Structural factors. Concentration Other things being equal, collusion is the more likely the smaller the number of firms in the industry. The comparison between gains and losses from deviations illustrates why this is the case. Imagine that there are many firms of identical size and of large capacity which co-exist in the industry. At a collusive situation, each of them will set a high price and get a (small) share of the total profits. However, if one of them deviates and sets a price lower than the rivals, it might get all the market for itself. Even if the punishment was harsh, so that a very small stream of expected profits would follow after a deviation, the gains from deviating would be so extraordinarily large in the deviation period that they would outweigh the collusive profits foregone during the punishment period. Compare this situation with the extreme one where there are only two firms in the industry. At a collusive equilibrium, they would get half the market, so that the gains from deviating are smaller relative to the lower profits due to the punishment which follows. If firms are symmetric, a lower number of firms is equivalent to a higher degree of concentration, which is therefore associated - ceteris paribus - with more likely (tacit or explicit) collusion. However, we shall see below that the more firms are asymmetric (in ca- pacities, market shares, costs, or product range) the less likely collusion will be. This qualifies the finding that concentration facilitates collusion, in the following sense. If a measure of concentration rises with the asymmetric distribution of assets among the firms - as is the case with the Xxxxxxxxxx- Xxxxxxxxx Index (see chapter S) - then one should expect an ambiguous relationship between concentration and collusion: such a measure confounds two factors - higher average market share and asymmetry - that aDect col- lusion in opposite ways. If instead the measure of concentration used does not vary with asymmetry - like for the concentration ratios, C&, that sum the market shares of the h largest firms in the industry - then an increase in measured concentration should correspond to higher likelihood of collusion. Finally, note that the concentration also helps firms' coordination on a collusive outcome, not only its enforcement: the lower the number of players in the industry the easier for them to coordinate their behaviour. Cntry The easier entry into an industry (the lower entry barriers) the more di9cult to sustain collu...
Structural factors. HST Bridge and Overpass Superstructure: Types and Materials Selection of bridge or overpass superstructure is highly dependent on location, span, design loads and purpose. The superstructure form selected will establish the overall aesthetic character of the HST bridge or overpass. Superstructure may be constructed of reinforced concrete or steel. Generally, lighter, thinner structural members will result in a more pleasing appearance. Depth of structural members is highly dependent upon span length; in order to lighten horizontal members, spans may be shortened and columns increased. Representative HST bridge and overpass types include the following: Concrete Arch, Cologne-Rhine, Germany Steel Girder, Mosel, Germany Steel Arch, Korea XXX Xxxxx Xxxxx, Xxx Xxxx Xxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx, Xxxx Xxxx Cable Stayed, East Huntington HST Bridge and Overpass Types HSR 13-06 - EXECUTION VERSION Substructure HST bridge and overpass substructures may be nearly as visible from below as the superstructure. As the examples above illustrate, a visually successful bridge or overpass integrates visible structural elements into a cohesive design. Seismic Considerations California’s structural design standards often result in bridge and overpasss with robust individual members and a xxxxx presence. When a structural member appears to be out of proportion compared to other members, bridge and overpass proportions should be carefully adjusted.
