Common use of Control Variables Clause in Contracts

Control Variables. Prioritizing Professionals? The paper controls for well-established variables that tap into groups’ characteristics and that relate to their capacity to provide different access goods to public officials. The first control is group type. It is included as a dichotomous variable indicating whether groups are business (e.g., European Dairy Association or the International Union of Combined Road-Rail Transport Companies) or non-business (e.g., European Consumer Organisa- tion or the European Federation of Employees in Public Services). Business groups are expected to be better represented in administrative venues such as the Commission (e.g., Fraussen et al., 2015; ▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇ et al., 2017; ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2019). Moreover, recent 87 research has demonstrated that business organizations face more difficulties than citizen groups when establishing policy positions on specific policy issues, which implies that they have a more active involvement of their members (▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2019). Related, the correlation matrix in Table A1 in Appendix to Chapter IV shows that business organiza- tions are more likely to approximate the transmission belt ideal, and thus it is important to control for this in the multivariate models. The second control distinguishes whether organizations are mobilized at a national or supranational level (Bunea, 2014). Aligned with previous studies, the Commission is expected to favor the interaction with groups representing encompassing interests that go beyond their national preferences (Bouwen, 2004; Bunea, 2014). Thirdly, the scope of activity of the group – measured with the number of policy domains or sectors in which the group is involved – is included as a control. Here the distinction is between generalists and niche players, and the formers are expected to have more access to the Commis- sion because they are active in more policy domains. Fourthly, membership diversity is included as a count variable to assess the effect of having a diverse set of members on degree of access. The membership options are: private citizens, firms, local and regional governments, national associations, and European associations. Organizational age and resources are also included as controls. In line with previous studies, organizational age is expected to have a positive effect on the level of access to public officials since older groups may have more expertise to engage in lobbying and a wider circle of contacts among public officials (Dür & ▇▇▇▇▇, 2014; Fraussen et al., 2015). The financial resources of the organizations are measured in terms of full-time equivalents (FTE) and is expected to positively relate with access (▇▇▇ & ▇▇▇▇▇, 2014; ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2016, p. 187). Although resources on their own cannot fully explain why groups get engaged in EU politics, they may have an effect on interest groups’ abilities to involve their members and develop the necessary organizational capacities to efficiently engage with public officials (▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2016, 188). Yet, as reported in the correlation matrix in Ap- pendix to Chapter IV, the variable resources is not correlated with the explanatory factors, suggesting that ‘resources cannot explain why we find different patterns of organizational structures among groups’ (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2018).