Judicial Decisions. (i) Preliminary Remarks As a preliminary remark, Courts might have been inclined to avoid directly interpreting the concept of ‘bodily injury’, and to have had recourse to the referral to domestic law set out in Article 24 of the 1929 Warsaw Conven- tion and Article 29 of the Montreal Convention. As a matter of fact, the distinction between ‘mental injury’ and ‘moral damage’, also referred to as ‘non-material damage’, is slightly blurred and has not always been clearly delineated by Courts.136 These Courts may therefore consider that any kind of damage could be compensated pursuant to domestic law, as per the above provisions of the Conventions, without analysing whether the term ‘bodily injury’ also include mental injury. 132 ICAO, <xxxxx://xxx.xxxx.xxx/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl99_EN.pdf> (accessed 18 August 2019). 133 Xxxx Xxxxxxx, Treaties, Declarations of Interpretation, Xxx Xxxxxx Encyclopedias of Interna- tional Law 9 (2007). 134 Xxxxxx XxXxx, The Legal Effect of Interpretative Declarations, 49 British Yearbook of Inter- national Law 160 (1978). 135 See, section 3.3.2. 136 See, for example, Xxxxxx x. American Airlines, Inc., 287 F. App’x 309, 317 (5th Cir. 2008), where the Court held that, under the 1999 Montreal Convention, emotional distress for the loss of items in baggage cannot be compensated. This last decision should be compared to the 2010 Xxxx decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which held that the term ‘damage’, which underpins Article 22 of the 1999 Montreal Conven- tion, that sets the limit of an air carrier’s liability for damage resulting, inter alia, from the loss of baggage, must be interpreted as including both material and non-material damage. The following section will only focus on the way Courts have inter- preted the concept of ‘bodily injury’ under the 1929 Warsaw Convention and the 1999 Montreal Convention.
Judicial Decisions. A substantial number of Courts acknowledged this principle and consid- ered the time limit established to be unbreakable, and that it therefore was not supposed to be suspended or interrupted.162 However, certain Courts have argued that the second paragraph of Article 29 of the 1929 Warsaw Convention authorized them to adapt this limit pursuant to their domestic procedural law.163 This is particularly the case in France, where the Cour de cassation held in 1977164 that, despite having considered the contents of the Travaux Préparatoires, nothing in the text of the Convention expressly indicated that the two-year limit could not 161 Ibid., p. 76.
Judicial Decisions. Minor changes in the English version do not seem to have been considered sufficient reason to re-examine in depth case law developed earlier in certain jurisdictions. For example, in 2018, the Federal Court of Australia confirmed pre-existing case law established under the 1929 Warsaw 169 ICAO Doc 9775, International Conference on Air Law (Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air), Montreal, 10 – 28 May 1999, volume I, Minutes, Montreal 1999, p. 188. 170 Ibid., p. 188-189. 171 Ibid., p. 189. 172 Ibid., p. 236: […] it related to the exercise in jurisdictions to deal with time limits on the basis that there might be aspects which would render it fraudulent or inequitable. […] many Courts did indeed exercise that jurisdiction. In terms of private international law, in terms of limitations of action, the matter was viewed as a procedural one, as a clas- sification to be determined by lex fori. It was not without significance that that language had been used for the last seventy years in Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention, as well as in its successors. […] no doubt that, if any action came up before a Court under circumstances where the claimant had been precluded from bringing suit as a result of imprisonment, kidnapping or matters of that kind, then a Court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, in exercise of lex fori, would come to the conclusion that time did not begin to run until the claimant were free to be available’. Convention, and held that the time limits of the 1999 Montreal Convention were unbreakable.173 Similar decisions can be found in other jurisdictions, such as in the United States174 and in Russia.175 However, the possibility of suspending or interrupting the two-year limit is still discussed in certain jurisdictions. In Spain, for example, the question arose of whether this provision was to be considered as falling within the category of ‘prescripción’ or ‘caducidad’.176 Although the highest Court has not officially put an end to this controversy, the Court of Appeal of Madrid held in 2015 that – in light of the foreign Warsaw and Montreal jurisprudence, the doctrine, and hopes of achieving uniformity – the time 173 See, Bhatia v. Malaysian Airline System Berhad, (2018) FCA 1471.
Judicial Decisions. A. Any provisions of this Agreement, or amendments thereto, judicially declared to be in violation of any applicable state or federal law shall be null and void, but all other provisions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. In the event any provision of this Agreement is declared unlawful in a manner described above, the parties agree to meet within 15 days and, for a reasonable period thereafter, continue negotiations until substitute clauses have been reached via negotiation or arbitration in accordance with State law.
Judicial Decisions. You have an absolute right to have a judge decide what you are entitled to in your action. We only give you our opinion based upon the thousands of times we have been in court. Your decision is very important - make sure you and your loved ones can live with it. Once a divorce is final (excluding child support & custody after two years) it is very hard to change.
Judicial Decisions. 1. The New Brunswick Reports;
Judicial Decisions
