Expectations in Governmental Sample Clauses

Expectations in Governmental. Political Ideology Conflicts‌ This project argues that, in governmental/political ideology insurgent conflicts, the political, cultural, and security context are such that an increased presence of counter-insurgents can effectively swing the distribution of noncombatants’ support preferences towards the government. As highlighted in the last chapter, this class of conflict is more likely to occur in institutionally weak states that have high levels of vertical economic and political inequality, which signals the presence of a number of crosscutting cleavages. As such, the general content of an governmental/political ideology strategic narrative centers on exploitation and class-based discrimination. Vertical inequality, economic and political vulnerability, and the inability of the govern- ment to patrol, monitor, and enforce compliance to its policy preferences are the primary conflict-enabling factors in governmental/political ideology insurgent conflicts. Lacking a unifying social identity group, these factors allow insurgent political entrepreneurs to mo- bilize and indoctrinate noncombatants using a narrative frame centered around a political ideology. Insurgent political entrepreneurs use language such as ‘the imperialist govern- ment,’ ‘the exploitation of the masses,’ and ‘the people’s struggle’ to draw attention to their unifying political ideology. Insurgent political entrepreneurs link the economic plight of noncombatants to the absent and neglectful government. The perception that the gov- ernment is exploitive and/or neglectful, favoring the rich at the expense of the common citizen—elements that increase the attractiveness of a governmental political objective. As is the case in all types of insurgent conflict, the immediate goal of violence is to provoke an overreaction by the government and to create economic instability, as both help their recruitment and indoctrination efforts. Prolonged disorder and economic uncertainty are effective mobilization platforms that are “cheap to create and very costly to prevent. The insurgent blows up a bridge, so every bridge has to be guarded... When the insurgent xxxxx a farm, all the farmers clamor for protection; if they do not receive it, they may be tempted to deal privately with the insurgent” (Galula 1964, 6). In governmental/political ideology insurgent conflicts, the party that can provide security becomes the de facto state, and in this regard, the resource superiority of the government gives co...