Applicability of. Article The provisions of this Article shall be applicable to any sinking fund for the retirement of Securities of a series, except as otherwise specified as contemplated by Section 2.3(a) for Securities of such series. The minimum amount of any sinking fund payment provided for by the terms of Securities of any series is herein referred to as a "mandatory sinking fund payment," and any payment in excess of such minimum amount provided for by the terms of Securities of any series is herein referred to as an "optional sinking fund payment." If provided for by the terms of Securities of any series, the cash amount of any sinking fund payment may be subject to reduction as provided in Section 10.2. Each sinking fund payment shall be applied to the redemption of Securities of any series as provided for by the terms of the Securities of such series.
Applicability of. SECTION 7.1 TO ARTICLE IV. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in Section 7.1 and to assure the District is compensated by Applicant for any loss that District incurs in its Maintenance and Operations Revenue as a result of, or on account of, entering into this Agreement, any and all payments otherwise due from the Applicant to the District under Articles IV, V, and VI shall not be reduced or eliminated, but rather, to the extent such payments are reduced pursuant to Section 7.1, shall be carried forward from year to year until paid in full. This provision is necessitated by the fact that the Parties are prohibited from modifying Section 7.1, so the Parties have agreed to include this Section 4.11 to express their intent that it supersede Section 7.1.
Applicability of. Salerno. EPA argues that the standard from United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), should apply to GE's pattern and practice claim. EPA Memorandum in Support of its Motion forSummary Judgment ("EPA Mem.") at 17-19. Under Salerno, a plaintiff facially challenging a statute's constitutionality must establish that the statute is unconstitutional in every application.Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. Notwithstanding some debate within the Supreme Court on this "no set of circumstances" prong of Salerno, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999), the D.C. Circuit continues to apply Salerno to facial challenges based on statutory text. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. EPA, 56 F.3d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Indeed this Court did so earlier on GE's textual challenge toCERCLA. See General Electric III, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 343-44. EPA argues now that GE's pattern and practice claim is tantamount to a facial challenge, and that the remedy GE seeks through the present claim -- a remedy "that would apply universally to EPA's conduct" -- is no different than the remedy GE sought in the facial challenge this Court considered (and rejected)
Applicability of. 2 CFR Part 200 All provisions of 2 CFR Part 200 and all Standard Provisions attached to this grant/cooperative agreement are applicable to the Recipient and to sub-recipients which meet the definition of “Recipient” in 2 Part §200.86, unless a section specifically excludes a sub-recipient from coverage. The Recipient and any sub-recipients must, in addition to the assurances made as part of the application, comply and require each of its sub-awardees employed in the completion of the project to comply with Subpart D of 2 CFR Part 200 and include this term in lower-tier (sub-award) covered transactions. Recipients must comply with monitoring procedures and audit requirements in accordance with 2 CFR Part 200, Subpart F—AUDIT REQUIREMENTS.
Applicability of. Janus to Individual Liability In Janus, First Derivative, a class of stockholders in Janus Capital Group (“JCG”), claimed that Janus Capital Management (“JCM”), the investment adviser for Janus Investment Fund (“JIF”), made false statements in prospectuses JIF filed with the SEC. Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299–2300 (2011). The Supreme Court pointed out that JIF and JCG were separate legal entities, that JIF’s sole assets were owned by its investors, even though JCG created JIF, and that the two entities maintained “more independence than is required” given that only one member of the JIF board was associated with JCM. Id. at 2299. The Supreme Court held that only those individuals or entities who have “ultimate authority” to make a statement, “including its content and whether and how to communicate it,” can be held liable for “making” the statement under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 2302.The Supreme Court reasoned that although JCM contributed to and was consulted about misleading statements in JIF’s prospectus, JCM was not the “maker” of the statements. It noted that the trust, rather than its adviser, had the obligation to file the prospectuses with the SEC, even though JCM was “significantly involved” in preparing the prospectuses. Id. at 2304–05. Because JCM did not have ultimate authority over the prospectuses, any assistance it provided constituted mere suggestion. Id.; see also In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 9184, 2012 WL 3758537, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.Aug. 30, 2012) (“In the post-Janus world, an executive may be held accountable where the executive had ultimate authority over the company’s statement; signed the company’s statement; ratified and approved the company’s statement; or where the statement is attributed to the executive.”). The Supreme Court appeared to limit its holding to private actions under Rule 10b-5 and did not address what effect, if any, its holding had on which entities can be liable for “making” statements in SEC enforcement actions. 131 S. Ct. at 2301.Duckson argues, based on Janus, that the Fund “made” the representations in the COMs because though he participated in the drafting process, he did not sign any of the COMs. Duckson further argues that, as a matter of law, he did not have ultimate authority over the November 2008 and February 2009 COMs because TFFM, not Duckson, was the Fund’s Investment Manager. He cites three cases from other jurisdictions including, Kerr v. E...
Applicability of. Article If so provided as contemplated by Section 3.01 hereof for Securities of any series, Securities of any series which are redeemable before their Stated Maturity shall be redeemable in accordance with their terms and in accordance with this Article 4.
Applicability of. Windsor ruling to calculation of FUTA taxes. Consistent with the text of section 3306(c)(5) and the decision in Windsor, for purposes of Federal law, wages paid to a same-sex spouse who is providing services in the employ of his/her same-sex spouse must be excluded from the calculation of FUTA taxes. Consistent with the agency’s broader policy, in the case of FUTA, ETA has adopted a “state of celebration” rule. That is, for purposes of FUTA Section 3306(c)(5), “spouse” refers to persons married in a state that legally recognizes and designates the relationship as a “marriage” under that state’s law. State of residence is not relevant to whether the exclusion applies. For example: An employer is legally married in State #1 (state of celebration), which recognizes same-sex marriage. The couple then moves to State #2 (state of residence), which does not recognize same-sex marriage. While in State #2, the employer pays wages to his/her “spouse” and files a tax return as an employer in the state. With respect to federal payroll taxes, s/he must still observe the FUTA exclusion, even if his/her marriage is not recognized in the state where s/he is filing the return. This interpretation has no effect on state UC law, when state law does not depend on federal law for definitions or interpretations. It does not require states to recognize same-sex marriages, nor does it require an exclusion from coverage of services provided by same-sex spouses in those states that exclude spouses from coverage but do not recognize same-sex marriages. States have authority to determine the scope of the spouse exclusion in accordance with state law. Likewise, this interpretation does not affect payment of benefits under Federal UC programs, including Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE), UnemploymentCompensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX), Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA), and Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRA). States pay benefits to UCFE and UCX claimants under an agreement with the Secretary of Labor, and are required, by the terms of that agreement, to pay benefits “in the same amount, on the same terms, and under the same conditions” as would have been payable under the state UC law. See 5 USC 8502(b). For DUA, the terms and conditions of state law regarding payment of regular compensation generally apply to applications for and payment of DUA. See 20 C.F.R. 625.11. Similarly, for TRA, the law of the state in which the applicant is entitled to UC appli...