Security Operations & Noncombatant Support Sample Clauses

Security Operations & Noncombatant Support. ‌ As defined in the last chapter, insurgent conflicts are internal political struggles between an armed non-state actor (insurgents) and the security forces of the established government (counter-insurgents). They are civil conflicts fought over the governing authority of or ter- ritorial secession from the established, recognized state. In this class of civil conflict, the military capabilities of the government far exceed those of the insurgent group. Therefore, rather than fight counter-insurgents head-on, where the probability of victory is slim, insur- gent group leaders adopt a guerrilla warfare strategy of prolonged attrition. The ambush and harassment tactics that define a guerrilla warfare strategy leave counter-insurgents little option but to take the defensive, surrendering the initiative to the insurgency. By attacking counter-insurgents and symbols of state authority, insurgents seek to sow chaos, disrupt the economy, and further subvert the established government. The aim is to erode public confidence in the government ability to suppress the insurgent group and protect the population from harm. Insurgent elites hope that their attacks will cause the government to overreact—use disproportional force or take other actions that causes civilian casualties, which will further alienate the government and its security forces from the noncombatant population. As FM 3-24 (2014, 7-2) notes: Often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose of enticing counter-insurgents to overreact, or at least to react in a way that insurgents can exploit. For example, counter-insurgents opening fire on a crowd or executing a clearing operation may create more enemies than it removes from the streets. If an assessment of the effects of a course of action determines that more negative than positive effects may result, an alternative should be considered, potentially including not acting. Because guerrilla tactics are more effective when insurgents can move among the popu- lation without detection and because the preparation for an attack often occurs in public, insurgent success is contingent on the willingness of noncombatants to share information. In brief, the insurgent group’s tactical advantage rests on its ability to attack the gov- ernment when and where they want, which is dependent their ability to plan and execute attacks without detection. Thus, the government’s probability of victory increases with the willingness of no...