Analysis part 3. The intelligible world gives existence to the material world The previous part of the analysis showed how Philo held that the intelligible world always exists in God as divine reason engaged in the act of creating the material world. This final part of the analysis will show how Philo maintained that the intelligible world exists in the material world as well. We will see that the intelligible world forms a bridge between God and the material world, connecting the world of ‘becoming’ to that of ‘being’. In this way, it is the medium for God to express his benevolence towards creation and his care for it. In Opif. 16, Philo describes how the intelligible world exists in the material world. Here, he claims that the material world was created after the pattern of the intelligible world.242 Philo writes that each material object that can be experienced through the senses has a corresponding immaterial object existing as part of the intelligible world. 240 See LA I, 3; Som. II, 70; Spec. III, 180; QG I, 15; II, 12. 241 Spec. I, 180. 242 Similarly, in Opif. 36, 130; Ebr. 133; Her. 280; Mos. I, 158; Spec. I, 302, 327; III, 191; Aet. 75. — Philo’s doctrine of God — In Opif. 21–22, Philo explains why material objects need corresponding immaterial objects to guarantee their continued existence: without a concept (ἰδέα), an individual object appearing in the material world would be without order and quality.243 As Philo saw it, without the concepts through which material objects are catalogued, qualified and identified they would remain an unidentifiable chaos. Such unidentifiable chaos has the potential of becoming anything, but only immaterial concepts can bring material objects into actual being. Did Philo believe that there is something like pre-existent matter? This is not the case. Instead, he maintained that unformed matter is something to which the term ‘existence’ does not quite apply; it exists only as potential, in and of itself it is nothing yet. It comes into being – it becomes something – through the imprint of the concepts from the intelligible world.244 Through that imprint, individual objects with qualities that identify them as belonging to a certain class or category can come into being. Through the intelligible world God grants ‘being’ to not-yet-existent matter, which explains why Philo saw the intelligible world as an expression of God’s benevolence. In Opif. 21, Philo writes that because of his goodness, the creator wished to grant existence to...
Analysis part 3. God and creation are not one According to Xxxxx, atomist philosophy failed to provide an explanation for the order visible in the material world. But Xxxxx was also aware of philosophers who did provide an explanation for the order visible in the material world, but at the same time, in his opinion, assigned too much splendour to it. Xxxxx used the name ‘Chaldeans’ to identify these philosophers. According to Xxxxx, they claimed the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon and the stars to be the ultimate powers which provide order and control events in the material world.189 As Xxxxx saw it, these philosophers presented the world itself as divine instead of distinguishing between creation and God.190 The identification of God with the world itself resembles a form of materialism present in Stoic philosophy.191 In general, the Stoics held that the material world was one whole and that nothing existed outside it. They held that God must be part of the material world as well.192 Xxxxx opposed this view of reality, although 188 See also Runia, Creation, pp. 117–118, where he additionally presents the example of Xxxxxxx (2nd century CE), who brought forward an argument in favour of divine providence similar to that of Xxxxx. 189 Migr. 179, 192–194; Her. 99, 301; Mut. 16; Spec. I, 13–14; Virt. 212. Xxxxx almost always combines his description of what he calls the ‘Chaldean creed’ with an exhortation to leave their opinion behind. 190 As Philo put it with a Greek wordplay in Congr. 49: μãλλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν θεὸν αὐτοκράτορα νομίζων, οὐκ αὐτοκράτορος ἔργον θεοῦ. 191 Xxxxxxx describes the similarities between what Xxxxx presents as the ‘Chaldean creed’ and Stoic materialism in Niehoff, Biography, pp. 226–228. 192 Xxxxxx, ND I.15.37; XXX XX, 000, 000. Xxxxx philosophy in general is described as pantheistic (see note 171 and also, for instance, Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p. 152 and Hornblower/Spawforth, Classical Dictionary, p. 1446). In the latter (p. 195) it is additionally claimed that Stoic philosophers, especially Xxxxxxxxxx, legitimised astrology, which is contested by Xxxx in Long, Xxxxxxxx to — Xxxxx’x doctrine of God — we should note that he describes this view as ‘Chaldean’ and not Stoic.193 In Opif. 6b–12, Xxxxx offers two arguments for why he maintains that God transcends his creation. These arguments bring two aspects to light of how Xxxxx considered God and creation to be fundamentally different from each other. Xxxxx’x first argument is that regardi...
