XxXxxxxx’x Corp et al., N.D. Cal. No. 3:14-cv-02098-JD (N.D. Cal.).
XxXxxxxx’x Corp et al., N. D. Cal. No. 3:14-cv-02096- RS.” The opt-out statement must be personally signed by the Class Member who seeks to opt out. No opt-out request may be made on behalf of a group of Class Members.
XxXxxxxx’x Corp et al., N.D. Cal. No. 3:14-cv-02096 RS, as set forth in the Class Notice. I understand that I am represented by the plaintiffs’ attorneys and that if I have any questions concerning the lawsuit, the settlement, or this Claim Form, I may contact one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys listed on the Class Notice. I also understand that the complete terms of the Settlement Agreement, including the definition of terms and the release of claims that will bind me as a class member if I do not opt out of the lawsuit, are set forth in the Settlement Agreement on file with the Court and at www. . I understand that the settlement of the lawsuit, as described in more detail in the Notice, is fully binding on me. I wish to participate in the settlement of the lawsuit by submitting this Claim Form for a settlement payment and by agreeing to the release of claims. Upon the Effective Date of this settlement, as set forth in full in the Settlement Agreement, I fully, finally, and forever release, relinquish, and discharge all “Settled Claims” against the “Released Parties,” as those quoted terms are defined in the Settlement Agreement and the Class Notice. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California and the United States that I have read and understand this Claim Form, that the information supplied by me is true and correct, and that I agree to the terms and conditions of the settlement as set forth in this Claim Form and the Settlement Agreement, including the release of claims I am providing. Signed: Date: (Sign your name here) (mm/dd/yyyy) This Claim Form was signed in: , . (City) (State)
XxXxxxxx’x Corp et al., N. D. Cal. No. 3:14-cv-02098-JD.” You must sign the statement and it must be postmarked by _ . The statement should be mailed to the following address: CPT Group, Inc. 00000 Xxxxx # X Xxxxxx, XX 00000 No opt-out statement will be valid if postmarked after . Requests to opt out that do not include all required information will be deemed null, void, and ineffective. If a class member files an opt-out statement and a Claim Form, the opt-out statement will be deemed invalid and the class member’s Claim Form and release of claims will be valid and controlling.
XxXxxxxx’x Corp. Signature Name Xxxxx X. Xxxxxxx H-GAC Signature Name Xxxxx Xxxxxx Title president Title Executive Director Date 5/24/2021 Date 5/24/2021 H-GAC Houston-Galveston Area Council X.X. Xxx 00000 · 0000 Xxxxxxx · Houston, Texas 77227-2777 Cooperative Agreement - Contract - X.X. XxXxxxxxx Corp. - Public Services - 6771 SPECIAL PROVISIONS Incorporated by attachment, as part of the whole agreement, H-GAC and the Contractor do, hereby agree to the Special Provisions as follows:
XxXxxxxx’x Corp. 793 S.W.2d 670, 682 (Tex. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 755 (1991) (XxXxxxxx II) (explaining that a court of equity could reform an overly broad agreement but the reformation did not have to be enforced by a court of law). 217 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Xxx. §15.51(c). to compete had to be “ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement” and, if the agreement were entered into as a separate agreement, the statute provided an additional requirement that “such covenant must be supported by independent valuable consideration.”218 The 1989 Act demonstrated the legislature’s intent, in spite of the prior disdain held by the Texas Supreme Court, to make agreements not to compete not only possible but enforceable in Texas.
XxXxxxxx’x Corp. 000 X.X.0x 270, 276 (Mo. App. 1995). * * * “Missouri courts are very protective of the notion that parties are entitled to an impartial arbiter.” Jetz Serv. Co. x. Xxxxxxxxxxx, 812 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo. App. 1991); see also State x. Xxxxxxxx, 691 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Mo. App. 1985). Where bias and prejudice are actually present, it is error for a trial judge not to recuse himself, even if the request is not timely made. See State ex rel. O'Brien x. Xxxxxx, 592 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Mo. App. 1979). “If the judge is interested or related to any party ... or is recused for any reason, the judge promptly shall transfer the case to the presiding judge of the circuit for reassignment in accordance with the procedures of Rule 51.05(e).” Rule 51.07 (emphasis added); § 508.090. A judge also becomes disqualified when “the opposite party has an undue influence over the mind of the judge.” § 508.090; see also § 476.180, (“No judge of any court of record, who is interested in any suit or related to either party, or who shall have been of counsel in any suit or proceeding pending before him, shall, without the express consent of the parties thereto, sit on the trial or determination thereof”). And “the law is concerned not only with the judge’s actual impartiality but also the public’s perception of the judge’s impartiality.” Jetz, 812 S.W.2d at 948. “Where a judge’s freedom from bias or his prejudgment of an issue is called into question, the inquiry is no longer whether he actually is prejudiced; the inquiry is whether an onlooker might on the basis of objective facts reasonably question whether he was so.” Id. Because of partiality or the appearance of partiality, Judge Xxxxxx should have recused himself prior to ruling the motion filed by his appointed receiver – an employee of the circuit clerk’s office in whom he had the utmost confidence. His recusal after granting the receiver’s motion was not “prompt.” Judge Xxxxxx had an “interest” in the outcome of the case and the trustee, to the extent she was at all independent of the judge, had undue influence over his mind. Judge Xxxxxx is involved in multi-faceted litigation seeking to retain control of a large fund of money and the interest it generates, and to avoid a finding that he wrongfully held and expended the same. At the time Judge Xxxxxx ruled this motion, he was the respondent in a quo warranto action,11 L.F. 174, and had asserted that the same was an attempt to interfere with his judicial immunity. Thus, Judge Xxxxxx...
