PPAs. The PPA's shall be in full force and effect as of the ----- Closing Date.
PPAs. Related to the three categories of power purchase agreements that can be used to serve Western Interconnection Member load as described in Rate Schedule No. 281, Tri-State and United Power have agreed the net Proposed Buyout Amount is $0.00 for the Renewables PPAs, Basin CROD PPA, and WAPA Agreements, so the Final Western Interconnection PPA Adjustment upon withdrawal will not result in a credit or debit to the Final Payment Amount (as those terms are defined in Rate Schedule No. 281).
PPAs. 4.2.1 Overview of incentives and barriers for market actors in each model In a similar fashion as for P2P trading, possible incentives/opportunities and barriers/threats of PPAs can also be summarized in the following table. Germany and Japan: Type of market actor Incentives and opportunities Barriers and threats Small to medium generator or prosumer Avoiding costs and risks of participation in auctions for FIP/MP; for on-site PPAs, possibly sharing part of the savings in part of the grid fees, taxes, and levies, depending on legislation Secure longer-term revenue stream in a post-FIT era Risk of receiving lower price than with marketing in the wholesale power market or through auction for FIP/MP Risk of losing off-taker when the contracted party has financial problems Wholesale trade company, e.g. VPP operator VPP could aggregate smaller generators for PPAs same as for P2P model G1 TSO Has financial incentive to shift feed-in and loads (demand side management) to avoid bottleneck: can support this through flexible network charges if law allows small for on-grid PPAs: may lose revenue if a new generator for PPA is built in the same DSO area as the customer may lose more revenue through on-site PPAs, depending on how regulated grid revenue depends on transport volume DSO Has financial incentive to shift feed-in none for on-site PPAs; may lose and loads (demand side management) to revenue through on-site PPAs, avoid bottleneck: can support this depending on how regulated grid through flexible network charges if law revenue depends on transport allows volume Electricity supplier could be the buyer in PPA contract to secure cheap power for its retail customers same as for P2P model G1 Consumer Possibly reduced power prices (if PPA uses very favorable production sites); for on-site PPA, saving a high initial capital investment on renewable power plant, and part of the grid fees, taxes, and levies, depending on legislation Possibility to demonstrate low-carbon electricity supply Risk to pay more than with supply based on wholesale market prices Table 11: Incentive/opportunities and barrier/threats of PPAs Compared to the cases of a P2P trading discussed above, in the case of PPA, there are far less substantial barriers and threats for all of market actors. This is also true for incentives and opportunities, which can be generally well compatible with the existing market.
PPAs. Related to the power purchase agreement serving Eastern Interconnection Member load as described in Rate Schedule No. 281, the Final Eastern Interconnection PPA Amount will be calculation pursuant to the FERC-accepted and effective version of Rate Schedule No. 281 as of April 24, 2024.
PPAs. Related to the power purchase agreement (i.e. the Basin All-Requirements PPA) serving Eastern Interconnection Member load as described in Rate Schedule No. 281, the Final Eastern Interconnection PPA Amount of the Basin All-Requirements PPA will be the CMVE (as those terms are defined in Rate Schedule No. 281).
PPAs. An internationally standardized definition is also not yet available for PPA, Power Purchasing Agreement. At the EU level, the above-mentioned RES Directive (EU 2018/2001 Article 2 Definition (17)) defines that “renewables power purchase agreement means a contract under which a natural or legal person agrees to purchase renewable electricity directly from an electricity producer.” The definition given by XXXXX (2018) is more specific that is “an arrangement under which a company enters into a long-term contract with an independent power producer or a utility and commits to purchasing a specific amount of renewable electricity or the output from a specific asset (sleeved or virtual), at an agreed price”. Having these, this paper defines PPA as “a medium-to-long-term electricity supply agreement concluded between a seller (plant operator) and a buyer, e.g. an energy supplier or final electricity consumers, such as large industrial consumers, data centres, and large buildings”. In principle, PPAs have a very wide scope of application, which can include a wide variety of design forms. This makes the scientific discussion more difficult because PPAs are a collective term for various different types of contracts, which do not necessarily have a novelty value, compared to the current status of known energy contracts. Classic direct marketing or electricity trading contracts, for example, also fall under this term according to their wording. The only defining feature of any PPA seems to be that it is a civil law contract in the electricity sector with certain individually designed conditions to the contract contents which are to be regulated compellingly. This concerns, for example, a remuneration agreed for the purchase of electricity. In the current discussion, however, it is also regularly a question of certain additional elements of an electricity purchase or purchase that can qualify a PPA: This concerns, for example, the negotiation of a comparatively long contract term, if a PPA is intended to secure the refinancing of an investment in renewable energy plants, the passing on of guarantees of origin as proof of the green electricity property or the proof of further characteristics of the electricity to be supplied, such as a certain regional purchase. PPAs are often, but not necessarily, regarded as a counter-model to FIT or FIP/MP support. In addition, the focus is particularly on forms in which electricity is sold and supplied directly from a producer or d...
PPAs. For deciding on whether to support the development of PPAs through policies, and if so, how to support it, policy should take the same principal decision: does it wish to continue with a FIT/FIP/MP scheme, including auctions for FIP/MP, or rather with market solutions? The crucial requirement for broad success of PPAs is that the cost of FIT-expired renewable energy generators or even of new generators is lower than the supply prices achievable or consumers in the general electricity market or at least the green electricity market. Currently, given the projects mentioned in chapter 3, this seems to be the case for on-site PPAs using PV in both Germany and Japan, and for on-grid PPAs with FIT-expired wind power plants and new large- scale PV in Germany. Even with a continued FIT/FIP/MP scheme, there may be market niches for these types of PPAs. Just as for P2P trading, we recommend that policy-makers should continue to legally allow and enable the use of PPAs but closely monitor their development. For example, if on-site PPAs grow a lot in capacity, this may erode the revenues of DSOs and TSOs. It may create the need to change the grid fees for consumers benefitting from such PPAs, so that they cover a fair share of grid costs. In Germany in any case, the model that has been created by law o supply tenants from a PV plant on the roof of the building they inhabit (called “Mieterstrom” in German) should be improved to make it more successful. Japan may consider to analyze the usefulness and feasibility of similar on-site models for multi-family houses.
