Payment of Performance Metric Clawback Amounts Sample Clauses

Payment of Performance Metric Clawback Amounts. In the event the Company fails to timely achieve any of the Performance Metrics set forth in in Section 2(a) and/or (b) above, then the Company shall pay to Triumph, within thirty (30) days of demand therefor, an amount of the Grant proportional to the jobs shortfall, based on $166,667 per job (see the basis for this number below). For example, if there is a shortfall of 1 job (35 jobs created or maintained instead of 36), then the amount owed would be $166,667 (1 x 166,667), and if there is a shortfall of 20 jobs (16 jobs created or maintained instead of 36), then the amount owed would be $3,333,340 (20 x $166,667). The $166,667 per job amount is determined by dividing the $6,000,000 Grant amount by the 36 promised jobs. In the event the Company fails to timely achieve the Performance Metric set forth in Section 2(c) above, then upon written demand by Triumph, the Company shall pay to Triumph an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) multiplied by the difference between (a) $32,000,000, minus (b) the actual amount of monies or funding received by Company focusing on the broader objectives of the Company’s activities. By way of example only, if the actual amount of such monies or funds was $26,000,000 rather than $32,000,000, the Company must pay to Triumph $900,000 (15% x ($32,000,000 - $26,000,000 = $6,000,000)). All amounts owed shall be repaid with interest at the rate Wall Street Journal Prime Rate plus three percent (3%) per annum on such amounts to be repaid. Such interest shall accrue commencing on the date of such written demand by Triumph and shall continue to accrue until the amount demanded is repaid in full. The amount(s) due under this Section 4, including interest thereon and any attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Triumph in connection with enforcing this Agreement is referred to herein as the “Performance Metric Clawback Amount.”
Sample 1
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Payment of Performance Metric Clawback Amounts. In the event the Company fails to timely achieve both of the Performance Metrics described in Section 3 above, then the Company shall pay to Triumph, within thirty (30) days of demand therefor, an amount of the Grant proportional to the jobs shortfall, based on $35,000 per job (see the basis for this number below). For example, if there is a shortfall of 1 job (199 jobs created or maintained instead of 200), then the amount owed would be $35,000 (1 x $35,000), and if there is a shortfall of 75 jobs (125 jobs created or maintained instead of 200), then the amount owed would be $2,625,000 (75 x $35,000). The $35,000 per job amount is determined by dividing the $7,000,000 Grant amount by the 200 promised jobs. All amounts owed under this Section 4 shall be repaid with interest at the rate Wall Street Journal Prime Rate plus three percent (3%) per annum on such amounts to be repaid. Such interest shall accrue commencing on the date of such written demand by Triumph and shall continue to accrue until the amount demanded is repaid in full. The amount(s) due under this Section 4, including interest thereon and any attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Triumph in connection with enforcing this Agreement is referred to herein as the “Performance Metric Clawback Amount.” Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the Company’s liability under this Agreement for payment of all or any portion of the Performance Metric Clawback Amount shall not exceed the sum of Seven Million Dollars ($7,000,000), plus interest and attorney’s fees under this Agreement.
Sample 1
Payment of Performance Metric Clawback Amounts. In the event the Company fails to timely achieve both of the Performance Metrics described in Section 3 above, and the Company fails to achieve the same within thirty (30) days after notice from Triumph to the Company specifying the facts constituting such failure, or if the failure is not reasonably capable of being cured within such thirty (30) day period, then for such longer period of time as long as the Company is diligently prosecuting the cure of such failure, then the Obligors shall pay to Triumph, within ninety (90) days of such demand (the “Clawback Repayment Period”), an amount of the Grant proportional to the New Jobs shortfall, based on $35,000 per New Job (see the basis for this number below). For example, if there is a shortfall of 1 New Job (104 New Jobs created or maintained instead of 105), then the amount owed would be $35,000 (1 x $35,000), and if there is a shortfall of 40 New Jobs (65 New Jobs created or maintained instead of 105, then the amount owed would be $1,400,000 (40 x $35,000). The $35,000 per New Job amount is determined by dividing the $3,675,000 Grant amount by the 105 promised jobs. All remaining amounts owed as of the end of the Clawback Repayment Period shall be repaid with interest at the rate Wall Street Journal Prime Rate plus three percent (3%) per annum on such amounts to be repaid. Such interest shall accrue commencing upon the expiration of the Clawback Repayment Period and shall continue to accrue until the amount demanded is repaid in full. The amount(s) due under this Section 4, including any interest thereon and any attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Triumph in connection with enforcing this Agreement is referred to herein as the “Performance Metric Clawback Amount.” The liability of the Company and the Principal under this Agreement is joint and several. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the Obligors’ liability under this Agreement for payment of all or any portion of the Performance Metric Clawback Amount shall not exceed the sum of Three Million Six Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($3,675,000), plus any interest and attorney’s fees under this Agreement.
Sample 1
Payment of Performance Metric Clawback Amounts. In the event the Company fails to timely achieve both of the Performance Metrics described in Section 2 above, then the Company shall pay to Triumph, within thirty (30) days of demand therefor, an amount of the Grant proportional to the jobs shortfall, based on $45,000 per job (see the basis for this number below). For example, if there is a shortfall of 1 job (249 jobs created or maintained instead of 250), then the amount owed would be $45,000 (1 x 45,000), and if there is a shortfall of 25 jobs (225 jobs created or maintained instead of 250), then the amount owed would be $1,125,000 (25 x $45,000). ).The $45,000 per job amount is determined by dividing the $11,250,000 Grant amount by the 250 promised jobs. All amounts owed shall be repaid with interest at the rate Wall Street Journal Prime Rate plus three percent (3%) per annum on such amounts to be repaid. Such interest shall accrue commencing on the date of such written demand by Triumph and shall continue to accrue until the amount demanded is repaid in full. The amount(s) due under this Section 4, including interest thereon and any attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Triumph in connection with enforcing this Agreement is referred to herein as the “Performance Metric Clawback Amount.”
Sample 1

