Performance Clawback Sample Clauses

Performance Clawback. A. If the number of full time equivalent employees attributable to the Project is less than 120 (Projected FTE Employees stated in application) (the “Employment Target”) on the first December 31 following the Completion Date and every December 31 thereafter (each a “Performance Date”) as set forth in the annual report of the Company to the Issuer pursuant to Section 4.20, then the Company may be required to pay to the Issuer, no later than the end of the calendar year immediately following the calendar year in which the Performance Date occurs (each a “Performance Year”), an amount not exceeding (i) that percentage (shown below corresponding to the percentage of the Employment Target that the Company actually employed on the pertinent Performance Date) (the “Employment Target Applicable Percentage”) of the ad valorem taxes on real and personal Leased Property that the Company would have been required to pay with respect to the Performance Year if the Bond had not been issued by the Issuer and the Leased Property had been subject to ad valorem taxation, calculated using mill levies and actual property tax valuations and rates for the Performance Year, plus (ii) the Employment Target Applicable Percentage of the amount of gross receipts tax that would have been payable by vendors of Leased Property with respect to the Performance Year if the Bond had not been issued and receipts from sales of Leased Property had not been deductible from gross receipts of the vendors plus (iii) the Employment Target Applicable Percentage of the amount of compensating tax that would have been payable (arising from liability incurred in the Performance Year) by the Company with respect to Leased Property if the Bond had not been issued. Percentage of Employment Target Applicable Percentage Less than 70% 100% 70% or more but less than 80% 20% 80% or more but less than 90% 10% 90% or more 0%
Sample 1
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Performance Clawback. If Interfaith does not achieve the Job Target set forth in Section 4(b) of this Agreement on or before (the “Job Target Date”), Interfaith shall make a penalty payment to the County (the “Performance Clawback”) in the amount of $ for each job Interfaith falls below the Job Target. If Interfaith has been required to pay the Facility Closure Clawback, Interfaith will not be required to pay any Performance Clawback that may come due after the date of such payment.
Sample 1
Performance Clawback. It is the Company’s intent to create, hire and maintain the number of jobs set forth in the table below under the column captioned “Cumulative Fulltime Target Job Number” on the Job Measurement Dates set forth below. If the Company does not meet or exceed the job numbers set forth under the column captioned “Minimum Job Number” in the table below on each of the specified Job Measurement Dates (and after expiration of the Cure Periods), then the Company shall be required to pay a Clawback Penalty (as defined below) to the County which will be applied in the percentage set forth in the table below: Job Creation Commitment and Schedule Job Measurement Date Cumulative Fulltime Target Job Number Minimum Job Number Clawback Due if Minimum Job Number not met December 31, 2024 4 4 100% of Clawback Penalty December 31, 2028 20 18 50% of Clawback Penalty Total 20 Starting Headcount: 0 As of: Ordinance approval The “Clawback Penalty” is a penalty that the Company will be required to pay the County upon the Company’s failure to meet the Minimum Job Target on the applicable Job Determination Date, if such Minimum Job Target is not otherwise reached by the Company during the Cure Period. The Clawback Penalty shall be equal to the product of the Percentage Hiring Shortfall (as defined herein), multiplied by the total State Contribution paid to the Company as of that time. For purposes of this subsection, the “Percentage Hiring Shortfall” shall be the quotient of (i) the Minimum Job Number for applicable Job Determination Date, minus the actual number of jobs the Company maintains at the Facility at that time, divided by (ii) the Minimum Job Number for applicable Job Determination Date. See Attachment 1 hereto for examples of Clawback Calculations “Cure Period” is the period of 180 calendar days after each Job Determination Date during which the Company shall have the opportunity to cure any shortfall in meeting the Minimum Job Number. For the avoidance of doubt, if the Company meets the Minimum Job Number at any time during the Cure Period as validated by the job reporting requirements set forth herein, the Company shall have no obligation to pay a Clawback Penalty corresponding to the applicable Job Determination Date. If the Company fails to reach the Minimum Job Number during the Cure Period, the Company shall pay the County a Clawback Penalty determined in accordance with the table set forth above.
Sample 1

Related to Performance Clawback

  • Performance Incentive 4.9.1 If the Seller delivers Coal to the Purchaser in excess of ninety percent (90%) of the ACQ in a particular Year, the Purchaser shall pay the Seller an incentive (“Performance Incentive”/ “PI”), to be determined as follows: PI = P x Additional Deliveries x Multiplier Where: PI = The Performance Incentive payable by the Purchaser to the Seller P = The Base Price of Highest Grade, as shown in Schedule II Additional Deliveries = Quantity [in tonnes] of Coal delivered by the Seller in the relevant Year in excess of 90% of the ACQ. Multiplier shall be 0.15 for Additional Deliveries between 90%-95% of ACQ and 0.30 for Additional Deliveries in excess of 95% of ACQ.