XxXxxxxx’x Corp. Lease Agreement August 4, 1993 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1835 Accuword International of Illinois, Inc. Lease Agreement March 2, 1992 First Amendment December 10, 1993 Termination Agreement March 19, 1998 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 220 Acculingua of Illinois, Inc. Lease Agreement March 19, 1998 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 230 Accuworld, LLC Lease Agreement March 19, 1998 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 520 Addeco Employment Services, Inc. Lease Agreement May 29, 1997 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2400 & 2500 Xxxxx & Xxxxxx, Inc. Lease Agreement July 25, 1984 Lease Amendment Undated Settlement Agreement July 20, 1994 Second Amendment July 20, 1994 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3510 Xxxxx, Xxxxxxxx & Company Lease Agreement July 1, 1983 Lease Amendment July 1, 1983 First Amendment July 25, 1989 Second Amendment October, 1991 Third Amendment September 5, 1995 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2610 Xxxxxx & Xxxxxxxxx Lease Agreement August 31, 1994 First Amendment May 23, 1995 Second Amendment June 9, 1995 Third Amendment January 22, 0000 Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx October 25, 1996 Fifth Amendment January 15, 1997 Sixth Amendment September 8, 1997 Seventh Amendment October 14, 1997 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1020 Bear Xxxxxxx & Co., Inc. Lease Agreement December 12, 1997 First Amendment February 27, 1998 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2670 Benefits Communication Corporation Lease Agreement March 2, 1995 First Amendment December 18, 1995 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2040 Birndorf & Birndorf, P.C. Lease Agreement May 30, 1995 -----------------------------------------------------------...
XxXxxxxx’x Corp. The Merger-Sub is authorized to issue 13,000,000 shares of its common stock, $0.01 par value (the "the Merger-Sub Common Stock") and 12,000,000 shares of its preferred stock, $0.01 par value . As of the date of this Merger Agreement, 1,000 shares of the Merger-Sub Common Stock (the "Outstanding Merger-Sub Common Stock") are issued and outstanding and shall remain outstanding (the "Surviving Corporation Common Stock") and none of the Merger-Sub's preferred stock is either issued or outstanding, so that at the Effective Time, Alfa shall be the holder of all of the issued and outstanding shares of the Surviving Corporation Common Stock.
XxXxxxxx’x Corp. The Department of Environmental Company cannot provide assurances that Protection ("Connecticut DEP") Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxxxxx Corp. and Xxxxxxxxx filed suit against Xxxxxx X. will have sufficient resources to fund Xxxxxxxxx Corp., Xxxxxxxxx, and any or all identifiable claims that the MTLM Connecticut in the Superior Company may assert. Court of the State of Connecticut - Judicial District of Hartford. The The Company has engaged in settlement suit alleges, among other things, discussions with Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxxxxx that the North Haven Facility Corp., Xxxxxxxxx and the Connecticut DEP discharged and continues to regarding the possible characterization discharge contaminants, including of the North Haven Facility, and the oily material, into the environment subsequent remediation thereof should and has failed to comply with the contamination be present at terms of certain permits and other concentrations that require remedial filing requirements. The suit seeks action. The Company is currently working injunctions to restrict us from with an independent environmental maintaining discharges and to consultant to develop an acceptable require us to remediate the characterization plan. The Company facility. The suit also seeks civil cannot provide assurances that it will penalties from all of the be able to reach an acceptable defendants in accordance with settlement of this matter with the other Connecticut environmental statutes. parties. SCHEDULE B, PART 6.12 LITIGATION PARTIES NATURE OF DISPUTE EXPOSURE OR BENEFIT/AMOUNT OF DISPUTE ------------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ Department of Justice In January 2003, the Company The Company is fully cooperating with received a subpoena requesting that the subpoena and the grand jury's the Company provides documents to a investigation. The Company is unable at grand jury that is investigating this stage to determine future legal scrap metal purchasing practices in costs or other costs to be incurred in the four state region of Ohio, responding to such subpoena or other Illinois, Indiana and Michigan. impact to the Company of such investigation.
