Policy Response. Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang Axis of Power In conjunction with Xxxxxxxx’x propensity towards fighting a continuous struggle against the imperialists, the concept of the ‘Axis of Power’ linking together Xxxxx Xxxxx, Xxxxx, Xxxx Xxx, Xxxxxxxx, xxx Xxxxxxxxx, eventually developed as a vehicle to advance the anti- imperialism platform onto the world stage. Under the worldwide band- wagoning of New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against an all-permeating neocolonialism brought forth by the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS), the Axis of Power was intended to become the primary instrument by which NEFOS was to be infused with life throughout East Asia. President Xxxxxxxx’x announcement during the Independence Day speech of 1965 establishing the Djakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang anti-imperialist axis of powers was the culmination of his revolutionary foreign policy. Xxxxxxxxx (1967, 227) claimed that such a proclamation officially removed Indonesia from Non – Alignment. Xxxxxxxx himself, however, did not seem to really mind for he claimed that ‘this axis is the most natural axis, formed by the course of history itself’ (Leifer 1983, 105). Among those present at the Independence Day speech were delegates from North Korea, Viet Nam, and Cambodia. President Xxxxxxxx underscored the symbolism of the presence of these delegates as to give the impression that NASAKOM (nationalists, religious leaders, and communists) was also present at the announcement: Let the imperialists look at the three of us: one who is a Prince (Xxxxxxxx of Cambodia); one who is a Marxist-Leninist (the representative of North Korea) and the other one (Xxxxxxxx) is NASAKOM compressed, but all three of them are patriots, all three of them fight imperialism … I am announcing to the whole world, to all friends and foes, that no evil spirit, no Jinn7, no devil can prevent Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia 7 To provide context to Xxxxxxxx’x words, in Islamic belief a Jinn is a ‘life-form’ that is created by God that takes the form on Earth of a ‘spirit.’ Jinns can be ‘good’ or ‘evil,’ and take up a physical form to that resembling a human (as a person) or an apparition, i.e. without physical form or presence. In the same belief, angels are created from light and are always obedient to God while the devil, or Satan, was created from fire and is always disobedient to God. In Indonesian culture as in other cultures as well, these beings are believed to have possess ext...
Policy Response. Confrontation over West Irian West Irian is a case that clearly showed the dynamics when a structuralist viewpoint (expelling an imperialist force out of one’s sphere of influence, or more aptly in this case, one’s territory) and a confrontationalist approach (coercive diplomacy) were joined. West Irian had been an integral part of the Netherlands East Indies. The Round Table Conference on December 1949 held in The Hague stipulated that the issue of West Irian would be discussed within a year. At the time Indonesia’s form of modern political existence was structured into that of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. This form of republic had been a member of the Netherlands –Indonesian Union headed by the Dutch Queen. With the issue of West Irian still unresolved in 1949 at the Round Table Conference, although there was a stipulation to discuss the issue by 1950, on the third anniversary of the proclamation of independence President Xxxxxxxx in 1948 pointed out that: The Indonesians have entered the international arena. If not instantly, the world gradually will undoubtedly participate in the settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict. This is what has become the basis of the foreign policy of the Republic (Leifer 1983, xiii). President Xxxxxxxx continued to elaborate that the struggle to free West Irian was part of the struggle to eradicate imperialism and colonialism worldwide and explained that: I never said ‘let us bring West Irian into the territory of the Republic,’ I always say ‘let us bring West Irian into the sovereign territory of the Republic.’ And that the Indonesian Flag does not fly there is due to the fact that Dutch imperialism is still there (Xxxxxxxx 1961, 57-58). To project the image that he obtained legitimacy from the state, President Xxxxxxxx continually referred to the opinion of the Supreme Advisory Council that the policy on the liberalization of West Irian ought to be based on the principle of confrontation of national power with the power of Dutch imperialism-colonialism – ‘a confrontation between our macht (power) and the macht of Dutch imperialism-colonialism’ (Soekarno 1960, 43). Euphoric from having just obtained independence and not seeing progress on the issue of West Irian, in an address commemorating the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of independence President Xxxxxxxx announced again that Indonesia would fight to secure the freedom of Xxxxx Xxxx if a negotiatied settlement was not achieved by year’s end...
Policy Response. Assertiveness towards the United States of America Given Xxxxxxxx’x structuralist and confrontationalist outlook on the world, Indonesia’s assertiveness towards the United States of America was simply a natural stance given the extensive U.S. involvement in the world developments pertaining to Indonesia, and the fact that the United States was one of the poles in the then bipolar international order of the Cold War. Xxxxxxxx’x foreign policy assertiveness towards the United States of America can be attributed to three factors: West Irian, Malaysia, and the combination of NEFOS/OLDEFOS and the Djakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Peking-Pyongyang Axis. During the negotiations on the transfer of West Irian from the Netherlands to Indonesia, despite U.S. pressure on the Dutch behind the scenes, no US representatives were present. This absence of the Indonesian requested US representatives from the negotiations created the impression that the United States had withdrawn its guarantee to underwrite the agreement. This impression was further exacerbated by xxx Xxxxxxxx Plan aid of USD 506 million to the Netherlands in the spring of 1948, and by the nonchalant US positions recorded in the United Nations and votes taken in the UN Security Council. Hence, although international pressure mainly from the United States and the United Nations greatly assisted the eventual transfer of West Irian, many Indonesians felt that American interests coincided more closely with the colonial powers than with the newer countries (Xxxxxxxxx 1967, 51-53). At the beginning of the Malaysia issue, the United States had been critical of the United Kingdom’s insensitivity towards Indonesia and tried to mediate. However, due to its own involvement in Vietnam and sensing that President Xxxxxxxx was against all foreign presence in the area, the United States aligned its position with that of the United Kingdom and supported the establishment of Malaysia (Hauswedell 1973, 19-20). Things turned ugly when aid was cut off by the United States after the launch of the Crush Malaysia Campaign in 1963 and President Xxxxxxxx blasted the United States with the famously colorful ‘go to hell with your aid’ retort spoken in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Xxxxxx Xxxxx (Xxxxxxxxx 1967, 226). Precipitated by Indonesia’s close relations with China, relations with the United States went downhill from then on. The PKI was allowed to boycott U.S. films and seize the U.S. Information Service (USIA) in Yogyakarta. Trainin...
Policy Response. A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT 49
Policy Response. A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT This chapter aims to explore the concept of policy, and to consider what is meant by policy response. We adopt a “critical postmodern perspective” (Nudzor, 2009) on the implementation of policy, viewing policy as both an attempt to solve problems and an attempt to persuade social actors to subscribe to particular beliefs that delineate action. We share Ball et al’s (2012, p. 8) conviction that ‘few policies arrive fully formed’ and that the processes of policy enactment ‘involve ad-hockery, borrowing, re- ordering, displacing, making do and re-invention’. However, we also endorse Ball’s (1993, p. 12) view that policies ‘create circumstances in which the range of options available in deciding what to do are narrowed or changed’. Consequently, in this chapter we provide an analysis that acknowledges that policy is in part extemporized, and in part the attempt to promote a “de-stated” account of governance.