  • Performance Incentives Provided that sufficient funds are available from athletics revenue or gifts for the unrestricted use of the Department of Athletics, Athletics Director shall be entitled to receive additional non-salary compensation from the University in the form of the following stated bonuses for increased responsibilities, provided that all varsity sports are in compliance with all Governing Athletics Rules and University Rules, and there are no pending or active NCAA or __________ Conference investigations or major violations of which Athletics Director knew or should have known. [Insert Incentives – See examples below

  • PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 8 A. CONTRACTOR shall achieve performance objectives, tracking and reporting Performance 9 Outcome Objective statistics in monthly programmatic reports, as appropriate. ADMINISTRATOR 10 recognizes that alterations may be necessary to the following services to meet the objectives, and,

  • Performance Goals A. The Trust and State Street have developed mutually acceptable performance goals dated March 1, 2011 , and as may be amended from time to time, regarding the manner in which they expect to deliver and receive the services under this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “Service Level Agreement”). The parties agree that such Service Level Agreement reflects performance goals and any failure to perform in accordance with the provisions thereof shall not be considered a breach of contract that gives rise to contractual or other remedies. It is the intention of the parties that the sole remedy for failure to perform in accordance with the provisions of the Service Level Agreement, or any dispute relating to performance goals set forth in the Service Level Agreement, will be a meeting of the parties to resolve the failure pursuant to the consultation procedure described in Sections V. B. and V.C. below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties hereby acknowledge that any party’s failure (or lack thereof) to meet the provisions of the Service Level Agreement, while not in and of itself a breach of contract giving rise to contractual or other remedies, may factor into the Trust’s reasonably determined belief regarding the standard of care exercised by State Street hereunder.

  • PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 4.1 The Performance Plan (Annexure A) sets out-

  • Performance Targets Threshold, target and maximum performance levels for each performance measure of the performance period are contained in Appendix B.

  • Performance Framework Service Agreements are a central component of the NSW Health Performance Framework, which documents how the Ministry monitors and assesses the performance of public sector health services to achieve expected service levels, financial performance, governance and other requirements. The performance of a health service is assessed on whether the organisation is meeting the strategic objectives for NSW Health and government, the Premier’s Priorities and performance against key performance indicators. The availability and implementation of governance structures and processes, and whether there has been a significant critical incident or sentinel event also influences the assessment. The Framework sets out responses to performance concerns and management processes that support the achievement of outcomes in accordance with NSW Health and government policies and priorities. Performance concerns will be raised with the Organisation for focused discussion at performance review meetings in line with the NSW Health Performance Framework available at: xxxx://xxx.xxxxxx.xxx.xxx.xx/Xxxxxxxxxxx/Xxxxx/xxxxxxxxxx.xxxx Legislation, governance and performance framework 2021–22 Service Agreement 6

  • Performance Frameworks ‌ The School's academic, organizational, and financial performance under this Charter Contract shall be evaluated using the Academic, Organizational, and Financial Performance Frameworks, respectively, attached as Exhibit B to this Charter Contract. The specific terms, forms, and requirements of the Performance Frameworks, including any required indicators, measures, metrics, and targets, are maintained and disseminated by the Commission and shall be binding on the School. Material changes to the Performance Frameworks shall require approval by the Commission.

  • Performance Pay In accordance with Section 8 of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020-2021, contingent upon the availability of funds and at the Agency Head’s discretion, each agency is authorized to grant merit pay increases based on the employee’s exemplary performance, as evidenced by a performance evaluation conducted pursuant to Rule 60L-35, Florida Administrative Code.

  • Performance Metrics In the event Grantee fails to timely achieve the following performance metrics (the “Performance Metrics”), then in accordance with Section 8.4 below Grantee shall upon written demand by Triumph repay to Triumph all portions of Grant theretofore funded to and received by Grantee:

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