CDFs and Rebel Mobility Sample Clauses

CDFs and Rebel Mobility. ‌ Due to CDFs’ relative affordability, incumbents are able to deploy static forces around the countryside in greater numbers and in doing so counter superior insurgent mobility by denying them room within which to evade advancing COIN forces. Since rebellions tend to spring up in poverty-stricken areas of poor countries (Xxxxxx and Xxxxxx 2003; Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx 2004; Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx and Xxxxxxx 2004; Do and Iyer 2010), states typically do not experience much difficulty finding citizens willing to serve as auxiliaries in return for modest compensation. Furthermore, because “[CDF] troops need little training and can be given surplus and obsolete weapons,” the recruitment of CDFs rather than regulars helps keep the cost of training, upkeep, and transportation to a minimum (Xxxxxx 1994, 96). For instance, Turkish Village Guards were armed with cheap Russian or Turkish-made automatic rifles and paid a salary of about a $100 per month — an attractive sum in the eyes of impoverished rural Kurds (Xxx 1995, 54–5; Bloom 2007, 111). CDFs’ relative affordability thus allows for the deployment of greater numbers of static defense units which effectively restricts rebel maneuvering space and thereby helps offset their mobility advantage. The notion is exemplified in the Indonesian military’s use of pagar betis to combat the Darul Islam insurgency during the 1950s. Pagar betis represents a search-and-destroy tactic in which Indonesian government forces successfully encircled insurgent fighters residing in the hill areas of West Java. Crucial to this success was the incumbent’s use of CDFs known as the Village Security Organization (VSO) to help cordon off designated areas and prevent guerrillas from escaping. During the operation, villagers in the VSO were required to establish a perimeter around the hills by linking up with recruits from neighboring villages. In doing so, pagar betis “used the whole population of the lowlands to encircle the hills, both controlling the local population and turning the Darul Islam strongholds into encircled death traps” (Xxxxxxxxx 2010, 92–3). In doing so, the Indonesian CDFs effectively restricted the rebel maneuvering space, making their neutralization by COIN forces that much more likely. In addition, the assignment of static duties to CDF personnel increases the number of regular troops available for tracking down elusive guerrillas in offensive operations (Asia Watch Report 1990, 55; Asia Watch Report 1992, 11; Xxxxxxx et al. 200...