Xxxxx v. Proskauer Rose LLP, No. 2011-77793 (Tex., Xxxxxx Cnty. [281st Dist.]) (dismissed without prejudice as non-suited on March 12, 2014)
Xxxxx v. State, 530 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1988) (city police officer lacked authority to seize vehicle on private property outside city limits); Xxxxxxx v. State, 143 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1962). Cf. Art. VIII, s. 2(c), Fla. Const., providing that municipalities may exercise extraterritorial powers only if authorized by general or special law; and s. 166.021(3)(a), Fla. Stat., stating that municipal home rule powers do not extend to "[t]he subjects of annexation, merger, and exercise of extraterritorial power, which require general or special law pursuant to s. 2(c), Art. VIII of the State Constitution[.]" [2] See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 71-72 (1971). But see s. 901.25(2), Fla. Stat. (municipal police officer authorized to make arrests outside officer's jurisdiction, if in fresh pursuit); s. 901.252, Fla. Stat. (municipal police officer may patrol municipally-owned property located outside municipal boundaries and when probable cause to believe person has committed or is committing a violation of law on such property or facilities, the officer may take the person into custody). [3] Section 23.121(1)(a), Fla. Stat. [4] Section 23.121(1)(g), Fla. Stat. And see s. 23.121(1), Fla. Stat., stating the need for the Florida Mutual Aid Act: "Because of the existing and continuing possibility of the occurrence of natural or manmade disasters or emergencies and other major law enforcement problems, including those that cross jurisdictional lines, and in order to ensure that preparations of this state will be adequate to deal with such activity, protect the public peace and safety, and preserve the lives and property of the people of the state[.]" [5] Attorney General Opinion 96-78 (1996). And see Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 90-84 (1990). [6] See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 82-52 (1982) (law enforcement services provided pursuant to mutual aid agreement do not require "cross swearing" of officers); Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 72-178 (1972). [7] Combined Voluntary Cooperation and Operational Assistance Mutual Aid Agreement, s. III, dated February 1997.
Xxxxx v. Italy (no. 1), § 72), save in exceptional circumstances (Goddi v. Italy, § 31) or where there is no basis for such a right in domestic law and practice (Xxxxxxxx
Xxxxx v. Cash 4 Titles, 2012 WL 5290155 at
Xxxxx v. Canada, although the claimant (“SDMI”) did not own shares in the enterprise in question, the tribunal held that it was a protected “investor” and that the local Canadian enterprise was its “investment,” based on SDMI’s executive president’s “control” of managerial decisions of the Canadian enterprise.147 This finding was upheld on review by the Federal Court of Canada, which noted that SDMI’s “control” was “not based on the legal ownership of shares, but on the 142 Rejoinder, ¶¶ 39-46; Canadian Statement on Implementation of the NAFTA, Canada Gazette, Part I, Jan. 1, 1994, CL-47, p. 147. 143 Rejoinder, ¶¶ 47-64. 144 See Procedural Order No. 5, tribunal’s question 1(ii). 145 Rejoinder, ¶¶ 175-184. 146 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States II, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award (Apr. 30, 2004), CL-36, ¶ 80. 147 S.D. Xxxxx, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), CL-30, ¶¶ 227-231. fact that [its executive president] controlled every decision, every investment, every move by [the local enterprise]” and that this fell within the “ordinary meaning of the word ‘controlled’.”148 88. NAFTA Article 1139 is instructive on this point. As the Tribunal notes, Article 1139 defines “investment of an investor” as an “investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an investor.”149 Article 1117 uses the almost identical phrase, “owns or controls directly or indirectly.” There is no reason to ascribe a different meaning to the same terms in the same treaty, and indeed, this would be contrary to a good faith interpretation of Article 1117 read in context as mandated by the VCLT. It would be incongruous and manifestly unreasonable to accept that an investor can “control” an enterprise for purposes of Article 1139 without share ownership but require share ownership for the same investor to “control” the same enterprise for purposes of Article 1117. In any event, Xxxxxxxxx remain entitled to claim damages to Operadora Pesa as the “investment” under Article 1139 over which they exercise “control.”150 These arguments dispose of Mexico’s hyper-technical objection.
Xxxxx v. The Procter & Xxxxxx Co. (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2012) to represent a certified nationwide class of purchasers of Crest Sensitivity Treatment & Protection toothpaste,
Xxxxx v. Xxxxxxxxx Xxxx LLP, No. 2011-77793 (Tex., Xxxxxx Cnty. [281st Dist.]) (dismissed without prejudice as non-suited on March 12, 2014)
Xxxxx v. Gov’t of Canada (UNCITRAL Partial Award, Nov. 12, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001), pg. no. 283-284. 21 Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxx and Xxxxx Xxxxxxxx, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, Kluwer Law International, 2009. Pg. No. 281. 22 Xxxxxxxxxx X (2004). The International Law on Foreign Investment. Second Edition. Cambridge University Press. Xxxxxxxxx.xx. No. 357. 23 Supra Note 5. 24 Ibid.
Xxxxx v. Auto-Owners Insurance ( SC 1998)
Xxxxx v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 430 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Xxxx Xxxx & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 702 (2d Cir. 1978)). In Xxxxx, the Ninth Circuit also recognized that “[a]lthough it may be difficult to prove actual bias without deposing the arbitrators, deposition of arbitrators are ‘repeatedly condemned' by courts.” Id. (citing O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof'l Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 748 (11th Cir. 1988)).
