Referee's Decision. It is the decision of the referee that the position of the carriers on this question is clearly supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Much of what the referee said in his decision on Question 2 under Article 1, dealing with Item G, "Time Paid for Because of Suspension or Dismissal," is applicable here also. Suffice to say at this point, the referee believes that the position of the labor organizations on this question is not a realistic one, but rather constitutes a very strained interpretation of the following language of Article 8: "whose employment relation with a carrier is terminated prior to the taking of his vacation." The position taken by the employees in their discussions of this problem, as set forth on pages 636 to 672 of the transcript, appear to the referee to be highly technical, especially their insistence that the criterion which should be considered as controlling in determining whether or not employment has been terminated is loss of seniority. They argue that if an employee is reinstated or returned to work by the carrier following a dismissal without loss of seniority, then his employment status never was terminated. However, the argument entirely overlooks the fact that when a man is dismissed for just cause, it falls within the discretion of the carrier to leave him off the payrolls permanently or, as an act of leniency, to put him back on the payroll with seniority. However, it is such dismissal that constitutes the termination of employment; such an employee's return to service without loss of seniority, and in some instances also with all or part pay for lost time, is in fact an act of leniency by the carrier and in no way modifies or changes the meaning of "termination of employment relation" as it is referred to in Article 8 of the vacation agreement. The referee feels that counsel for the carriers put the problem rather effectively when, on page 659 of the transcript, he stated : "Now, Mr. Referee, I will agree that this is a small thing and the situation with which we are confronted does not occur every day, but I find myself just in this position: "I think railroad managers are human. I know from my own experience that they listen with care and consideration to leniency pleas. But what Xx. Xxxxx suggests, it seems to me, is simply this: that whenever from now on a plea is made for the reinstatement of a man, the man who gives it has to say to himself,'Here is a man who is guilty, his guilt was such as to justify dis...
Referee's Decision. It is the decision of the referee that the position of the carriers on this question cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the position of the labor organizations can be sustained only in part. It is submitted that it would be a very unreasonable and unfair interpretation of Article I of the agreement to hold, as contended for by the carriers, that " A day is to be considered as a 24-hour period from the time an employee first began service on any day." The term "day," as used in collective-bargaining agreements, generally means "work day" and not "calendar day." The length of a man's work day generally is measured in terms of the work shift or tour of duty. Hence, it is possible for an employee under some circumstances to complete two or more work days in one calendar day of twenty-four hours if he is assigned to more than one shift or tour of duty in one calendar day. Thus, the referee rejects the contention of the carriers that a day. under Article I of the agreement, shall be considered as a 24-hour period from the time an employee first began service on any day and that all compensated service on such day, regardless of the time or the amount of compensation paid, shall be considered as one day. The referee approves the following proposals of the labor organizations: "The days need not be consecutive, but may be any days of the calendar year preceding the year in which the vacation is to be taken. Each calendar day for which an employee is paid by the employing carrier for some time, regardless of the amount of compensation, or the length of time paid for, will be counted as one day, provided, however;
Referee's Decision the Referee will render a written and impartial decision with reasons on the Dispute and identifying the strengths and deficiencies of each BAFO, with copies to both parties, as soon as practicable in the circumstances, with the objective of rendering a decision within 3 Business Days of receiving the BAFOs. The Referee shall only be authorized to select and issue as its final decision one party’s “best and final offer” submitted pursuant to Section 1.4(c) [Final Offer Proposal] of this Schedule 20 [Dispute Resolution Procedure]. For the avoidance of doubt, the Referee shall not be authorized or permitted to issue any final decision that deviates from the “BAFOs” submitted by the parties unless the Parties mutually agree in writing at the time to empower the Referee with the authority to make his or her own decision.
Referee's Decision. The Referee will render his or her decision in writing, with detailed reasons, and shall provide a copy of the decision to each Party within 5 Business Days of the BAFO Submission Date or such later date as the Parties may agree in writing (the “Referee Review Period”). The Referee’s decision (unless otherwise expressly agreed by the Parties in writing) shall be based on one Party’s BAFO and shall not be based on or influenced by any matter or consideration other than may be contained in the successful Party’s BAFO.
Referee's Decision. Binding But Not Final 4
Referee's Decision. It is the opinion of the referee that no disagreement of substance exists in fact between the parties as to the meaning and intent of the first paragraph of Article 5. The language of the paragraph gives to the management the right to defer vacations. As pointed out in the contentions of the employees, the language does not mean that management can defer vacations on the basis of trivial or inconsequential reasons. What the language of the paragraph does do is lay down a statement of policy that when a vacation schedule is agreed to and the employees have received notice of the same and have made their vacation plans accordingly, the schedule shall be adhered to unless the management, for good and sufficient reason, finds it necessary to defer some of the scheduled vacations. When such a situation arises, the management is obligated to give the employee as much advance notice as possible and in any event, not less than ten days' notice, except in case of an emergency. In case it becomes necessary to advance the scheduled vacation date, then the employee is entitled to a thirty days' notice under the language.
Referee's Decision. The arbitrator's decision shall include the essential determinations and conclusions on which the arbitrator has based the award. The execution of the arbitral award may be requested before any competent court. The arbitrator may award any relief permitted by law or the AAA Rules, but declaratory or injunctive relief may only be awarded on an individual basis and only to the extent necessary to provide relief justified by plaintiff's individual claim.
Referee's Decision. The referee sustained the initial determination of the local office ruling claimants eligible to receive benefits effective various dates without disqualifying conditions, except as modified by the referee to make the initial determinations effective July 7, 1959 as to all claimants except claimants Xxx, Xxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx, and to that extent overruling the objections of the employer thereto. The employer further appeals from the decision of the referee filed February 3, 1960 sustaining the initial determinations of the local office holding the three claimants there involved, Xxxxxxxxx, Armeli and Xxxxxx, eligible to receive benefits effective various dates without disqualifying conditions and overruling the objections of the employer thereto. Xxxxxxxx Xxxx Xxxxxxx appeals from the decision of the referee filed September 17, 1959 insofar as it modifies the initial determination of the local office holding claimant eligible to receive benefits effective June 1, 1959 without disqualifying conditions by making it effective July 7, 1959. Xxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx appeals from the decision of the referee filed September 17,1959 insofar as it overrules the initial determination of the local office holding claimant eligible to receive benefits effective June 1, 1959 without disqualifying conditions and sustaining the objections of the employer.
