Xxxxx’ Theory of Justice. Xxxxx’ Theory of Justice (1999) which aims to propose principles of a just society has limitations that do not make it a suitable theory to underpin the capability to live in the community as an equal member, or for the capabilities of disabled persons more broadly. One main issue is its focus on the fair distribution of resources or ‘primary goods’, things that every individual would want in order to pursue their different life plans. Partly in response to this theory, Xxx pointed out in the ‘Equality of What?’ lectures, that resources should not be the primary focus of justice. Firstly, they are instrumental to what we truly value, namely wellbeing. And the equal distribution of resources does not guarantee that persons will have the same wellbeing outcomes because every individual is diversely situated. When the focus is on the capabilities persons can achieve, which explicitly takes account of the diversity of individuals, their internal and external factors and their conversion factors, as well as the availability of resources, this is avoided (Sen, 1979). This leads to the second aspect where the CA has the advantage over Xxxxx’ social contract in providing support for the CLCES argument. Xxxxx develops his theoretical architecture of a just society based on an abstract or ideal human being, an individual who has the capacity to reason, is self-interested, has a sense of justice, and can cooperate equally with others to contribute to society (Xxxxxxxx, 2006b; Xxxxx, 1999; Xxxxxxx, 1996). As a result, people with disabilities, both physical and mental, are excluded from the designing of basic social institutions from the start. That is, their interests are to be addressed after the basic institutions are designed around the interests of non-disabled human beings. Xxxxx (2005) argued that their needs would be addressed after the basic institutions were designed (p.20). This exclusion leaves persons with disabilities out of distributive justice and therefore renders them subjects of charity (Simplican, 2016). Furthermore, Xxxxx considered human health, which includes mental health, to be a good that is not socially produced. That is, he considered this good to be a ‘natural good’ and not a matter of social justice (Xxxxx, 1999; Venkatapuram, 2011). In contrast, the CA and the social model of disability’s understand disabilities (health-related issues) as the product of both biological and social factors (Xxxxxx, 2013; Xxxxxxxxx et al., 2016a). As such, ...
Xxxxx’ Theory of Justice. Xxxxx’ thoughts on human rights were developed within the framework of “justice as fairness.” As such, it would be prudent to briefly address this notion of justice before delving into its specification of particular rights. For Xxxxx, justice is “the virtue of practices where there are assumed to be competing interests and conflicting claims, and where it is supposed that persons will press their rights on each other.”3 There are two principles of justice: that each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all; and that inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work to everyone’s advantage.4 Xxxxx arrives at the two principles of justice through a thought experiment called the veil of ignorance. In deliberating about requirements of justice, Xxxxx rightly acknowledges that thinkers may be biased based on their particular position in society. Any conclusions drawn in such a way are likely to be self-interested.5 In order to remove any personal bias, Xxxxx proposes that the discussion take place under the veil of ignorance. Under the veil of ignorance, individuals deliberate about justice without knowledge of their position in society; they have no idea which socioeconomic class they may be born into, what natural aptitudes they may 3 Xxxxx, “Justice as Fairness,” Philosophical Review, 64, no.1 (January 1955), 3-32, in Xxxx Xxxxx: Collected Papers, 56. 5 We can imagine that a destitute individual would prefer extensive governmental provisions to improve his condition whereas a wealthy individual may not desire to pay such taxes. possess, what their conception of the good may be, and so on.6 This is what Xxxxx calls the “original position.”7 The conclusions individuals reach in the original position – the two aforementioned principles of justice –serve as criteria by which one may evaluate the legitimacy of social arrangements.8
