MAI Sample Clauses

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MAI. Corollary 2: If B = B∗, then the only equilibrium is one where all countries join Proof: See appendix 7. The intuition of Corollary 2 is also straight forward. The benchmark B∗ is the value of the rent extraction rate that is chosen by a social planner in a world without information asymmetries. Since the lobbying distortion pushes the desired rent extraction rate below B∗, the time inconsistency distortion alone causes a rent extraction rate above B∗. However, MAI rule B∗ provides to all countries a commitment device to solve the time-inconsistency problem by joining MAI at no cost. Hence, opting out of MAI makes no longer sense. Overall, a weak MAI (large B) is not sharply binding and every country joins MAI to avoid losses from signalling high rent-extraction rates in case of staying out. Next, I compare the incentives of governments to protest against MAI negotiations. Every government objects negotiation if it expects a loss in a world with MAI compared to one without. Proposition 2 Governments of all countries that do not join MAI lose compared to a world without MAI; governments of all countries with χi > χ gain. At least some govern- ˜ ments of countries that join MAI with χi such that χ∗ > χi > χ lose. Proof: See appendix 8. This proposition can explain why some countries object other countries to negoti- ate a MAI even though they are neither forced into nor excluded from membership. A partial MAI, i.e. a MAI where some countries join and others opt out, exerts a negative information externality on non-members; outsiders signal that they are inclined to extract large rents from MNEs. The resulting investment diversion harms governments that do not decide to join. It need to be kept in mind, however, that a loss for a government does not necessarily imply a welfare loss of the country, since government objectives are distorted by lobbying groups.24 Proposition 2 can explain the protest storm of some LDCs against the negotiation of MAI by the club of the OECD countries, although they were both free to opt in or out. According to my explanation, they were fearing the information externality that may arise from the decision to opt out. The protest comes from governments that are ex post but not ex ante contra free-market spirited. Again, a quote by the former Commerce Secretary to Government of India supports this model feature: "Selective and judicious government intervention is therefore widely considered necessary to support or protect domestic in...

MAI. 36/6-54, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 9 Aug. 1889; Doc. Dipl. 1889–1890 XV, ▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 95 95 Doc. Dipl. 1890–1891 XVII, 16if., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 14 Nov. 1890; 78, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to Minilik, undated memorandum of 23–24 Dec. 1890; 85ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to Minilik, undated memo of 26–28 Jan. ▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 96 96 Ibid. 85ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to Minilik, undated memorandum. ‘As Your Majesty was making the corrections I wrote them step by step in the Italian text and Your Majesty's interpreter [did the same] in the Amharic text. The corrections were so many that the Italian and the Amharic texts were recopied.’. 98 98 Ibid. 16ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 14 Nov. 1890. ‘Moreover, besides the translation, every article was expounded word for word during the negotiations; all possible explanations were given so that the Emperor might form an exact concept of the obligations into which he entered.’.Google Scholar 99 99 Ibid. 53, Minilik to Salimbeni, Nehasë 11, 1882 (16 Aug. 1890), and 49ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 29 Aug. ▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 100 100 Ibid. 31ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Tir 15, 1883 (22 Jan. 1891). By this time ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ was making use of Mr ▇▇ for his correspondence with Italy and therefore the French language is used. 101 101 Ibid. 41ff., MiniIikto ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Yekatit 5, 1883 (11 Feb. 1891). 102 102 I have not been able to find the Aniharic or Italian drafts referred to by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ in the files of ▇. ▇. ▇▇▇.

MAI acknowledges that Lenders would not enter into this Amendment without MAI's assurance that MAI has no claim against any of Lenders, their parents companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors, shareholders, employees, attorneys, agents, professionals and servants, or any of their respective predecessors, successors, heirs and assigns (collectively, the "Lender Parties" and each, a "Lender Party"). MAI, for itself and on behalf of its officers and directors, and its respective predecessors, successors and assigns (collectively, the "Releasors") releases each Lender Party from any known or unknown claims which MAI now has against any Lender Party of any nature, including any claims that any Releasor, or any Releasor's successors, counsel and advisors may in the future discover they would have had now if they had known facts not now known to them, whether founded in contract, in tort or pursuant to any other theory of liability, including but not limited to any claims arising out of or related to the Loan Documents or the transactions contemplated thereby. MAI, FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF EACH RELEASOR, WAIVES THE PROVISIONS OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 1542, WHICH STATE: A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS WHICH THE CREDITOR DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE, WHICH IF KNOWN BY HIM MUST HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR.

MAI. 36/2-13; Article 7 in the Italian draft and 6 in the Amharic draft. The Italian text is printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889–1890 XV, 143f. The Amharic text of the article runs in full: This is a somewhat complex and obscure sentence, which is not easy to render into acceptable English without paraphrasing it completely. The following is an attempt to convey the meaning of the clause without changing it more than necessary: ‘When I said: if Your Majesty should wish by Your own will to send messengers to Egypt, to Jerusalem, to the Red Sea [or] anywhere else by the hand [or: under the protection] of the Italian consul, I meant so that anyone who does not know should not maltreat them and that they should return having carried out Your will without lacking food, drink, [and] shelter; if You send whatever You wish by any of the Italian consuls, everything You desire should be done and fulfilled’.Google Scholar 131 131 MAE., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 266f., Originally ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, then stationed at L–1890 XV, 128ff. The Amharic text has never been published, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, the present official historian of Italian political activity in Ethiopia, writing for the ‘Comitato per la documentazione dell’ opera dell'Italia in Africa', seems to have been ignorant even of the existence of the original of the treaty in the archives. See M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 282, n. ▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 132 132 A. S. MAE., Serie V, Trattati, Etiopia No. 2. The Italian text was first published in Doc. DipI. 1889–90 XV, iz8ff. The Amharic text has never been published, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, the present official historian of Italian political activity in Ethiopia, writing for the ‘Comitato per la documentazione dell'opera dell'Italia in Africa’, seems to have been ignorant even of the existence of the original of the treaty in the archives. See M.A.E., Etiopia/Mar Rosso, I, 282, 51.

