DMA. One of the criteria for such designation is similar to designating VLOPs and VLOSEs, regarding the number of active users being 45 million a year. However, the designation process in the DMA also includes the evaluation of further qualitative and quantitative criteria. For example, one quantitative criterion looks at whether the yearly turnover of the core platform service provider in the EU amounts 1041 The DSA refers to “intermediation service” providers (see GLOSSARY). See Id. recs. 7–15. 1042 The DSA builds on the landmark e-Commerce Directive of 2000 and primarily includes intermediation liability rules for online businesses. Nevertheless, the DSA gives particular importance to digital platforms (including search engines) due to their reach, and, therefore, imposes special obligations to them. See Digital Services Act, supra note 38, recs. 75-76. The DSA adopts the threshold of 45 million active monthly users. Further, DSA distinguishes Very Large Online Platforms (VLOP)s and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs). 1043 Digital Services Act, supra note 38, art. 33. 17 VLOPs: Alibaba AliExpress, Amazon Store, Apple AppStore, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇, Facebook, Google Maps, Google Play, Google Shopping, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, Zalando; 2 VLOSEs: Google Search, Microsoft Bing. See DSA: Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ▇▇▇▇▇://▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_2413 (last visited Apr 28, 2023). 1044 Digital Services Act, supra note 2, art. 33. 1045 Digital Markets Act, supra note 14, art.2(2). 1046 Id. to at least €7,5 billion.1047 For designating gatekeepers, it is essential that such core platform providers hold a particularly “durable” and “entrenched” position. 1048 Designated gatekeepers and VLOPs/VLOSEs are overlapping concepts. In case core platform services that gatekeepers provide are “online platforms” and “online search engines”, they are also VLOPs/VLOSEs. However, VLOPs/VLOSEs are not always gatekeepers (e.g., Snapchat) because they do not meet further Article 3 DMA criteria.1049 The DMA addresses structural ▇▇▇▇▇ on the market stemming primarily from the “data power” of designated gatekeepers and promotes contestability and fairness in the EU single market.1050 The DSA and the DMA include several provisions that set boundaries for consumer manipulation via OBA. The EU legislator considered the complete ban on OBA when advertising relied on processing consumers’ data in the DSA.1051 However, the final text of the DSA prohibits “online platforms” from engaging in OBA when: (i) “when they are aware with reasonable certainty that the recipient of the service is a minor”1052 or (ii) when they process special categories of data” (as defined under the GDPR).1053 The DSA justifies these prohibitions of OBA targeted to minors and using sensitive data as having a potential for exploitation of vulnerabilities and manipulation, creating higher societal risks.1054
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