Critiques Sample Clauses

Critiques. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ is criticised for generalising its occidental rational behaviour and being insensitive to cultural contexts (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 1997, Benhabib 1992, Flyvbjerg 1998). ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, presupposes that human social life is based upon rational processes for establishing reciprocal understanding ; constitutions is all it takes for uniting citizens in a pluralist society (Flyvbjerg, 1998). In 1998, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ clarified his position by stating that his model refers to societies free from religious or metaphysical thinking: A fundamentalist self-understanding often privileges value choices that subordinate individual rights to collective goals and thus favour non- egalitarian regulations. Only under the conditions of post metaphysical thinking do ethical-political discourses lead to regulations that lie per se in the equal interest of all members (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 1998, p167). ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1997) critiques ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ for his moral universalism. He observes that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇‟ social theory universalises morality in the sense that it tries to provide a normative basis for “civilized humanity”: “Universal morality cannot be reduced to self-interest any more than it can be reduced to culture and identity” (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 1997, p33). He argues that this occidental rationality is fostered through a comparison of modernity and the pre-modern tradition of Europe and is based on European enlightenment; hence cannot simply be applied elsewhere. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇‟ model is also critiqued for its over emphasis on law as the cornerstone of democracy. ▇▇▇▇▇ (2002) argues that law can be double sided: “While people use it to resist and contest power, they are also subjugated by it” (p487). Another critique of ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇‟ rational communicative model is its absence of a practical aspect and its limited engagement with the dynamics of power. He is critiqued for being unrealistic in his modelling: He describes to us the utopia of communicative rationality but not how to get there…it is easy to point to constitution writing and institutional development as a solution; it is something else to implement specific constitutional and institutional changes (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p215 & 228). His focus on communicative power dismisses the fact that communication can be penetrated by power. Moreover, as ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1997) indicates, it is less possible for minorities to conceive a majority by the means of better argument. As Flyvbjerg (1998) rightly points out, communication can be power sensitive through non- rational rhetoric and be used to ...