Registration Phase. The registration phase for SMs and SPs are similar and follow the ECQV certificate scheme, refer to Section 2.3. As a result, each entity U is storing the public parameters {Ep(a,b), P, H0, H1, H2, H3, Ek(), Dk(), Ppub}, its public key Pu, certificate certU and identity IDU, together with its private key dU. Note that only the private key needs to be stored in the tamper resistant part of the memory. Similar as in the other papers in literature on key agreement schemes, we assume that the SM is also storing the public key of the SP. If not, it needs to request before the key agreement phase the identity and certificate of the SP in order to compute the corresponding public key and verify the certificate, cf. Equation (1).
Registration Phase. The household smart meter needs to be registered at the NAN gateway before participating into the SEN and obtained security parameters, as follows. For each SM (say j), the NAN generates and assigns an unique identity (XXXX ) and a secret token STj with its identifier (idST ). It
Registration Phase. The SA generates a unique secret identity idN for node N . It then randomly chooses the temporary secret parameter kN and calculates aN = idN ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ h(kHN , kN ) and bN = kHN aN kN . A unique idjIN for the intermediary node (IN ) is chosen and the parameters (idN , aN , bN ) and (idjIN , idN , aN , bN ) are stored in N and IN respectively, while idjIN is stored by HN as the identity of IN when communicating in relay mode. aN = γ η and bN = γ µ. The shared session key kS is computed as h(idN , rN , fN , xN ) and the authentication parameters (aN , bN ) are replaced with (a+ , b+ ). N N
Registration Phase. The registration phase is mostly identical to PPKA Proto- col 1. However, SA additionally computes zN = h(kHN, idN, kN). Parameters ⟨idN, aN, bN, zN⟩ are stored in N. N ⟨idN , aN , bN , [zN ]⟩ Picks rN Generates timestamp tN IN ⟨ ⟩ HN ⟨kHN ⟩ yN = xN ⊕rN , Picks idN′ Computes xN = aN ⊕idN , < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , idN′ > Checks Relay Field Validates tN , Computes kN∗ = kHN ⊕aN ⊕bN , < tidN , yN , aN , bN , tN , idN′ > xN∗ = h(kHN , kN∗ ), [tidN = h(idN , idN′ , zN , tN , rN )] Sets “Relay Field” to 1 {tidN = h(idN , idN′ , tN , rN )} idN∗ = xN∗ ⊕aN , [zN∗ = h(kHN , idN , kN∗ )], rN∗ = xN∗ ⊕yN , {tidN∗ = h(idN∗ , idN′ , tN , rN∗ )} [tidN∗ = h(idN∗ , idN′ , z∗N , tN , rN∗ )] Verify that tidN ? tidN∗ = Picks fN Computes α = xN ⊕ fN , γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕h(idN , tN ) Computes fN∗ = xN ⊕α, γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕h(idN , tN , rN , idN′ ) Picks new k+, Computes N {β∗ = h(xN , rN , fN∗ , η, µ, idN′ )} a = id ⊕h( + N N HN x , x ), + N [β∗ = h(xN , xX , xX , xX∗ , x, x, µ, idN′ )] Verifies β∗ ? β. Computes b = k ⊕a ⊕k , + + + N HN N N = γ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕h(idN , tN ), η = γ ⊕a , µ = ⊕b , + x′ + X X [xX = x(xxX , xX , rN , fN , xN , 1)] γ′ = rN ⊕ fN ⊕h(idN , tN , rN , idN′ ), {kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )}, [kS = h(idN , zX , xX , xX , xX , 0)], [kZ = h(zN , idN , rN , fN , xN , 0)] a = γ ⊕η, b = ⊕ µ, + N + γ′ {kS = h(idN , rN , fN , xN )} N [kZ = h(zN , idN , rN , fN , xN , 0)] Stores session key kS < α, x, x, µ, [δ ], idN′ > Checks Relay Field < α, x, x, µ, [δ ], idN′ > [Computes z+ = h(kHN , idN , k+)], N N [δ = Enc(kz, z+)] N [Computes z+ = Dec(kz, δ )] N Replaces (aN , bN , [zN ]) with {β = h(xN , rN , fN , η, µ, idN′ )} (a+, b+, [z+]), Stores session key kS N N N [β = h(xN , zN , xX , xX , x, x, µ, idN′ )] Sets “Relay Field” to 1 { }
Registration Phase. A user U registers at the gateway node GWN in line with the requirement, while a regular sensor node S registers at GWN offline. A detailed process of registration process about U and S is highlighted as below.
Registration Phase. In this phase, the home agent (HA) must choose a public key cryptosystem based on the Chebyshev chaotic map; the corresponding public key is (x; Ts(x)), and his private key is s. When a mobile user (MU ) wants to register to the home agent HA, MU chooses her or his identity IDMU and password pw, selects a random number b, and submits IDMU and h(pw b) to HA for registration over a secure channel. HA computes V = EKS(IDMU h(pw b)), where KS is a secret key kept by HA, and issues a smart card to MU over a secure channel, which contains V , x, Ts(x), EK(·) and a one-way hash function h(·). When MU receives the smart card, he or she Figure 1. The registration phase of the proposed protocol { · · } stores b into the smart card. Finally, the smart card contains b, V, x, Ts(x), EK( ), h( ) . This phase is outlined in Fig. 1.
Registration Phase. In this phase, the doctors and patients make a profile at the TTP, containing relevant attributes like expertise, linked hospital, etc. in case of the doctor, allergies, blood group, etc. in case of the patient. As a result, each user also possesses a user identity, private key, public key and corresponding certificate of the TTP, which is securely stored at the user side (e.g. on smartphone or smartcard) and at the TTP.
Registration Phase. User registers with GWN. A new user Ui proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Registration Phase. Let KGWN-U and PUGWN-U=gKGWN-U denote GWN’s private key and its corresponding public key, where s is kept secret by GWN and PUGWN-U is stored inside each user’s smart card. When a user, Xx wants to be registered to the GWN, Ui proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Registration Phase. The intermediary node (IN ) is not provided with a relay identity idj . Parameters (id , a , b )
