Cal Sample Clauses

Cal. App.5th 659 (2018) is a reminder that arbitrability is still governed by the agreement’s specific language. When Xxxxxx Xxxxxx was terminated as Kaggle, Inc.’s president, he held nearly half of Xxxxxx’s stock. Subsequently, Xxxxxx’s CEO and board members increased Xxxxxx’s outstanding stock tenfold, thereby diluting the existing stock without compensating the minority shareholders. Xxxxxx sued, alleging the CEO and board members abused their corporate power and breached their fiduciary duties. Defendants moved to compel arbitration based on several employment agreements and a separation agreement. The court of appeal carefully analyzed the language of each agreement to hold that Xxxxxx’x claims were not arbitrable. The separation agreement only covered disputes arising out of the agreement itself or matters released in the agreement, which did not include the defendantsalleged misconduct. The provisions in the employment agreements were broader, providing the parties would arbitrate “any and all controversies, claims or disputes . . . arising out of, relating to, or resulting from” his stock agreement or his employment. Nonetheless, the court held Xxxxxx’x claims fell outside the scope of those provisions. The court reasoned that Xxxxxx’x claims were not based on his employment, but instead rooted in his March 2019 1 New Cases * Certified Specialist, Appellate Law The State Bar Board of Legal Specialization Attorney’s Fees—Fees on Appeal Not Affected by Award of Costs Attorneys—Disqualification— Conflict of Interest rights as a company stockholder, and that defendants’ fiduciary duties to minority shareholders existed independently of the partiesemployment relationship. California Rules of Court Rule 8.278(d)(2) provides that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney’s fees on appeal nor precludes a party from seeking them under rule 3.1702.” In Xxxxxxxx x. Xxxx, 30 Cal.App.5th 901 (2018) a creative appellant contended that this rule precluded the prevailing respondent from seeking attorney’s fees because the court of appeal ordered the parties to bear their own costs. According to appellant, this was an “order otherwise” precluding fees along with costs. The court of appeal rejected that contention, holding that the order regarding “costs” on appeal did not affect a party’s ability to recover attorney’s fees. Xxxxxxxx presents a textbook case of why an attorney should not represent himself. The dispute, which re...
Cal. Civ. Code Section 2810;
Cal. App. 2d 187 (1944). Accordingly, wx xxxo xxxxxx xxr purposes of our opinion that if the sum total of all fees, bonuses, commissions, discounts and other consideration payable by FTCS to or for the benefit of FSB as the Owner Trustee (including trustee fees) or to or for the benefit of the Lenders and Holders or their affiliates over the entire term of the loan (including, without limitation, structuring fees, upfront fees, unused fees) and not considered as validly paid for specific services rendered were to be calculated as a percentage rate over the entire term of the loan based upon the maximum "net" amount available to be drawn were $1,650,000, such calculation would produce the equivalent of a simple interest rate not in excess of 0.25% per annum of the maximum "net" amount available to be drawn of $168,350,000 over the 5-year maximum term. Thus, based on the foregoing assumption, we assume that the maximum "all-in" interest rate for the initial interest rate period of the deemed loan will not exceed 6.855% per annum (the stated rate of 6.605% plus the interest equivalency factor of 0.25% attributable to fees, etc. considered to be interest). In this case, based on the assumptions set forth above, the "net" balance outstanding during the initial interest rate period of the loan will be $9,100,000 ($10,000,000 minus $900,000). We further assume that, since the assumed initial interest rate period is 180 days and the maximum non-usurious rate is 10%, the maximum interest which could be charged on such "net" balance during that assumed initial interest rate period is $448,767.12 ($9,100,000 x 10% x 180/365). Since, under the assumptions set forth above, the full initial outstanding balance bearing interest at the rate provided for in the Operative Agreements is $10,000,000, the assumed initial interest rate period is 180 days and the "all-in" interest rate which the loan bears under the Operative Agreements is 6.855% during the assumed initial interest rate period, we further assume that the actual interest which will accrue on the full outstanding balance of the loan during that initial interest rate period is $338,054.79 ($10,000,000 x 6.855% x 180/365). This amount is less than the maximum permissible amount of $448,767.12 referred to above. We note that California case law has determined that the calculation of the effective interest rate of interest on a loan is a question of fact, as to which expert testimony is admissible. See White v. Sweeney, 13...
