Performance Clawback Clause Samples
A Performance Clawback clause allows an employer or company to reclaim previously awarded compensation or benefits from an employee if certain performance targets are later found not to have been met or if misconduct is discovered. Typically, this clause applies to bonuses, stock options, or other incentive-based payments, and may be triggered by events such as financial restatements, regulatory violations, or breaches of company policy. Its core practical function is to protect the company from overcompensating employees based on inaccurate or misleading performance results, thereby aligning employee incentives with long-term organizational goals and accountability.
POPULAR SAMPLE Copied 2 times
Performance Clawback. If Interfaith does not achieve the Job Target set forth in Section 4(b) of this Agreement on or before (the “Job Target Date”), Interfaith shall make a penalty payment to the County (the “Performance Clawback”) in the amount of $ for each job Interfaith falls below the Job Target. If Interfaith has been required to pay the Facility Closure Clawback, Interfaith will not be required to pay any Performance Clawback that may come due after the date of such payment.
Performance Clawback. A. If the number of new full time equivalent direct employees hired after the date of this Lease is less than 60 on December 31, 2023 (i.e. over and above the headcount of 171 employees employed at the Series 2011 Project as of October 31, 2017) and every December 31 thereafter (the “Employment Target” and each such December 31 date on which the Employment Target is determined, a “Performance Date”) as set forth in the annual report of the Company furnished to the Issuer pursuant to Section 4.21, then the Company may be required to pay to the Issuer, no later than the end of the calendar year immediately following the calendar year in which the Performance Date occurs (each a “Performance Year”), an amount not exceeding (i) that percentage shown below corresponding to the Percentage of the Employment Target that the Company actually employed on the pertinent Performance Date (the “Employment Target Applicable Percentage”) of the ad valorem taxes on the Series 2018 PILOT Property (as defined in Section 5.10) that the Company would have been required to pay with respect to the Performance Year if the Series 2018 Bonds had not been issued by the Issuer and the Series 2018 PILOT Property had been subject to ad valorem taxation, calculated using mill levies and actual property tax valuations and rates for the Performance Year, plus (ii) the Employment Target Applicable Percentage of the amount of gross receipts tax that would have been payable by vendors of the Series 2018 Improvements with respect to the Performance Year if the Series 2018 Bonds had not been issued and receipts from sales of the Series 2018 Improvements had not been deductible from gross receipts of the vendors plus (iii) the Employment Target Applicable Percentage of the amount of compensating tax that would have been payable (arising from liability incurred in the Performance Year) by the Company with respect to the Series 2018 Improvements if the Series 2018 Bonds had not been issued.
B. The Company acknowledges that the average projected salary with respect to the categories of jobs to be attributed to the Series 2018 Project referred to in subsection A of this Section is $37,100. If, on the first Performance Date and each Performance Date thereafter, the average annual salary actually paid with respect to such jobs, as set forth in the annual report of the Company furnished to the Issuer pursuant to Section 4.21 is less than projected above (the “Projected Wage”), then the Company shall b...
Performance Clawback. It is the Company’s intent to create, hire and maintain the number of jobs set forth in the table below under the column captioned “Cumulative Fulltime Target Job Number” on the Job Measurement Dates set forth below. If the Company does not meet or exceed the job numbers set forth under the column captioned “Minimum Job Number” in the table below on each of the specified Job Measurement Dates (and after expiration of the Cure Periods), then the Company shall be required to pay a Clawback Penalty (as defined below) to the County which will be applied in the percentage set forth in the table below: December 31, 2024 4 4 100% of Clawback Penalty December 31, 2028 20 18 50% of Clawback Penalty Starting Headcount: 0 As of: Ordinance approval The “Clawback Penalty” is a penalty that the Company will be required to pay the County upon the Company’s failure to meet the Minimum Job Target on the applicable Job Determination Date, if such Minimum Job Target is not otherwise reached by the Company during the Cure Period. The Clawback Penalty shall be equal to the product of the Percentage Hiring Shortfall (as defined herein), multiplied by the total State Contribution paid to the Company as of that time. For purposes of this subsection, the “Percentage Hiring Shortfall” shall be the quotient of (i) the Minimum Job Number for applicable Job Determination Date, minus the actual number of jobs the Company maintains at the Facility at that time, divided by (ii) the Minimum Job Number for applicable Job Determination Date. See Attachment 1 hereto for examples of Clawback Calculations “Cure Period” is the period of 180 calendar days after each Job Determination Date during which the Company shall have the opportunity to cure any shortfall in meeting the Minimum Job Number. For the avoidance of doubt, if the Company meets the Minimum Job Number at any time during the Cure Period as validated by the job reporting requirements set forth herein, the Company shall have no obligation to pay a Clawback Penalty corresponding to the applicable Job Determination Date. If the Company fails to reach the Minimum Job Number during the Cure Period, the Company shall pay the County a Clawback Penalty determined in accordance with the table set forth above.