The Protocol Sample Clauses

The Protocol. Based on Scheme 1 and the n-DHI assumption, we formulate a two-party key agreement protocol that is secure in the AM. The proof of the security is in fact very similar to the proof of Theorem 8 in [8]. The established session key is often required as a binary string. Since we have no requirements for the representations of the algebras, we assume that for any particular representation of an algebra A, there is an injective public function B that maps elements of the algebra to binary strings. This function can be used to derive a valid session key.
The Protocol. The protocol can be formally speci ed by an e ciently computable function
The Protocol. The Corporation must issue a Verification Document to Xxx Xxx Wurrung members who propose to carry out any activities pursuant to an instrument referred to in item 1. The Verification Document must comply with the requirements in this Schedule 19. The Verification Document must be indelible and must be issued and administered by the Corporation. The Verification Document shall be sufficient to establish an individual’s entitlement to the terms and conditions of the Authorisation Orders and the Exemption and include the following details of the holder: name residential address date of birth; and a unique emblem or insignia of Xxx Xxx Wurrung membership. The Corporation agrees to maintain an accurate register of those Xxx Xxx Wurrung members to whom the Verification Document has been issued. When requested by Authorised Officers, the Corporation agrees to confirm, by reference to this register, whether or not an individual is the holder of the Verification Document. The State will respect the privacy of the members of the Xxx Xxx Wurrung and will comply with the Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) and the Privacy Xxx 0000 (Cth). When an Authorised Officer encounters an individual asserting entitlement to access and use natural resources or carry out activities in accordance with an Authorisation Order or the Exemption, the Authorised Officer will verify the individual’s membership by inspecting the Verification Document. The Authorised Officer may act to ensure compliance with the Authorisation Order or the exemption. If the individual fails to produce the Verification Document to establish his or her entitlement under the Authorisation Orders or the Exemption, the Authorised Officer may act in accordance with his or her statutory duties. The State and the Corporation agree to review the operation of the verification protocol, when either Party requests this in writing. Variations and new Authorisation Orders etc (Clause (b) and 6.8)
The Protocol. ↔ { } Xxxxx and Xxx simultaneously transfer C-signatures of contract M . A symmetric encryption (e.g. one-time pad) of message m with a key K is denoted by m K. We denote by A B : OT 2(m0, m1) the instance of an oblivious transfer protocol with A playing the role of the sender (possessing two strings m0, m1), and B playing the role of the chooser (and selecting the string which he wishes to obtain randomly). Xxxxx chooses random RA ∈ {0, 1}k and random symmetric keys KA,i,b, for i ∈ {1,..., k} and b ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, Xxx chooses random RB ∈ {0, 1}k and random symmetric keys KB,i,b, for i ∈ {1,..., k} and b ∈ {0, 1}. Let k∗ be the length of symmetric key and i-th bit of key K is denoted by A,i,b K ... K B,i,b K ... K .
The Protocol. 2.1.2. the terms of all relevant regulatory permissions and approvals. These may include, but are not limited to:
The Protocol. The Protocol for the ShORe Trial (the “ShORe Protocol”) existing on the Effective Date is set forth on Schedule 2.2.1(a) hereto. The Protocol for the COAST Trial (the “COAST Protocol”) existing on the Effective Date is set forth on Schedule 2.2.1(b) hereto.
The Protocol. The Protocol for the RESPONSE Trial (the “RESPONSE Protocol”) existing on the Effective Date is set forth on Schedule 2.2.1 hereto.
The Protocol. |→ We now combine the three steps (preprocessing, information reconcilia- tion, and privacy amplification) into a single protocol. Depending on the code we use to do information reconciliation the protocol will have dif- ferent properties. We first give the protocol where without specifying a specific code and later insert the different codes we have into that proto- col. For the following theorem recall that S (X; Y Z) is the one-message secret key rate (see Definition 3.1 on page 30).
The Protocol. The protocol consists of executions of the Elect-Subcommittee protocol in each committee node C. Recall that each committee has size k = Θ(log8 n). Since processors participate in many such committees (both per layer, and across layers), messages sent between processors are annotated with the name of the committee node C whose election procedure the message contributes to. If a processor p receives a message from a processor p′, annotated with the committee node C, yet p′ ∈/ vp(C), then p simply disregards the message. P Initially, all processors have identical views of processor nodes in layer 0, and ⊥ ⊥