Public Key Cryptography Sample Clauses

Public Key Cryptography. The public key cryptography (PKC) is introduced by Xxxxxx and Xxxxxxx [5]. PKC involves two different keys for encryption and decryption instead of sin- gle key as symmetric key system. Since, public key is random string in PKC. Therefore, To prove the relation between entity and its public key, PKC adopts certificate mechanism where certificate-based protocols work by considering that each entity has a public and private key pair. These public keys are authenti- cated via certificate authority (CA) which issue a certificate. When two entities wish to establish a session key, a pair of ephemeral (short term) public keys are exchanged between them. The ephemeral and static keys are then combined in a way so as to obtain the agreed session key. The authenticity of the static keys provided by signature of CA assures that only the entities who posses the static keys are able to compute the session key.
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Public Key Cryptography. ‌ In modern cryptography, there’s a difference between symmetric and asymmetric cryp- tosystems. In symmetric cryptography, there is only one secret key used between the sender and the receiver. Thus, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Symmetric primitives include block ciphers, stream ciphers, cryptographic hash func- tions, and message authentication codes (MACs). Common to all symmetric cryptosys- tems is that the parties who wish to communicate need some prior secret established before distributing keys. This is usually achieved by establishing a secure channel to a trusted authority (TA) who then issues a common secret key to both parties. In comparison to symmetric-key cryptosystems, the main idea of asymmetric or public key cryptosystems is to make key distribution easier. It is asymmetric in the sense that each party has a key pair, a public key and a private key. Respectively, these are used for encryption and decryption. Although the keys have some cryptographic relation, the public key can be widely distributed without compromising the private key. Thus, any party who wish to communicate with another party can encrypt the message using the recipient’s public key who then can decrypt it using his or her private key. It is also possible to sign data, in which the private key is used for signing and the public key is used for verification. Unlike symmetric-key cryptography, there is no need for having established a secret prior to interaction.

Related to Public Key Cryptography

  • Cryptography Supplier will maintain policies and standards on the use of cryptographic controls that are implemented to protect Accenture Data.

  • Bibliography [Ben83] Xxxxxxx Xxx-Or. Another advantage of free choice (extended ab- stract): Completely asynchronous agreement protocols. In Proceed- ings of the second annual ACM symposium on Principles of distrib- uted computing, pages 27–30. ACM, 1983. [BG89] Xxxxx Xxxxxx and Xxxx X Xxxxx. Asymptotically optimal distributed consensus. Springer, 1989. [BGP89] Xxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxx X. Xxxxx, and Xxxxxxx X. Xxxxx. Towards optimal distributed consensus (extended abstract). In 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, USA, 30 October - 1 November 1989, pages 410–415, 1989. [BT85] Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx and Xxx Xxxxx. Asynchronous consensus and broadcast protocols. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 32(4):824–840, 1985. [DGM+11] Xxxxxxxx Xxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxx Xxxxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx Xxxxxxxxx, and Xxxxxxxxx Xxxxxxxxxx. Stabilizing Consensus with the Power of Two Choices. In Proceedings of the Twenty-third Annual ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, June 2011. [DS83] Xxxxx Xxxxx and X. Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx. Authenticated algorithms for byzantine agreement. SIAM Journal on Computing, 12(4):656–666, 1983. [FG03] Xxxxxxxx Xxxxx and Xxxx X Xxxxx. Efficient player-optimal protocols for strong and differential consensus. In Proceedings of the twenty- second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages 211–220. ACM, 2003.

  • System Logging The system must maintain an automated audit trail which can 20 identify the user or system process which initiates a request for PHI COUNTY discloses to 21 CONTRACTOR or CONTRACTOR creates, receives, maintains, or transmits on behalf of COUNTY, 22 or which alters such PHI. The audit trail must be date and time stamped, must log both successful and 23 failed accesses, must be read only, and must be restricted to authorized users. If such PHI is stored in a 24 database, database logging functionality must be enabled. Audit trail data must be archived for at least 3 25 years after occurrence.

  • Database The LERG is available through Telcordia. ICONN is available through the Qwest web site.

  • Web Site Information on registration for and use of the E-Verify program can be obtained via the Internet at the Department of Homeland Security Web site: xxxx://xxx.xxx.xxx/E-Verify.

  • Programming (a) Pursuant to Section 624 of the Cable Act, the Licensee shall maintain the mix, quality and broad categories of Programming set forth in Exhibit 4, attached hereto and made a part hereof. Pursuant to applicable federal law, all Programming decisions, including the Programming listed in Exhibit 4, attached hereto, shall be at the sole discretion of the Licensee.

  • ETHICS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTING This Contract incorporates by reference Article 9 of the Arlington County Purchasing Resolution, as well as all state and federal laws related to ethics, conflicts of interest or bribery, including the State and Local Government Conflict of Interests Act (Code of Virginia § 2.2-3100 et seq.), the Virginia Governmental Frauds Act (Code of Virginia § 18.2-498.1 et seq.) and Articles 2 and 3 of Chapter 10 of Title 18.2 of the Code of Virginia, as amended (§ 18.2-438 et seq.). The Contractor certifies that its proposal was made without collusion or fraud; that it has not offered or received any kickbacks or inducements from any other offeror, supplier, manufacturer or subcontractor; and that it has not conferred on any public employee having official responsibility for this procurement any payment, loan, subscription, advance, deposit of money, services or anything of more than nominal value, present or promised, unless consideration of substantially equal or greater value was exchanged.

  • Authoritative Root Database To the extent that ICANN is authorized to set policy with regard to an authoritative root server system (the “Authoritative Root Server System”), ICANN shall use commercially reasonable efforts to (a) ensure that the authoritative root will point to the top-­‐level domain nameservers designated by Registry Operator for the TLD, (b) maintain a stable, secure, and authoritative publicly available database of relevant information about the TLD, in accordance with ICANN publicly available policies and procedures, and (c) coordinate the Authoritative Root Server System so that it is operated and maintained in a stable and secure manner; provided, that ICANN shall not be in breach of this Agreement and ICANN shall have no liability in the event that any third party (including any governmental entity or internet service provider) blocks or restricts access to the TLD in any jurisdiction.

  • Vlastnictví Zdravotnické zařízení si ponechá a bude uchovávat Zdravotní záznamy. Zdravotnické zařízení a Zkoušející převedou na Zadavatele veškerá svá práva, nároky a tituly, včetně práv duševního vlastnictví k Důvěrným informacím (ve smyslu níže uvedeném) a k jakýmkoli jiným Studijním datům a údajům.

  • Root-­‐zone Information Publication ICANN’s publication of root-­‐zone contact information for the TLD will include Registry Operator and its administrative and technical contacts. Any request to modify the contact information for the Registry Operator must be made in the format specified from time to time by ICANN at xxxx://xxx.xxxx.xxx/domains/root/.

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