MAI. 36/6–54, Pro Memoria al Cay. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ Dossi, 19 Sep. 1889, by ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Printed in Zaghi, op. cit. ▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 108 108 ▇▇▇▇▇, op. cit. 108f., diary 15 July 1890, and 148, diary 18 Aug. 1890. See also 123 and 238 for evidence that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ at times spoke with the Emperor without ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 109 109 Ibid. 177f., Traversi to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 14 Aug. 1890. 110 110 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, op. cit. ▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 111 111 A. S. MAI. 36/7–59, Pro Memoria about the audience, undated; printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889–90 XV bis, ▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 112 112 ▇▇▇▇▇, op. cit. ▇▇▇▇▇., diary 16 July 1890 (italics mine).Google Scholar 113 113 For more evidence that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ was supposed by his superiors to know ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, see ▇▇▇. Dipl. 1889–90 XV, 260f., Robilant to ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ii Mar. 1887. It should be noted that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ already in 1886 had wrong translations corrected, as he says himself, ‘under my supervision’; Doc. DipI. 1889–1890 XV, 214ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to Robilant, ‘Apr. 1886. On the other hand ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ kept his interpreter ▇▇▇▇▇ with him also during an interview with ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ in 1888, which was so secret that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ had to swear that he would reveal nothing; A. S. MAI. 36/5-47, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 8 Aug. 1888. The portion about the oath and ▇▇▇▇▇'s presence is missing in the document as printed in Doc. Dipl. 1889–1890 XV, ▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 114 114 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇, op. cit. 44, n. 1. I do not know when and under what circumstances ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ made this statement. ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ does not give the source of his information, and in the Italian papers that I have seen so far I have not been able to discover ▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 115 115 Doc. Dipl. 1890–1891 XVII, 63ff., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 29 Jan. ▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇ Scholar 116 116 ▇▇▇▇▇, op. cit. 186, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ to ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 9 Oct. 1890. ‘Now I understand how one can obtain so eailv such splendid success. One rites a treaty: iii the Italian text one puts what is wanted in Italy, in the Amharic text one puts what ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, and it doesn't matter if the two do not agree. Those who come later will think about it. What a mess, my dear ▇▇▇▇▇▇, what imbroglios, what lies, what an enormous difference between this king and King ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇!-the same as between the King of Italy and Minilik. I owe much to A…, I cannot pose as his accuser. But when I tried to put the blame for the false translation of Article r of the treaty with ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ on ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, he gave me such details and reasons that he shut my mouth, proving tome that. ...

MAI. DEFINITION – The provision of a range of client-centered services that link clients from 12 ethnic groups that are disproportionately represented in the HIV epidemic with health care, 13 psychosocial, and other services. The coordination and follow-up of medical treatments are primary 14 components of medical case management.

MAI. An evaluation

MAI. The Road Ahead a) The MAI fails to tackle the single most important aspect of international investment taxation, the avoidance of double taxation. Since the tax systems of the major home countries are based on worldwide income taxation principles, their multinational companies are frequently subject to some degree of double taxation. This fact not only ▇▇▇▇▇▇ international investment, but also provides incentives for the use of tax ▇▇▇▇▇▇ to channel cross-border capital flows (through the incorporation of offshore holding companies). The use of these schemes is detrimental to the home country, but it also affects recipient countries through both reduced tax revenues and through distorted investment inflows. b) The developing countries - and the smaller low-income countries in particular - would require considerable assistance if they are to accede to the MAI or any other agreement of this type. Wide and semi-permanent exceptions are not the solution, because these would undermine the very rigour which creates confidence among investors. The issue is thus one of raising domestic standards rather than lowering international requirements. c) Such strengthening of domestic standards is a complex, lengthy and expensive undertaking. However, it could bring considerable benefits for foreign as well as domestic firms. In particular, it would involve an overhaul of the system of commercial law - including the courts - and a parallel rationalisation of systems of public registries, accountancy systems, and government regulation. The role of aid donors could be crucial in this regard - providing not just financial support but, more importantly, technical expertise. d) The development impact of MAI on poor countries could be positive if special provision for their accession is made. There is sufficient flexibility in the existing proposal to accommodate developing country interests. De facto exclusion may lead to negative effects such as loss of productive investment and a risk of competitive lowering of legal, fiscal, labour and environmental safeguards. e) The treatment of environmental standards in the preamble to the MAI contains an adequate commitment to international norms and should be acceptable. The proposed inclusion of binding labour standards, although perhaps desirable in a general sense, may not be feasible in practice for developing countries and would effectively prevent their accession. These issues need to be addressed. f) As an essential complement ...