The transition Sample Clauses

The transition. 27 13.1 Transition....................................................27 13.2

The transition. 2 For other considerations on this topic, see the same site by the same author, the article " The assets/liabilities guarantee" The challenge is to know what will be the impact of the sale transaction on the target. The ownership of shares (and the changes to such ownership) is, in theory, independent from the management of the target-company and the sale transaction should not have operational consequences. In particular, the management appointed by the 'historical' partners and the commitments made by the target-company before its sale shall remain unchanged. In practice, however, the impact of the share transfer on the target-company is huge. Regarding the management, for example, if such management had the confidence of the historical partners, it might not be the same for new partners, who do not have appointed such management and who may wish to implement a new strategy and to appoint a new management. Regarding the commitments that were binding upon the target-company prior to the sale transaction, they can (or not, it depends entirely on the drafting of the contracts, the law is silent on this point, and this is one of the elements to be identified in the due diligence) provide for change of control clauses, whereby a party may terminate a contract simply based on the change of control of the target-company. This is typically the case for financings, which were granted to the target-company based on the identity of partners who were controlling such company. It is also common (it depends on the activity), for customer contracts. Beyond these considerations, the environment in which the target-company operates changes with the change of control. The company was probably relying on a set of inflows, more or less documented, with the transferor or its group (eg procurement, intellectual property, 'support' services - legal, HR, accounting ... - cash pooling). What happens to these obligations? Is it desirable that they stop or that they continue? Can the conditions agreed upon yesterday, when the company was belonging to the same group as the counterparty be maintained now that the target-company is no longer under the control of the transferor?

The transition. In 2013, a major shock to the system of Internet policy occurred. Former government contractor ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ publicly leaked classified government documents revealing that the U.S. government had been engaged in mass digital surveillance of its citizens and the citizens of other countries. Like with the earlier U.S. invasion of Iraq, this event drew widespread criticism of the American government that pervaded different policy spheres such as Internet governance, again reigniting other states’ discomfort with the U.S.’s authority. The ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ revelations were newly impactful in this regard, though, because not only did they weaken general trust in the U.S., but they were also directly related to Internet issues. This event revived and enflamed the international community’s long-standing discontent with American dominance of ICANN and reinvigorated efforts to change the status quo (Raustiala 2016: 12). On October 7, 2013, the leaders of global Internet infrastructure organizations met in Montevideo, Uruguay and released the “Montevideo statement” calling for the acceleration of the globalization of ICANN and the IANA functions, and warning about the alternative of the Internet fragmenting along national boundaries.19 This statement was reminiscent of past international demands for globalization, but with a few key circumstantial differences. This time around, the international community had a particularly strong grievance with the existing arrangement, accompanied by a new balance of power in the Internet space. Figure 2 illustrates a steady decline in the United States’ share of the world’s Internet population, declining from nearly a third of the world’s user in 2000 to less than a tenth in 2013. Pressure on the U.S. did not come from European Union countries overtaking its share of the Internet population; these countries still lagged behind the U.S.’s Internet market. Instead, the U.S. became genuinely concerned by requests to multilateralize Internet governance from authoritarian states including China, which had indeed overtaken the U.S. in terms of share of the global Internet market. To prevent what it viewed as a catastrophic result of Internet fragmentation and multilateral, state-led Internet governance, the U.S. finally agreed enter into meaningful conversation and action towards globalizing ICANN and removing its special oversight authority. Through the subsequent transition process, the U.S. avoided its least preferred outcome by allying with...

The transition. 8. The sides herewith acknowledge and confirm that under Presidential Decree No. (24) FY 2011, the President has irrevocably delegated to the Vice President the Presidential powers to negotiate, sign and bring into force this Mechanism, along with all constitutional powers connected with its implementation and follow on. These powers extend to the call for early elections and all acts necessary to effect the formation of a Government of National Unity, including the swearing in of its members, and other bodies foreseen in this Mechanism. 9. The transition shall be effected as follows: (a) In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2014 (2011), which notes the commitment by the President of Yemen to immediately sign the GCC Initiative and encourages him, or those authorized to act on his behalf, to do so, and to implement a political settlement based upon it, and Presidential Decree No. (24) FY 2011, the President, or the Vice President acting on behalf of the President, will sign the GCC initiative concurrently with the signature of this Mechanism by the sides. (b) Concurrent with the signing of this Mechanism and acting under powers delegated by the President under the Presidential Decree No. (24) FY 2011, the Vice President will issue a Decree calling for early Presidential elections to be held within a maximum of 90 days after entry into force of this Mechanism. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the constitution, the Decree will take effect 60 days before the elections. The text of the Decree is annexed to this Mechanism. (c) This Mechanism enters into force once signature of the GCC Initiative by the President or Vice President and of this Mechanism by the sides has taken place according to this paragraph and the Decree calling for elections noted in sub-paragraph (b) above has been issued. 10. The transition commences with the entry into force of this Mechanism. The transition period will then have two stages: (a) the first stage will begin with the entry into force of this Mechanism and end with the swearing in of the President following the initial Presidential elections; (b) the second stage will begin with the swearing in of the President after the initial Presidential elections and end with the swearing in of a government following general elections that will be held no later than two years from the beginning of the second stage. 11. During both stages of the Transition, decisions of the House of Representatives on matters rela...