Export competition. 1. For the purposes of this Article, "export subsidies" means subsidies referred to in subparagraph (e) of Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and other subsidies listed in Annex I to the SCM Agreement that may be applied to agricultural goods which are listed in Annex 1 to the Agreement on Agriculture.
Export competition. 1. No Party shall adopt or maintain an export subsidy on any agricultural good destined for the territory of another Party.
Export competition. Covers all forms of government financial incentives or support for exported products (export subsidies, export refunds, export credits, tax breaks, differential pricing practices - operated by State-trading enterprises - abuse of food aid, etc). However, under the application of the Agreement on Agriculture only export refunds are subject to control and reduction. Export control - Export control are measures aimed at controlling either dual use (civil items which can be used to contribute to producing arms) or arms. Export credit - Financing arrangement allowing a foreign buyer of exported goods and/or services to defer payment over a period of time, often used also for an insurance or guarantee arrangement. Export Credit Agency - Institution dealing with export credits. Export enhancement programme – see EEP Export Subsidies - Any form of government payment that helps an exporter or manufacturing concern to lower its export costs. Export-performance - Requirement that a certain quantity of production must be exported. External responsibilities of the EC whether they are conferred on the - The EC‘s external responsibilities are defined in accordance with Community or on the Member States. They are described as "exclusive" where they are exercised entirely by the Community and "mixed" where they are shared with the Member States. The distinction has been defined in Court of Justice case law and is based on the principle of implicit responsibility, whereby external responsibility derives from the existence of internal responsibility. The Treaty confers explicit responsibility in only two cases: commercial policy (Article 133) and association agreements (Article 310).
Export competition. 1. The Parties reaffirm their commitments expressed in the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition.
Export competition. As for export competition, the Framework includes an agreed target for this pillar: elimination of export subsidies by a ‘credible’ date. The Framework Agreement refers to “all forms of export subsidies” which means parallel elimination of the subsidy component of government-supported export credit (with the phasing-out of credits and insurance of over 180 days), food aid, and State-sanctioned exporting monopolies. The negotiations will also develop disciplines on all export measures whose effects are equivalent to subsidies. The final stage of the negotiations has to finalise the identification of policies with equivalent effect within the scope of export credits with repayment terms of 180 days or below, certain types of Food Aid, and certain practices of exporting State Trading Enterprises (STEs). Within the WTO membership, the EU accounts for 92% of export subsidies in value, with an expenditure of $29.3 billion over the 1995–2000 period. However, in 2000-2001, the EU granted export subsidies by
Export competition. CAP’s export subsidies to reduce its support price-induced surpluses was one of the greatest sources of contention. Competitors regained some of the lost market share by providing their own export subsidies, a budgetary expense. Previous GATT failures to discipline CAP on this provided the motivation for its presence in the Uruguay Round. Although not eliminating export subsidies (the EU and US refused to eliminate the subsidies) the Uruguay Round succeeded in lessening the role of export subsidies by agreeing to binding constraints on export subsidization. Furthermore, for the first time, new export subsidies are banned. This, in conjunction with binding tariffication that limited the EU’s ability to protect its domestic markets, meant a major reform in the operation of the CAP. Table 2, modified from IATRC, contains the main features of the export subsidy provisions. Table 2 Key Export Subsidy Provisions in the Agreement on Agriculture
Export competition. The industrial countries' export subsi- dies have a particularly negative impact on farming in developing countries. They lower world market prices, drive down local prices and ruin all those farmers whose governments can not or do not want to pay subsidies or apply protective tariffs. While the complete abolition of these direct export subsidies and other forms of export competition was decided as part of the framework agreement no time-scale has been set. The envisaged rules do not adequately address indirect ways of subsidizing exports. The abolition of export subsidies is a matter of course. The industrial- ized countries must not use it to gain an advantage in the negotiations.
Export competition. 1. For the purposes of this Article:
