Agency Response definition
Agency Response. Whether or not entering into the Agreement constituted a “project” under CEQA, we believe that, pursuant to title 14, CCR, section 15061(b)(3) it is exempt from CEQA because it is, as the regulation provides,
Agency Response. Along with King County, WA – Petition for Declaratory Order – Burlington Northern Railroad Company – Stampede Pass Line, 1996 WL 545598 (S.T.B. 1996), Cities of Auburn & Kent was the first STB decision to address the preemptive effect of the ICCTA on state and local regulatory actions.2 A number of subsequent STB decisions have refined and clarified the STB’s position in this area, and Cities of Auburn & Kent must accordingly be read in the context of the later decisions. Taken together, these decisions make clear that if the STB were to be presented today with state or local regulations containing the key elements of the Rail Yard Agreement, there is a likelihood – at the very least a substantial possibility – that the STB would conclude those elements are preempted by the ICCTA, specifically by 49 U.S.C. section 10501(b). The key consideration is that the sort of non-preempted waste disposal ordinance referred to in the passage of Cities of Auburn & Kent quoted by ▇▇▇▇▇▇ – and the hypothetical local law prohibiting a railroad from dumping excavated earth into local 2 While the commenter states that the STB’s Cities of Auburn & Kent decision was the ruling “upheld” by the Ninth Circuit in City of Auburn, it is important to recognize that the STB’s discussion of what sort of hypothetical state or local regulations might not be preempted was never referred to or commented upon by the Ninth Circuit panel. The only decision of the STB that was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit was the determination that the state and local permitting laws at issue in the case were preempted by the ICCTA; the Ninth Circuit also found that the STB did not abuse its discretion or render an arbitrary and capricious ruling under the National Environmental Policy Act by approving the railroad line reopening without conducting a full environmental impact statement. City of Auburn, supra, 154 F.2d at 1032- 1033. waterways also referred to by the STB – are nondiscriminatory, generally applicable prohibitions that do not target railroads and do not adversely affect railroad operations. In contrast, all of the significant elements of the Rail Yard Agreement are specifically designed to reduce emissions from railroad locomotives, and they affect how the railroads are permitted to use and operate those locomotives. With that in mind, the four most significant subsequent STB decisions are reviewed below.
Agency Response. The STB decision characterized in the quote from Boston & Maine Corp. is Ayer III, supra, described in the response to Comment 11. As explained in that response, ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇ in no way supports the commenter’s position. The often cited local police powers that have typically been found by the STB and the courts to not be preempted are such ordinances as building and electrical codes, measures that are generally applied across the community and are not specifically, or discriminatorily, applied to railroad operations. The measures covered by the elements of the Agreement, although environmental, are designed to be applied specifically to railroad operations. As the STB stated, its evaluation of whether a state or local measure is preempted or not is a factual question. ARB considered the facts and concluded that the program elements, applied specifically to railway operations, may very well be preempted. Upon its evaluation, ARB concluded that entering into the Agreement with the railroads was the proper course of action – ensuring that immediate emission reductions are achieved and avoiding potentially protracted litigation. As discussed in the response to Comment 15, the STB’s decisions assure that the executed Agreement is clearly enforceable and the railroads cannot subsequently argue that the subject matter of the Agreement’s program elements is preempted.
Examples of Agency Response in a sentence
Recognizing that emergencies may require aid or assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, services and supplies from outside the area of impact, the signatory utilities hereby establish an Intrastate Mutual Aid and Assistance Program called the Illinois Water and Wastewater Agency Response Network (ILWARN).
A Member who requests aid or assistance under the Illinois Water and Wastewater Agency Response Network (ILWARN).
Concord and the Acton Water District have a long history of cooperation on public water supply issues, and both participate in the Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (WARN), an inter-community organization that facilitates the assistance between and among utilities in times of crisis to provide rapid, short-term deployment of emergency services sufficient to restore the critical operation of a utility in need.
