Hierarchical. The hierarchy model assumes that the entire journey from China to the West is coordinated centrally. Different smuggling groups are ultimately responsible to a snakehead di tutti snakeheads. This supra-organizer ensures that the migrants are helped to reach their final destination by a chain of smuggling groups in different countries. In China it is claimed that such individuals are situated in the West, out of the reach of the Chinese police (Interpol Beijing, 2001: 23; ▇▇▇▇▇ & ▇▇▇▇, 2002). According to Western sources, such individuals are situated in China, and that is how they manage to elude the Western authorities (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 2003: 243). Several Dutch government officials also hold the latter view. The head organizer is said to be situated in China, not in the Netherlands (B22). The fact that the Dutch-based organizers take on assignments is considered evidence of this the- ory. Through telephone contact the Chinese smugglers in the Netherlands are notified, for example, that new groups of smuggled people are on their way. Des- tinations are sometimes adhered to and sometimes altered. In one case, a migrant decided not to continue his journey to Britain following a telephone con- versation with an organizer in China. This organizer informed the organizer that the migrant was allowed to “disembark” in the Netherlands (case 98). Financing is another important reason for smugglers in the Netherlands and in China to consult with each other. While most migrants claim they had to pay 20,000 euros for their passage to the West, the Dutch smugglers earn a great deal less, for example about 5,000 euros for the Netherlands–Great Britain route. And various expenses have to be paid from that fee. For example, the organizer has to pay the Dutch transporters in cash. That can cost up to 1,000 euros per smuggled migrant, so he has to have a considerable amount of cash on hand. In addition, the other members of the smuggling group have to be compensated, cars or safe houses rented, food bought, etc. If the journey is not carried out in a clandestine fashion, passports and airline tickets have to be purchased. The net profit for the Chinese smuggling group is therefore closer to 1,000 to 3,000 per smuggled person (although because smuggling groups bring in a high volume of migrants each month, the total profit is probably considerable). In one exception, an organizer in the Netherlands was paid 28,000 euros per smuggled person, but only because, instead of Great Britain, she offered passage from the Netherlands to the United States, which is a much sought-after final destination (case 9). From the hierarchical perspective, it is plausible to speculate that a large cen- tral organizer in China determines the smuggling fee and compensates the smuggling groups accordingly. However, there is neither proof for or against this theory. During the research period, financial matters were either not investigated, or there was only a cursory examination. As a result, it remains unclear how the organizers arrange their finances. The only certainty regarding financial matters to emerge from file study is that the migrants frequently pay their smuggling fees in China (this topic is addressed in detail in section 7.3). If and how the money finds it’s way to the smugglers in the Netherlands remains unknown. In short, taking the entire smuggling route into consideration, it seems obvi- ous that there is central coordination. Because a smuggling journey is often split up in different legs, someone has to keep in control. On the other hand, the evi- dence for this assumption is less convincing than may at first appear. An alterna- tive explanation is set out in the discussion of the network model below.
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Sources: Doctoral Thesis, Doctoral Thesis