Summary reflections and comments on the rationalist epistemology of regulatory competition theory Based on the case studies in this book, and in contrast to previous quan- titative findings, we conclude that regulatory competition does play a role in patterns of international environmental policy convergence – even though in more subtle and more diverse ways than suggested in the basic reading of the theory. First, dynamics of regulatory competition may be hidden behind processes of international standard setting. Second, our cases show evidence that all countries irrespective of their overall level of embeddedness in international trade are involved in dynamics of regulatory competition. We find that the vulnerability of affected indus- tries and their constellation vis-a`-vis other industries and relations to the state prove to be more decisive than the overall economic embed- dedness of a country. Third, we observe patterns of regulatory compe- tition in cases focusing on product and production standards as well as 286 Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx and Xxxxx Xx¨rgens non-trade-related standards and environmental principles. An analyti- cal focus on trading activities has created a previous bias on product and production process items; when including in the analysis decisions for domestic and foreign investment, industrial interest in broad regula- tory certainty enters the theoretical horizon as a significant cost factor. Finally, the case material shows that the theory of regulatory competi- tion has blinded us to patterns of evasion of costs and competition after regulatory decisions have been taken, thereby deferring the effective race to the bottom to the later phases of implementation and enforcement. While the previous points suggest that reconsidering choices for the levels and scopes of analysis can repair existing biases against finding evidence of regulatory competition, our research also points us to a more fundamental critique of the theory – namely its overly rationalist epis- temological foundation. The five cases where dynamics of regulatory competition were detected are all characterised by a ‘rhetoric of calcu- lus’, emphasising the costs of regulation with implications for the level of national standard setting and incentives to push for international coop- eration or harmonisation. Yet comparative analysis shows that national governments perceive the costs of (non-)regulation quite differently, not merely because of different economic and industrial str...
