See id at Article 5.
See id at Article 2. The Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx X. Bose July 19, 2022 Article 3 provides details on the construction of the Shared Network Upgrade.5 Article 4 contains information on force majeure.6 Article 5 covers information reporting.7 Article 6 provides details on creditworthiness, billing, and payments.8 Article 7 contains information related to assignment of the Agreement.9 Article 8 contains information on indemnity.10 Article 9 provides details on breach, cure and default.11 Article 10 contains information regarding termination of the Agreement.12 Article 11 provides information relating to subcontractors.13 Article 12 contains confidentiality provisions.14 Article 13 contains information access and audit rights provisions.15 Article 14 contains information on disputes.16
See id. 37. See 1999 Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA)–Section II ¶¶ B.2.a, available at xxxx://xxx.xxx.xxxx.xxx/policies/1999policy.html .
See id released contract claims and copyright infringement is a tort claim; (2) Immix did not have the authority to release 4DD’s copyright infringement claims;
See id at 7. This appeal followed. 1 Appellant’s petition did not ask the Orphans’ court to construe the residual paragraph found at the end of paragraph A of the SIXTH Article of the Trust. By stipulation filed on September 16, 2013, however, the parties agreed that the declaratory judgment action initiated by Appellant would encompass a construction of the residual paragraph as if the Trustee had filed its own declaratory judgment action. Appellant’s brief raises the following questions for our review: Whether the Orphans’ [c]ourt erred when it concluded that the amount[] [Appellant] is entitled to withdraw under A.1.c. of Article SIXTH of the Trust should be reduced by discretionary payments of principal to her by the Trustee under A.1.b.? Whether the Orphans’ [c]ourt erred when it concluded that the Trustee could give consideration to [Appellant’s] “other resources” when making discretionary payments of principal to her under A.1.b. of Article SIXTH of the Trust? Whether the Orphans’ [c]ourt’s interpretation of Article SIXTH of the Trust ignores the Settlor’s direction to the Trustee to apply principal liberally for [Appellant] to allow her to maintain the lifestyle to which she has become accustomed even if that leads to the exhaustion of the Trust? Whether this Court should reverse the Orphans’ [c]ourt’s interpretation of Article SIXTH of the Trust where it is contrary to the stated intent of the Settlor as set forth in the plain and unambiguous language of the Trust and violates established principles of [t]rust interpretation under Pennsylvania law? Appellant’s Brief at 4.2 Appellant challenges the Orphans court’s construction of Decedent’s Trust. Under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7711(c), “[a] judicial proceeding involving a trust may relate to any matter involving the trust's administration, including a request for declaratory judgment.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7711(c). “Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7531–7541, the [Orphans’] court 2 Our examination of Appellant’s first two claims raised on appeal incorporates a consideration of Decedent’s intent, as expressed in the terms of the Trust. Accordingly, in our discretion, we shall forego independent discussion of claims three and four in Appellant’s statement of questions involved in this appeal.
See id. 3 See id. at 3. employers in the hiring context. Accordingly, errors in credit reports can negatively impact consumers.
See id. Attachment E. The Postal Service filed much of the supporting materials, including the unredacted Governors’ Decision and the unredacted contract, under seal. In its Request, the Postal Service maintains that the contract and related financial information, including the customer’s name and the accompanying analyses that provide prices, terms, conditions, and financial projections, should remain confidential. Id. at 2–3. In Order No. 142, the Commission gave notice of the two dockets, appointed a public representative, and provided the public with an opportunity to comment.7
See id. In the article, Deputy Mayor Xxxxxx X. Xxxxxxxxx is quoted as say- ing, “The university’s expansion is critical. ” Id.
See id. Attachment E. The Postal Service filed much of the supporting materials, including the unredacted Governors’ Decision and the unredacted contract, under seal. In its Request, the Postal Service maintains that the contract and related financial information, including the customer’s name and the accompanying analyses that provide prices, terms, conditions, and financial projections, should remain confidential. Id. at 2–3. In Order No. 185, the Commission gave notice of the two dockets, appointed a public representative, and provided the public with an opportunity to comment.7 II. Comments Comments were filed by the Public Representative.8 No filings were submitted by other interested parties. The Public Representative states that the Postal Service’s filing complies with applicable Commission rules of practice and procedure, and concludes that the Express Mail & Priority Mail Contract 5 agreement comports with the requirements of title 39. Public Representative Comments at 4. He further states that the agreement appears beneficial to the general public. Id. at 1. The Public Representative notes that the Postal Service has provided adequate justification for maintaining confidentiality in this case. Id. at 3. He also points out several contractual provisions that he believes are mutually beneficial to the parties and general public. Id.
See id benefit electorally from backlash. This happened in 1ççç when the citizens of Panama elected President Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx on a platform of renationalization and nonprivatization, after President X. Xxxxxxx Xxxxx Balladares’s attempts to privatize the telecommunications and railway industries failed to achieve desired efficiency benefits and were plagued by financial and political scandals.75 Two major groups may have a financial interest in the breakdown of concession agreements. Competing companies not initially chosen for the concession, and the local consortiums affiliated with them, may oppose the concession agreement’s success because a collapse could provide them with an opportunity to take over the concession agreement or eliminate the first-mover advantage obtained by the initial concessionaire in securing future agreements with the country.76 In addition, local businesspeople affiliated with the state or municipal entity that previously operated in the area of the concession, or otherwise financially benefited from the existing arrangement, will oppose the concession agreement because they will lose business. For example, in Bolivia, local water providers, which included truck vendors, small cooperatives, and neighborhood associations and companies that drilled private xxxxx, were opposed to the Cochabamba concession from the outset because they feared being put out of business by a concessionaire who was given exclusive water rights.77 The extralegislative, insular method by which concessionaires and executive government officials create concession agreements exacerbates this natural opposition from political and business interests in several ways. First, governmental failure to consult with oppositional groups or groups harmed by the project makes those groups feel marginalized.78 The groups will likely feel shut out of the process, and they will, in turn, be even less likely to think of the agreement as legitimate—and to accept it without violence. Second, when government officials fail to meet with business interests who might stand to lose from the agreement, they are less likely to attempt to reach an amicable solution, or one that allows these businesses to stay in business even for a short