Cal. EVID. CODE § 622 (‘‘The facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto ’’). The parties, intending to be legally bound, agree as follows:
Cal. App.5th 886 (2019), held the party seeking to reduce an award of future damages to present value bears the burden of proving an appropriate method of doing so, including the appropriate discount rate. A party who seeks an upward adjustment of a future damages award to account for inflation likewise bears the burden of proving an appropriate method and inflation rate. Finding no California case directly on point, the court followed Ninth Circuit precedent in Xxxx x. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 684 X.0x 000, 000 (0xx Xxx. 0000), which reasons the proper rate is an evidentiary issue that should be borne by the party seeking to adjust the award. This rule is consistent with the Directions for Use to CACI 3904A on Present Cash Value, which states: “It would appear that because reduction to present value benefits the defendant, the defendant bears the burden of proof on the discount rate.” Where the defendant fails to carry its burden, the trial court should not discount an award of future damages.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1542. The Parties do not deem the releases described in Sections VII(A)(5), VII(B)(4) or VII(C)(3) of this Agreement (“Releases”) to be “general releases” as contemplated by California or similar state, federal, provincial, territorial or tribal laws. To the extent that any court construes the Releases as “general releases,” the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Settlement Class Members, specifically waive any and all provisions, rights and benefits conferred by section 1542 of the California Civil Code or any comparable statutory or common law provision of any other jurisdiction with respect to the Releases. The Parties acknowledge, and the Settlement Class Members shall be deemed by operation of the entry of final approval by the Court to have acknowledged, that the foregoing waiver was separately bargained for and a key element of this Agreement.
Cal. App.5th 1070 (2019), the court interpreted this statute in a collection action where the creditor sold its account to a debt collection agency, which sought prejudgment interest based on a statutory rate rather than the contractual rate. The court framed the question as follows: “if the contract sets forth a legal rate of interest, can the creditor ignore the contract interest provision and instead choose to collect prejudgment interest at the statutory rate set forth in section 3289, subdivision (b)?” The court answered “no.” Because this “appears to be a question of first impression in California,” the court looked to cases interpreting statutes in other states and to the legislative history of section 3289. Unsurprisingly, the court concluded “if the creditor entered into a contractual agreement containing a legal rate of interest, it remains bound by the terms of that agreement; prejudgment interest at the statutory rate is available only in the absence of an applicable contractual provision.”
Cal. App. 3d 104 held that the judicial act of assigning an attorney to represent an indigent defendant with knowledge of the compensation contract between the board of supervisors and that attorney constitutes judicial approval and ratification of the contract and recognition that the contract provides reasonable compensation to the attorney;
Cal. 4th 969, as requests for exclusion do not apply to the PAGA Claims, and the State’s claims for civil penalties for the released PAGA Claims are also extinguished. All PAGA Claims, as defined in the Settlement Agreement, are settled and Class Members are prohibited from pursuing a further action under PAGA for the covered PAGA Claims.
Cal. No. 5:16-cv-06594-LHK. The Xxxx case is a federal class action lawsuit challenging access to programs, services, and activities at the Santa Xxxxx County Jails on behalf of inmates with mobility disabilities. You are a member of this class if you have a mobility disability and are incarcerated in the County Jails. The Court has preliminarily approved the settlement of this matter. This notice explains the proposed settlement, how you can see it, and how you can tell the Court whether you think it is fair. This action does not seek money damages and none will be awarded. Nor does the proposed Consent Decree release any claims for monetary damages class members may have. The terms of the settlement are described in a document called the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree implements a document called the “Remedial Plan,” which outlines specific conditions in the jails that the County has agreed to remedy. Under the Consent Decree, the County will be required to develop implementation plans to reform certain policies, procedures, and practices for providing accommodations to inmates with mobility disabilities in the Jails, including in the areas of the County’s: (1) intake process; (2) verification of mobility disability process; (3) issuance, retention, and denial of mobility device(s); (4) classification and housing of inmates with mobility disabilities; (5) tracking of inmates with mobility disabilities and disability-related needs; (6) provision of programs and services; (7) ADA Coordinator; (8) training of custody and custody health staff; and (9) ADA-related grievance and request systems. The Consent Decree also requires that the County undertake significant construction to remedy physical barriers at the County Jails including increasing the number of ADA-accessible cells, removing barriers in the County’s booking area, medical areas, dining areas, education and program areas, yards, and along paths of travel. The County has already begun these efforts and has allocated over $100 million dollars to ADA jail improvements. Finally, the Consent Decree requires the County to retain experts to monitor the County’s implementation of, and compliance with, the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree further provides for plaintiffscounsel to also monitor the County’s compliance. You can read about these changes in the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree and Remedial Plan will be available in a binder in each housing unit or, alternatively, you can read the Consent D...