See, e. g., The WTO Dispute Settlement Unders tanding, art. 22(4) (“The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.”). there may also be a reputational sanction, 48 there is no reason to think that reputation is sufficient to provide for an efficient level of breach between states. Reputational sanctions are limited in magnitude and can be unpredictable, and even a total loss of reputation may not be enough to deter a violation of international law. 49 Reputational sanctions are also likely to under-deter breach because the actions of the parties may not be obser vable to third parties. In the absence of a disinterested adjudicator, the breached -against party cannot credibly demonstrate that the other party was at fault. Before proceeding it is worth pausing to address a potential objection. It might be said that a rule of customary international law imposes on a violating state the obligation to “make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.” 50 If one has sufficient belief in the power of customary international law one might ask if states rely on this background rule and, therefore, do not find it necessary to provide for damages in their agreements. Analogizing to the domestic sphere, the argument would be that private parties relying on the default remedies of contract law may not feel it necessary to include a liquidated damage clause of other contractual language governing damages. A realistic appraisal of both the power of customary international law and the status of this particular rule, however, makes it clear that this c laim is implausible. First, it does not seem to be the case that a rule requiring reparation in the event of a violation of
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