Design Goals. We seek a protocol with the following characteristics: — Security: No one other than the participants may have access to the generated key. — PFS: It must approach Perfect Forward Secrecy. — Privacy: It must preserve the privacy of the initiator and/or responder, insofar as possible. — Memory-DoS: It must resist memory exhaustion attacks. — Computation-DoS: It must resist CPU exhaustion attacks on the responder. — Availability: It must protect against easy to mount protocol-specific DoS at- tacks, for example, in a wireless environment where an attacker can observe everyone’s transmissions but cannot interfere with the transmitted packets themselves. — Efficiency: It must be efficient with respect to computation, bandwidth, and number of rounds. — Non-negotiated: It must avoid complex negotiations over capabilities. — Simplicity: The resulting protocol must be as simple as possible, within the constraints of the requirements. The Security requirement is obvious enough (we use the security model of Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx [2001; 2002a]). The rest, however, require some discussion. The PFS property is perhaps the most controversial. (PFS is an attribute of encrypted communications allowing for a long-term key to be compromised without affecting the security of past session keys.) Rather than assert that “we must have PFS at all costs,” we treat the amount of forward secrecy as an engineering parameter that can be traded off against other necessary functions, such as efficiency or resistance to DoS attacks. In fact, this corresponds quite nicely to the reality of today’s Internet systems, where a compromise during the existence of a security association (SA) will reveal the plaintext of any ongoing transmissions. Our protocol has a forward secrecy interval; SAs are protected against compromises that occur outside of that interval. Specifically, we allow a party to reuse the same secret Diffie–Xxxxxxx (DH) exponents for multiple exchanges within a given time period; this may save a large number of costly modular exponentiations. The Privacy property means that the protocol must not reveal the identity of a participant to any unauthorized party, including an active attacker that attempts to act as the peer. Clearly, it is not possible for a protocol to pro- tect both the initator and the responder against an active attacker; one of the participants must always “go first.” In general, we believe that the most ap- propriate choice is to protect the initator, since t...
Design Goals. The goal for the design review process will be for there to be two distinct facilities, with separately identifiable spaces, and functions. The Parties may wish to create common areas that can be jointly managed and/or made available to others as needed.
Design Goals. 2.1 The building shall create an icon for New York City and have a memorable presence on the skyline.
Design Goals. To design an AKA protocol, we need to consider three aspects at the same time, which are the network environment, security goals and privacy goals. This subsection will consider them one by one. IoT offers numerous advantages and services to the users. An important aspect of pervasive IoT devices is its constrained resources. So, various energy efficient lightweight mechanisms should be designed to store, process and transfer the data as per application requirements and with an optimized resource management. AKA-Goal 1: Lightweight property: Given the constraints of IoT environment, it is desirable that the AKA protocol should be lightweight in computation and communication. AKA protocol primitives should consume fewer resources without compromising the required level of security and privacy.
Design Goals. The Task Assistance Framework provides a simple, flexible, and configurable layer that demonstrates the following characteristics: • The Task Assistance Framework uses the Script as a model to provide visual assistance and navigation control to the User that is performing the Script. • The Script model is used as a structure on which many different types of Task Assistance can be built. Thus a new Task Assistance Framework can be added without affecting the Script model. • The Script description can be persisted in a number of forms (for example, flat file, relational database table, class with an instance variable holding onto a collection of Activities). It can be changed without changing the Task Assistance Framework that utilizes it. • The Task Assistance Framework implements a clear separation of responsibilities between the visual representation of the Script model and the Task Assistance services. This allows transparent additions of new forms of Task Assistance (visual "task lists," CueCards, "wizards"). • The Task Assistance Framework is an optional extension to the User Interface Control Framework.
Design Goals. Based on existing literatures, a secure protocol should satisfy the following security requirements and functions: •
Design Goals. Our two main design goals in this study were:
