User Impersonation Attack Clause Samples
User Impersonation Attack k
1) Uk generates a random number v∗ and computes V ∗ = gv∗ mod n, CIDi∗ = h(IDi) ⊕ h(V ∗ǁh(xǁy)), M1∗ = h(CIDi∗ ǁ V ∗ ǁ C1). Then, Uk sends {CIDi∗, V ∗, M1∗} to Si.
2) Si computes h(xǁy), h(IDi) = CIDi∗⊕ Thus, Uk is authenticated as the legitimate server by the user Ui.
User Impersonation Attack. In such attack, an adversary may try to impersonate as a legitimate user in M0. However, our proposed scheme resists this attack. Because in the setup phase, the legal SE must send its IDi using hash function, which is considered as a collision- resistant one-way hash function. Therefore, it is hard for an attacker to extract the real ID of allowable user since each SE/Fog has previously registered its real ID in the CSA.
User Impersonation Attack. As CIDi, C2, C3, C4, M1, M2 and M3 are all protected by secure one-way hash function, any modification to these parameters of the legitimate Ui’s authentication messages will be detected by S if the attacker cannot fabricate the valid CIDi∗. Because the attacker has no way of obtaining the values of IDi, PWi and h(x Y) corresponding to Ui, he (or she) cannot fabricate the valid CIDi*, M1, M2 and M3. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against user impersonation attack.