Common use of Democracy Clause in Contracts

Democracy. As above, political society’s key comparator, for ▇▇▇▇▇, is the state of nature. Political society requires, on his view, the legitimate establishment of political power, not least to be able to enforce justice. This legitimacy is dependent on its members having ‘quitted this natural power [of preserving property and punishing offences, and having] resigned it up into the hands of the community’, such that the community ‘comes to be umpire’.128 ▇▇▇▇▇ states that being a member of such a society, on ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ approach, amounts to ‘transforming oneself into a constituent element of a political body’.129 And it seems clear that ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ approach is democratic in nature. To this end, ▇▇▇▇▇ describes how, in legitimate political society, political representatives (i.e., ‘men having authority from the community’) are charged with ‘decid[ing] all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right’.130 A key distinction between political society and the state of nature, therefore, is the parsing and discharge of the law of nature on particular matters of justice. As ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ states, ‘in the absence of institutions, ▇▇▇▇▇ maintains that natural law is enforceable by any individual’. 131 Again, this does not mean that individuals in political society have ceded their moral obligations to discern and follow prerequisite moral standards for themselves. Rather, members of Lockean political society, as a matter of precondition, are morally committed to behaving towards each other in accordance with the moral standards of the law of nature — as well as contributing to the determination of legitimate positive law, by partaking in a representative model of political participation: 128 ▇▇▇▇▇, Second Treatise, 46 (§87). 129 ▇▇▇▇▇, Discourse on Property, 158-9. 130 ▇▇▇▇▇, 46-47 (§87). 131 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, “What is Natural Law Like?” 79. [th]us every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it[.]132 I shall return to this reference to ‘the majority’ in Chapter 6. But what is key for current purposes, here, is that in Lockean political society, the mechanisms of political institutions enable legitimate societal decision-making and the formal enaction of those decisions, amidst a political culture that protects and maintains members’ equally-held political and societal rights and freedoms, as well as their fundamental equally-held ‘natural’ rights.133 This focus on equality drives the requirement for democratic participation. As per ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, the way in which each person is no other person’s natural superior, means that, in political society, each person is ‘owed an answer’ from political power holders, because each person has ‘equal interests and ▇▇▇▇▇’.134 This relates to what ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ terms ‘democratic intellect’,135 and it demands that governors are accountable to, as well as representative of, the governed. I contend therefore that, whilst there is scope for a vast variety of different Lockean political societies, they will all be democratic — in the minimal sense of requiring respect for equally-held political rights to deliberative participation, realised on some kind of representative model, and underpinned by the basic preconditions of democracy, including respect for the rule of law, and certain basic rights.136 This is what I shall refer to below as ‘minimally democratic’. Again, ▇▇▇▇▇ did not personally fully advocate this conception of democracy (or at least not in terms of explicitly arguing in favour of equal political rights for all). But it is, I contend, consistent with, and a natural consequence of, the basic principles his political philosophy advances. 132 ▇▇▇▇▇, Second Treatise, 52 (§97). 133 e.g., ▇▇▇▇▇, 50-51 (§94). 134 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, God, ▇▇▇▇▇, and Equality, 108. 135 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Chapter 4.

Democracy. As above, political society’s key comparator, for ▇▇▇▇▇, is the state of nature. Political society requires, on his view, the legitimate establishment of political power, not least to be able to enforce justice. This legitimacy is dependent on its members having ‘quitted this natural power [of preserving property and punishing offences, and having] resigned it up into the hands of the community’, such that the community ‘comes to be umpire’.128 ▇▇▇▇▇ states that being a member of such a society, on ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ approach, amounts to ‘transforming oneself into a constituent element of a political body’.129 And it seems clear that ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ approach is democratic in nature. To this end, ▇▇▇▇▇ describes how, in legitimate political society, political representatives (i.e., ‘men having authority from the community’) are charged with ‘decid[ing] all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right’.130 A key distinction between political society and the state of nature, therefore, is the parsing and discharge of the law of nature on particular matters of justice. As ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Waldron states, ‘in the absence of institutions, ▇▇▇▇▇ maintains that natural law is enforceable by any individual’. 131 Again, this does not mean that individuals in political society have ceded their moral obligations to discern and follow prerequisite moral standards for themselves. Rather, members of Lockean political society, as a matter of precondition, are morally committed to behaving towards each other in accordance with the moral standards of the law of nature — as well as contributing to the determination of legitimate positive law, by partaking in a representative model of political participation: 128 ▇▇▇▇▇, Second Treatise, 46 (§87). 129 ▇▇▇▇▇, Discourse on Property, 158-9. 130 ▇▇▇▇▇, 46-47 (§87). 131 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, “What is Natural Law Like?” 79. [th]us every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it[.]132 I shall return to this reference to ‘the majority’ in Chapter 6. But what is key for current purposes, here, is that in Lockean political society, the mechanisms of political institutions enable legitimate societal decision-making and the formal enaction of those decisions, amidst a political culture that protects and maintains members’ equally-held political and societal rights and freedoms, as well as their fundamental equally-held ‘natural’ rights.133 This focus on equality drives the requirement for democratic participation. As per ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, the way in which each person is no other person’s natural superior, means that, in political society, each person is ‘owed an answer’ from political power holders, because each person has ‘equal interests and ▇▇▇▇▇’.134 This relates to what ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ terms ‘democratic intellect’,135 and it demands that governors are accountable to, as well as representative of, the governed. I contend therefore that, whilst there is scope for a vast variety of different Lockean political societies, they will all be democratic — in the minimal sense of requiring respect for equally-held political rights to deliberative participation, realised on some kind of representative model, and underpinned by the basic preconditions of democracy, including respect for the rule of law, and certain basic rights.136 This is what I shall refer to below as ‘minimally democratic’. Again, ▇▇▇▇▇ did not personally fully advocate this conception of democracy (or at least not in terms of explicitly arguing in favour of equal political rights for all). But it is, I contend, consistent with, and a natural consequence of, the basic principles his political philosophy advances. 132 ▇▇▇▇▇, Second Treatise, 52 (§97). 133 e.g., ▇▇▇▇▇, 50-51 (§94). 134 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, God, ▇▇▇▇▇, and Equality, 108. 135 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Chapter 4.