On June 17,...
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. This case comes before us on a second appeal, the first appeal having been dismissed on the grounds that the judgment at issue was interlocutory rather than final in nature. Khoobehi Props., L.L.C. x.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. On November 12, 2005, Plaintiff Xxxxxxx X. Xxxxx’x (“Plaintiff”) wife died “as a result of a tragic medical mistake.” (Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff subsequently received a medical malpractice settlement of $1,250,000. (Id.) On July 17, 2007, Plaintiff met with Defendant Xxx XxXxxxx (“XxXxxxx”) in Honolulu for a presentation about having Mellon manage these funds. (Id. ¶ 13.) At this initial meeting, Plaintiff signed an Investment Management Account Agreement (“July 17, 2007 Agreement,” Opp’n Ex. 1). In August 2007, Plaintiff deposited approximately $1,256,353 in his investment account with Mellon. (Compl. ¶ 18.) XxXxxxx was the senior portfolio manager for Plaintiff’s investment account, and Defendant Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx (“Xxxxxxxxx”) was the portfolio manager. (Id.) In September 2007, after Plaintiff had been advised to create a trust and to change the name on his investment account to the name of his trust, the parties executed another Investment Management Account Agreement (“September 10, 2007 Agreement,” Mot. Ex. 1). (Opp’n at 4.) The September 10, 2007 Agreement reflects the Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx Xxxxx Trust as the account holder. (See September 10, 2007 Agreement.) Plaintiff withdrew $100,000 from his investment account in December 2007, and another $50,000 in February 2008. (Compl. ¶ 21.) In April 2008, Plaintiff allegedly told XxXxxxx and Xxxxxxxxx that he wanted to withdraw additional funds, but they purportedly advised him to obtain a line of credit instead. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff initially obtained a $525,000 line of credit, which was increased to $625,000 in August 2008. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff contends that this leverage against his investment account greatly exacerbated the losses he incurred in the Fall 2008 stock market downturn. (Id. ¶¶ 28–31.) On September 1, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Hawaii state court against Defendants The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, BNY Mellon Wealth Management Trust, Mellon Trust Company of California nka BNY Mellon, N.A., Xxx XxXxxxx, and Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxx (collectively, “Defendants”), as well as various Doe defendants, for damages and other remedies resulting from Plaintiff’s investment losses. (“Compl.,” Doc. # 1, Ex. A.) Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Counts: (Count I) violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes Chapter 480 (id. ¶¶ 34–40); (Count II) violation of the Hawaii Uniform Securities Act (id. ¶¶ 41–45); (Count III) breach of fiduciary duty (id. ¶¶ 46–52); (Count IV) breach of contract (id. ¶¶ 53–5...
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 2 In February 2000, the following entities signed an agreement establishing Sun Valley Ranch 308 Limited Partnership (“SVR 308”): • General partner Timberline Village Corporation (“Timberline”) by Xxxxxx Xxxxxx,1 president; • Limited partner Englewood Properties, Inc. (“Englewood”) by its president; • Limited partner The Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx Separate Property Trust Agreement of 1988 Dated October 30, 1984 by Xxxxxx Xxxxxx; • Limited partner Xxxxxxxx Management Inc. by Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, president; • Special limited partner Xxxxx Homes Multifamily, Inc. (“Xxxxx Homes”) by Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, president.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. Plaintiffs Xxxxxx Xxxxx and Xxxxx Xxxxx sued defendants Xxxxxx and NBD for providing allegedly erroneous legal and tax advice concerning an estate plan for the decedent, Xxxxxxx Xxxxx, Xx., that plaintiffs claim resulted in a large federal estate tax liability upon the decedent's death. The estate plan consisted of a last will and testament and a revocable trust (including amendments) with the decedent as the settlor and trustee. Upon his death, Xxxxxx Xxxxx, the decedent's surviving spouse, and Xxxxx Xxxxx, one of the decedent's children, became the 1 Defendants Law Offices of Xxxxx X. Xxxxxx, Xxxxx X. Xxxxxx, and Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxx are referred to collectively as "defendants Xxxxxx" while defendant National Bank of Detroit is further referenced as "NBD." xxxxxxxxxx of the decedent's trust and were appointed as the copersonal representatives of his estate. They brought this action on behalf of both the trust and the estate, and Xxxxxx Xxxxx also joined the action as a beneficiary of the decedent's estate. A somewhat basic overview of federal estate tax law2 is helpful to an understanding of this case. In the vast majority of cases, no estate tax is due upon a person's death if he leaves his assets to a surviving spouse or others. There are two principal reasons for this. First, the estate tax is intended for wealthy individuals; the estate tax system has a built-in tax credit that corresponds to an amount that is excluded from taxation. In this context, the "unified credit" refers to a credit on the amount of otherwise payable tax. The "applicable exclusion amount" or "credit equivalent" refers to the monetary value of the person's assets that, if subject to tax, would result in a tax equal to the unified credit amount. The actual unified credit amount, and thus the corresponding credit equivalent in assets, has varied over the years. At the time of the decedent's death, the allowable unified credit was $192,800, which in effect exempted from tax an asset amount of $600,000. Thus, at that time, if a person died having less than $600,000 in assets, his estate would not owe any federal estate tax, regardless of to whom he left his estate. A second principal reason that a person might not owe federal estate taxes upon death is the existence of an "unlimited marital deduction." The estate tax scheme allows for an automatic deduction for all property left to a surviving spouse. The amount deducted is not taxed upon the death of the first spouse, but any assets r...
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 2. Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxx were married on February 24, 1974. The divorce proceedings commenced in August 2002, and the parties finally entered into a stipulation of divorce on March 29, 2006, stipulating to irreconcilable differences as the ground for divorce. A property settlement agreement, which had been executed by the parties, was incorporated into the judgment of divorce that was entered on May 16, 2006. On May 30, 2006, Xxxxxx remarried.