Related to Payment of Performance Metric Clawback Amounts

  • Covenants of Performance Measurement No interference. Registry Operator shall not interfere with measurement Probes, including any form of preferential treatment of the requests for the monitored services. Registry Operator shall respond to the measurement tests described in this Specification as it would to any other request from an Internet user (for DNS and RDDS) or registrar (for EPP). ICANN testing registrar. Registry Operator agrees that ICANN will have a testing registrar used for purposes of measuring the SLRs described above. Registry Operator agrees to not provide any differentiated treatment for the testing registrar other than no billing of the transactions. ICANN shall not use the registrar for registering domain names (or other registry objects) for itself or others, except for the purposes of verifying contractual compliance with the conditions described in this Agreement. PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENTS Registry Operator will use only ICANN accredited registrars that are party to the Registrar Accreditation Agreement approved by the ICANN Board of Directors on 27 June 2013 in registering domain names. A list of such registrars shall be maintained by ICANN on ICANN’s website. (Intentionally omitted. Registry Operator has not included commitments, statements of intent or business plans provided for in its application to ICANN for the TLD.) Registry Operator agrees to perform the following specific public interest commitments, which commitments shall be enforceable by ICANN and through the Public Interest Commitment Dispute Resolution Process established by ICANN (posted at xxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xxx/en/resources/registries/picdrp), which may be revised in immaterial respects by ICANN from time to time (the “PICDRP”). Registry Operator shall comply with the PICDRP. Registry Operator agrees to implement and adhere to any remedies ICANN imposes (which may include any reasonable remedy, including for the avoidance of doubt, the termination of the Registry Agreement pursuant to Section 4.3(e) of the Agreement) following a determination by any PICDRP panel and to be bound by any such determination. Registry Operator will include a provision in its Registry-Registrar Agreement that requires Registrars to include in their Registration Agreements a provision prohibiting Registered Name Holders from distributing malware, abusively operating botnets, phishing, piracy, trademark or copyright infringement, fraudulent or deceptive practices, counterfeiting or otherwise engaging in activity contrary to applicable law, and providing (consistent with applicable law and any related procedures) consequences for such activities including suspension of the domain name. Registry Operator will periodically conduct a technical analysis to assess whether domains in the TLD are being used to perpetrate security threats, such as pharming, phishing, malware, and botnets. Registry Operator will maintain statistical reports on the number of security threats identified and the actions taken as a result of the periodic security checks. Registry Operator will maintain these reports for the term of the Agreement unless a shorter period is required by law or approved by ICANN, and will provide them to ICANN upon request. Registry Operator will operate the TLD in a transparent manner consistent with general principles of openness and non-discrimination by establishing, publishing and adhering to clear registration policies.

  • Ongoing Performance Measures The Department intends to use performance-reporting tools in order to measure the performance of Contractor(s). These tools will include the Contractor Performance Survey (Exhibit H), to be completed by Customers on a quarterly basis. Such measures will allow the Department to better track Vendor performance through the term of the Contract(s) and ensure that Contractor(s) consistently provide quality services to the State and its Customers. The Department reserves the right to modify the Contractor Performance Survey document and introduce additional performance-reporting tools as they are developed, including online tools (e.g. tools within MFMP or on the Department's website).

  • Performance Schedule The Parties will perform their respective responsibilities in accordance with the Performance Schedule. By executing this Agreement, Customer authorizes Motorola to proceed with contract performance.

  • Availability of Performance Order If, and to the extent that, a breach of this contract has been caused by a Relevant Force Majeure Event, the Non-affected Party shall not be entitled to a Performance Order except to secure performance by the Affected Party of its obligations under this Clause 17.

  • Performance Metrics In the event Grantee fails to timely achieve the following performance metrics (the “Performance Metrics”), then in accordance with Section 8.4 below Grantee shall upon written demand by Triumph repay to Triumph all portions of Grant theretofore funded to and received by Grantee:

  • Employee Performance Evaluations Any employee performance evaluation shall be prepared by the employee's supervisor who has the responsibility and authority to prepare such reports. Employee performance evaluation reports shall be discussed with the employee prior to finalization of each category of the report. An employee will receive an appointment with his/her department's reviewing officer to discuss the evaluation by signing the evaluation form in the space provided. Each department shall make a reasonable effort to ensure that the reviewing officer for this purpose has not been a party to the preparation of the evaluation. In no case shall the reviewing officer sign the evaluation form until a review has occurred. Any regular or special evaluation with a rating of "unsatisfactory" shall include plans for employee development. Except in cases of termination, release from probation, or leave of absence, employees who receive an unsatisfactory performance evaluation must receive a follow-up evaluation. The follow-up evaluation shall cover a period of time no greater than ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the final review of the initial unsatisfactory evaluation. An employee shall have the right to submit written comments regarding any evaluation and to have such comments included in his/her personnel file along with the evaluation.

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