Trade Remedies. Article 81. Global safeguard measures
Trade Remedies. Article 3.1
Trade Remedies. Section A.
Trade Remedies. This chapter aims to address problems caused either by unfair practices such as dumping and subsidisation, or by a sudden increase in imports. It is a very good result, in particular due to carefully crafted bilateral safeguard clauses, which will apply to both industrial and agricultural goods subject to preferential treatment. It will give the Parties the possibility to provide relief if certain conditions are met, but the rules cannot be abused to remove preferences without due justification. In concrete terms, the trade remedies chapter consists of two parts. The first one covers the WTO trade defence instruments: anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and global safeguards; and the second one covers bilateral safeguard measures. The agreement confirms that WTO trade defence instruments should remain at the disposal of the Parties in order to address problems caused either by unfair practices such as dumping and subsidisation, or by a sudden increase in imports. In addition to the confirmation of the Parties' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements, some additional elements are included, such as increased transparency and extra consultations. The text also provides for imposing a lower duty than the dumping/subsidy margin if this is sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumped or subsidised imports (the so- called ‘lesser duty rule’) and to take into consideration the interests of users and consumers of the imported product. The bilateral safeguard clause provides an opportunity to remedy economic damage caused by unexpected or significant increases in preferential imports resulting from the agreement. This clause is limited in time (up to 18 years from the entry into force of the agreement) and allows for the suspension of preferences during a period of up to two years, with a possible extension of another two years. A provision is also included to cater for the specific circumstances of the outermost regions of the EU and it ensures that there is no risk of disrupting the markets in these regions through imports from Mercosur.
Trade Remedies. Trade remedies allow governments to provide temporary relief to domestic industry from unfair competition from abroad or an unexpected surge in imports. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules cover three types of trade remedy: • Anti-dumping duties. (Applied, in certain circumstances, on an imported product that has been exported at a lower price than its “normal value”.) • Subsidies and countervailing measures. (The WTO rules seek to limit trade-distorting subsidies, and provide for countervailing duties to offset the use of certain subsidies by other countries.) • Safeguard action. (Temporary measures applied to allow domestic producers to adjust to sudden surges in imports.) The Trade Remedies chapter provides that CPTPP Parties retain their rights and obligations under the relevant WTO agreements, and includes an Annex that identifies a range of practices that promote the goals of transparency and due process in anti-dumping and countervailing duty proceedings. The chapter also provides that a Party may apply transitional safeguard measures with respect to imported goods from another Party (which involves temporarily raising the tariff applying to the imported goods), if, as a result of the reduction of tariffs under CPTPP, there is an increase in imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the Party’s domestic industry. The chapter sets out the conditions and procedures for such measures. New Zealand’s agreement to the inclusion of a transitional safeguard mechanism along the lines of outcomes negotiated in past FTAs 19 One-off establishment cost of $400,000, with on-going costs to be met from baseline funding or cost recovered. See Section 8 of this NIA. was conditional on an appropriately ambitious outcome on goods market access. The outcome meets those requirements.
Trade Remedies. As compared to the existing agreement, the Trade Remedies chapter brings clarity and legal certainty to the economic operators by making a clear distinction between the different instruments and clarifying the conditions for their application. The chapter contains three sections. Two are related to the use of the existing WTO instruments (anti-dumping/anti-subsidy and global safeguards), and one relates to bilateral safeguards. While the aim of a free trade agreement is to open markets, the WTO trade defence instruments should remain at the disposal of economic operators, in order to address problems caused by either unfair practices such as dumping and subsidization, or by a sudden increase of imports. In addition to the confirmation of the parties' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements, some additional elements have been included, such as increased transparency and additional consultations. The text also includes provisions allowing for the possibility to introduce a limited level of duties if this is sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped or subsidized imports (the so called lesser duty rule) and a public interest test. The objective of the bilateral safeguard clause is to remedy economic damage caused by an unexpected and significant increase of preferential imports. This clause is limited in time (in general 10 years) and allows for the suspension of preferences during a period of up to 2 years, with a possible extension of one year. While the clause is sufficient to give relief to an industry if the conditions are met, it is also designed in a way that it cannot be abused to remove preferences without due justification.
Trade Remedies. The agreement has confirmed the right of both parties to apply trade defence instruments according to the WTO rules. The agreement has also defined some additional rules ensuring transparency and right of defence during the trade remedy investigations. Both parties have also agreed on a bilateral safeguard clause by which preferences can be temporarily suspended in order to allow a domestic industry to adjust to any significant and unexpected increase of imports resulting from the elimination or reduction of the customs duties.
Trade Remedies. This Chapter regulates the parties’ recourse to anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and safeguard measures in volatile markets. This area is already highly circumscribed by the WTO framework. A UK/EU Agreement could copy over the identical wording. 4. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 4. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) This Chapter prevents the parties frustrating the value of concessions made by ensuring that the same technical standards apply to domestic goods and imports. In essence, this section merely repeats the WTO Agreement on TBTs, but doing so does streamline the process by making commitments enforceable bilaterally and strengthening transparent disclosure. The Protocol II (Mutual Acceptance of the This area is already highly circumscribed (at least in theory) by the WTO framework and by international standard-setting bodies. Subject to one issue, a UK/EU Agreement could copy over the identical wording. The Annex on car registrations might require some revision to reflect current EU practice, and the fact that the UK already follows it. At present there are supposedly no TBTs between the UK/EU because both are CETA PROVISION SUPERCANADA PROVISION
Trade Remedies. Section A: Bilateral Safeguard Measures Article 7.1:
Trade Remedies. The Parties agree to the applicability of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing duties and establish additional notification and consultation requirements. The Parties address the application of anti-dumping measures and provide that a Party may exclude originating products from global safeguard measures if such products do not cause or threaten to cause serious injury, in accordance with WTO rules and practice. Finally, the Agreement provides for the possibility of taking bilateral safeguard measures when a Party faces possible economic injury caused by increases in preferential imports of goods as a consequence of liberalising trade under the Agreement.
