Initialization. During initialization, port drivers register each communication port as well as all supported interfaces. User code creates an asynUser, which is a "handle" for accessing asynDriver facilities, by calling pasynManager->createAsynUser(processCallback,timeoutCallback); An asynUser has the following features: • An asynUser is the means by which asynManager manages multiple requests for accessing a port. • processCallback,which is used by queueRequest described below, is the addresss of a user supplied callback routine. • timeoutCallback is the address of caller supplied callback that will be called if a queueRequest remains on the queue too long. • Device support code should create an asynUser for each "atomic" access to low level drivers, i.e. a set of calls that must not be interlaced with other calls to the low level drivers. For example device support for EPICS record support should create an asynUser for each record instance. • Device support code should NOT try to share an asynUser between multiple sources of requests for access to a port. If this is done then device support must itself handle contention issues that are already handled by asynManager. User code connects to a low level driver via a call to status = pasynManager->connectDevice(pasynUser,portName,addr); This call must specify the name of the port and the address of the device. It then calls findInterface to locate the interfaces with which it calls the driver. For example: pasynInterface = pasynManager->findInterface(pasynUser,asynOctetType,1);
Initialization. Set (i) t = 0; (ii) WeakEpochs, WeakUsers = 𝜙; and (iii) G[∗], Rand[∗], ST[∗], K[∗] → ⊥. • Gen() executes (ST, PK) →$ Gen(), sets ST[PK] → ST, and returns PK. • Add(PK, PK∗) first aborts if (i) PK = PK∗; (ii) t =/ 0 and PK ∈/ G[t]; or (iii) PK∗ ∈ G[t]. Otherwise it:
Initialization. For every (l, m) such that Hml = 1, let q0 = 1 — p′(t—1) and q
Initialization. User id 1 runs (id 0.xx, W ) ← baCGKA.Init(G, (pkid1 , . . . , pkidn ), sskid1 ) to initialize a session. Here G = (id 1, . . . , idn) specifies the group, pkidi is the initialization encryption public-key of user idi, and sskid1 the initialization authentication secret key of the party setting up the group. The output consists of user id 1’s initial state and a welcome message W . ←
Initialization. To initialize a group for users (id 1, . . . , idn), user id 1 first generates the $ c c dummy key-pair (pk , sk ) ← skuPKE.Gen(1λ). They then set up a left-balanced binary ratchet tree T = (V, E), where the ith leaf corresponds to user idi. T is completely blanked except for the leaves, that are set to have the corresponding user’s initialization public key as associated key and further contain their signature verification key. Further, vid1 .stsec contains id 1’s secret decryption and signing key. id 1 incorporates (pkc, skc), T , a copy Tnext of T , and an empty list Onext in their state and then computes ((∆i, δi, Ci)i, κ) ← gen-path-upd(id 0.xx ). ((∆i, δi)i, κ) is added to id 1’s state together with epoch counter ectr = 1 and Knext is set to the zero string. The resulting welcome message is W = (T.stpub, (∆i, Ci)i, (pkc, skc), σ, id 1), where σ is a signature of (T.stpub, (∆i, Ci)i, (pkc, skc)) under sskid1 .
Initialization. The EAR software is composed of many components, each of which has varying requirements and dependencies. One of the goals for EAR in HEROES is to be able to provide some of its functionalities even when some component is missing. For example, the EAR Daemon, which is the only component with superuser privileges, reads the memory bandwidth metric among other metrics. If the EAR Daemon is missing, this metric cannot be read, and therefore some backup should be put into place to run the rest of the program without any problem. A full EAR installation consists of one EARGM per scheduler, one EARDBD per service node, one EARD per compute node, and one XXXX per application. The EARGM is optional and is not required for the proper function of the software. For cases where one or more components are missing, a more modular version of EAR has been implemented, called EAR Light. In that case, EAR Light loads alternative components to replace the capabilities of the missing features. Every considered component has a “dummy” variant that is put in place in case everything else fails. This dummy component is a bare-bones alternative, way less potent than any other component for the task, but with the added bonus that it depends on no one, and therefore it should always be able to load. In a complete installation of EAR, the execution sequence is the following (see Figure 4):
Initialization. There are a number of steps necessary for an OS to bring its Host Controller Driver to an operational state: ?? Load Host Controller Driver and locate the HC ?? Verify the HC and allocate system resources ?? Take control of HC (support for an optional System Management Mode driver) ?? Set up HC registers and HC Communications Area ?? Begin sending SOF tokens on the USB Note: Due to some devices on the USB that may take a long time to reset, it is desirable that the Host Controller Driver startup process not transition to the USBRESET state if at all possible. The description of driver and controller initialization in following sections takes this into account. OpenHCI Operational Registers Mode HCCA Status Event Frame Int Ratio Control Bulk Host Controller Commications Area Interrupt 0 Interrupt 1 Interrupt 2 . . . Interrupt 31
Initialization. This subsection illustrates that how n members U1, , Un can establish a group key to create a secure multicast session among them. The entire group key establishment process divided in two algorithms: Algo- rithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Algorithm 1 is run by KGC while Algorithm 2 is to be run by every user after com- pletion of Algorithm 1. On completion of Algorithm 1 every user got their long term private key < Si, Ri > though some secure channel. On receiving the same every user can validate it by check- ing whether the following equation hold: R + H (ID ).P = S . (1) Ki+2R = Xi+2 ⊕ Ki+1R · · · · · · KnR = Xn ⊕ Kn−1R R K1R = X1 ⊕ Kn · · · · · · R = X ⊕ K R. Ki−1 i−1 i−2 Algorithm 1 Key Generation Algorithm (KGC)
Initialization. There are a number of steps necessary for an OS to bring its Host Controller Driver to an operational state: • Load Host Controller Driver and locate the HC • Verify the HC and allocate system resources • Take control of HC (support for an optional System Management Mode driver) • Set up HC registers and HC Communications Area • Begin sending SOF tokens on the USB Note: Due to some devices on the USB that may take a long time to reset, it is desirable that the Host Controller Driver startup process not transition to the USBRESET state if at all possible. The description of driver and controller initialization in following sections takes this into account. Device Enumeration OpenHCI Operational Registers Mode HCCA Status Event Frame Int Ratio Control Bulk Host Controller Commications Area Interrupt 0 Interrupt 1 Interrupt 2 . . . Interrupt 31 . . .
Initialization. We define the algorithms B.Init and U.Init before we proceed any further. In the blockchain program, we initialize a set called FrozenCoins that will contains coins that are frozen. ⊆ transcript that is computationally indistinguishable from the transcript generated in the real world. We denote by ˙xJ for J [n] the sub-vector of ˙x containing the components of ˙x at every index in J. Experiment IDEALF,S,I (f, P, ˙x))D: transcript ← SFf,P (˙xI¯,·)(f, P, ˙xI ) Output D(transcript) Definition 3: A PSC evaluation protocol π is t-secure if for all I ⊆ [n] with |I| ≤ t, all polynomial-time computable smart contract functions f , all polynomial-sized ˙x ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n and all subsets of participants P ⊆ {Pi}i∈[n], then for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for any PPT distinguisher D it holds that . PrΣREALπ,A,I (f, P, ˙x)D → 1Σ− . PrΣIDEALF,S,I (f, P, ˙x)D → 1Σ ≤ negl(λ) where negl(λ) is a negligible function in the security parameter λ.
