Common use of The Use of Concepts Taken from Other International Instruments Clause in Contracts

The Use of Concepts Taken from Other International Instruments. After a lack of definition, another drafting element that could affect the uniform application of the Conventions may be that their drafters incorpo- rated terms from other international instruments despite the autonomy of the Conventions. Indeed, the 1929 Warsaw Convention was not drafted from scratch, and more than mere inspiration was taken from pre-existing international conventions, such as those from the rail sector.90 The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1929 Warsaw Convention make this clear, stating that: Il y a une autre proposition qui consistait à prendre l’article 39 de la Convention xx Xxxxx. La commission a été d’accord pour se rallier à cette proposition.91 86 See, Xxxxxxx Xxxx, Le régime uniforme de responsabilité du transporteur aérien de personnes 158 et seq. (Xxxxxxxxx, 2013); Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx, Les sources de la responsabilité du transporteur aérien international: entre conflit et complémentarité – La Convention de Montréal et son interac- tion avec le droit européen et national 189 (Schulthess, 2012). 87 See, section 4.3.2.3. 88 See, section 2.3.3.2. 89 See, section 3.2.2.3(4). 90 See, Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxx, National Airlegislation and the Warsaw Convention (Springer, 1937). 91 ICAO Doc 7838, II Conférence Internationale de Droit Privé Aérien, 4-12 Octobre 1929, Procès-Verbaux, Varsovie, 1930, p. 105. See also, Ibid., p. 130. Although it was clearly established from an early stage that the terminology used in the 1929 Warsaw Convention was independent from the one encountered in other international transportation conventions,92 it cannot be ignored that these would certainly have had an impact on the way the terms laid down in the 1929 Warsaw Convention have been understood and interpreted in States which were also Parties to these international conven- tions. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that, while interpreting certain provisions of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, Courts were likely, at least initially, to use their knowledge of how identical terms and concepts were used in other international conventions, especially when it came to other international conventions regulating transport, such as the 1924 Bern CIM and CIV, which already had a well-established jurisprudence.93 The use of other international conventions and their related case law might have led to divergent interpretations. This divergence would be particularly apparent between States that ratified the 1924 Bern CIM and CIV and those that did not. Knowing that rail conventions were used in the drafting process, they may offer additional interpretation tools. References to rail conventions and their successive amendments, were, for instance, cautiously made in the United Kingdom while interpreting the term ‘bodily injury’.94 But such recourse raises several concerns. First, it questions the genuine existence of the reference to other instruments, as not all Courts develop their reasoning in detail.95 Second, this should be put in perspective with the lack of ratifica- tion of rail conventions by all the Parties to the 1929 Warsaw Convention. Indeed, the rail conventions only concerned some European countries in 1929. For these simple reasons, Courts should not transpose definitions or rely on case law developed under other instruments such as international rail conventions. While an examination of solutions adopted in other inter- national instruments may be instructive, the sui generis nature of the liability regime established by the Conventions limits their use.96 They could there- fore only be used, after due consideration, as a supplementary means of interpretation pursuant to Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.97 92 Ibid., p. 91: ‘Je tiens à faire cette déclaration, parce que je crois être une des personnes qui s’occupent le plus du droit aérien et je crois pouvoir dire que l’intérêt du droit aérien est de se développer librement, de n’être opprimé ni par le droit maritime, ni par le droit terrestre, ni par le droit des chemins de fer’.