In coordination with the emergency management and public health systems of the state, the ILWARN Steering Committee shall develop operational and planning procedures for the Illinois Water and Wastewater Agency Response Network (ILWARN).
A Member that responds to a request for aid or assistance under the Illinois Water and Wastewater Agency Response Network (ILWARN).
More Definitions of Agency Response
Agency Response. The cases cited in the response to Comment 15 indicate that the ICCTA basically protects the railroads from any regulation – environmental or not – that has a potential economic impact on railroad operations. Program Element 2 of the Agreement requires that 80 percent of the locomotive fleet operated in California – including both intrastate and interstate locomotives – use low-sulfur CARB or U.S. EPA on-road diesel fuel. On its face, this is a requirement that inherently affects railroad economics and railway operations; and, thus, could very possibly be found preempted by the ICCTA. Moreover, having a patchwork of different fuel specification standards throughout California, let alone across the nation, would potentially significantly impact interstate railway operations. In light of these considerations, staff decided that the most prudent course would be to address fuel specification use requirements for interstate locomotive through the Agreement process. The Agreement guaranties that a large portion of the railroads’ interstate fleet will be using low sulfur fuel more than
Agency Response. The Eleventh Circuit in Florida E. Coast Railway Co. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) – a case in which the Court held that a city zoning ordinance was not preempted as it applied to an aggregate rock distributor which leased property from the railroad for non-railway purposes – sets forth a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the ICCTA. A summary or the Court’s analysis provides: Our conclusion as to the meaning of the ICCTA pre-emption provision is bolstered by the history and purpose of the ICCTA itself. The statutory changes brought about by the ICCTA reflect the focus of legislative attention on removing direct [emphasis by Court] economic regulation by the States, as opposed to the incidental effects [emphasis by ARB] that inhere in the exercise of traditionally local police powers such as zoning. The pre-ICCTA statute expressly authorized regulation of certain railroad activities to be undertaken concurrently by the federal and state governments, while still other regulation would be the exclusive province of state law. For example, former section 10103 of Title 49 provided that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies provided under this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing under another law or at common law.” 49 U.S.C. § 10103 (1988) [emphasis added by the Court]. Concurrent federal-state authority was also contemplated for much intrastate railroad activity. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)-(d) (1988). Federal law also recognized exclusive state authority over “the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State....” 49 U.S.C. § 10907(b)(1) (1988). See also 49 U.S.C. § 11501(b) (1988) (acknowledging regulatory role of States over railroads). The ICCTA removed the authority of the States to regulate those railroad activities that had previously been subject to state regulation or to concurrent federal-state regulation, providing instead for federal uniformity in the regulation of rail transport. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501 (1994 & Supp.1998).10 [Emphasis added by ARB.]
Agency Response. ARB’s attorneys agree, notwithstanding commenter Nawi’s conjecture, that the Agreement provisions requiring idling reduction devices would likely be preempted under CAA section 209(e)(1)(B) and 40 CFR section 85.1603(c)(2), because such devices would be expected to affect the design and manufacture of the locomotive or locomotive engine.
Agency Response. The Legislature entrusted local air districts with primary authority to regulate nonvehicular sources under Health and Safety Code
Agency Response means the protocol prescribed by the state and county departments that guides practice pertaining to the protection of children in the dual-track response system.
Agency Response. The preemption principles identified by Justice ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ are obviously important in construing the preemptive effect of CAA section 209(e), the ICCTA, and the Boiler Act. But none of the cases he cites actually involve any of these federal laws, despite the fact that there are a substantial number of cases and administrative determinations specifically addressing whether the federal laws – particularly the ICCTA – preempt specific state and local regulations. The relevant cases and administrative determinations are described in the responses to subsequent comments focusing on the particular federal laws. In reaching their decisions in these matters, the courts and boards accounted for the principles cited by Justice ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.
Agency Response. ARB’s attorneys disagree with the commenters’ opinions that all or a vast majority of the Agreement provisions clearly are not preempted by federal law. The four sources of potential preemption are federal Clean Air Act (CAA)