Common use of Tasks Performed Clause in Contracts

Tasks Performed. Given that the primary task of Operation Atalanta is to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean, intelligence naturally forms an integral part of the operation, to increase the understanding of piracy and its highly adaptable modus operandi. As the number of piracy attacks has gradually dropped, with the last known successful attack in May 2012, and the subsequent need for escorts at sea reduced, intelligence collection closer to the Somali shore has become increasingly important to Operation Atalanta in order to understand how piracy is evolving, adapting and regrouping.242 Accordingly, the EUNAVFOR intelligence branches work to establish a baseline for the situation in different areas and, based on these, make assessments of how piracy is developing. The main task of the MINT was thus to support the FHQ and the CO of HNLMS ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ by providing related assessments and intelligence.243 As mentioned above, the primary tasks of the Dutch and Swedish enablers during the mission were ISR operations and FOB operations. The MINT, for its part, was instrumental in planning these operations and specifying the information that was to be collected. More specifically, the MINT would receive a task from the FHQ intelligence branch (N2), which it then operationalised into information requirements, images and maps. Depending on these, surveillance and reconnaissance operations were conducted by either the helicopter unit or the LCCT. According to one interviewee, however, the Swedish combat boats mainly relied on Dutch intelligence for their operations while the Swedish intelligence cell mainly supported the flight side.244 After a completed operation the units were debriefed by the MINT and the information collected was 239 Interview 21. 240 Interview 21. 241 Interview 21. 242 Interviews 16, 26 and 40. 243 Interviews 21 and 26. 244 Interview 26. FOI-R--4101--SE analysed and put into different intelligence reports. In cases where the images taken during operations were deemed particularly interesting, a separate intelligence report, a so-called reconnaissance exploitation report, would be produced.245 In the next step the reports were sent for approval to the Dutch officer in charge of the MINT and subsequently delivered to the FHQ as the ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇’▇ joint intelligence products.246 The information collected also constituted the foundation for the planning of new surveillance and reconnaissance operations. Initially, according to two Dutch interviewees, the debriefing system differed between the flight side and the boat side, in the sense that the same process was not used for both kinds of operations.247 The process was first harmonised for the Swedish enablers and then later with the Dutch FRISCs. In practice, this meant that the debriefing session became standardised for all the enablers and, most importantly, ensured that information could be more easily and systematically shared between the units. For instance, the information collected during a flight operation was directly transferred to the LCCT, or the other way around if a boat operation had been conducted.248 At the start of the mission, the MINT held internal twice-daily meetings to coordinate the work of the team between its Dutch and Swedish parts. As the operation proceeded, however, these meetings were reduced to once a day.249 In addition, as noted above, Intelligence Fusion Boards were held daily together with the FHQ, during which intelligence plans and upcoming operations were managed and coordinated.250 An interviewee who worked for the MINT noted that the Dutch and Swedish cells initially had different formats for their respective intelligence reports. Furthermore, the team initially had a huge output, producing 14 intelligence reports a day which was too many for the FHQ N2 branch to process. Consequently, the production process was tightened and the report format standardised to increase the coherence of the intelligence reports between the respective cells.251 Several interviewees pointed out that the limited number of interpreters on board put significant strains on the ability to collect intelligence during friendly approaches. There was only one Somali interpreter and one who spoke Arabic and Farsi, while several enablers often operated separately. This capability was 245 Interviews 21 and 26. 246 Interviews 24 and 26. 247 Interviews 21 and 29. 248 Interview 21. 249 Interview 21. 250 Interview 21. 251 Interview 21. therefore not adequate for the assigned tasks.252 For example, on one occasion a FOB operation was conducted with the LCU and the combat boats, but the interpreter could not attend because of a conflicting local leader engagement which had higher priority. As a result, according to one interviewee working in the MINT, the FOB operation did not generate any intelligence of value.253 A Dutch officer made a similar point, noting that with more interpreters the operational capacity could have been doubled, for example, by enabling a FRISC operation to be carried out in parallel with a FOB operation.254 Thus, an additional capability of one to three interpreters would have increased the output of the ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇’▇ operations and, hence, the intelligence collected during the mission.

Tasks Performed. Given that Apart from the primary task of Operation Atalanta is to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean, intelligence naturally forms an integral part of the operation, to increase the understanding of piracy and its highly adaptable modus operandi. As the number of piracy attacks has gradually dropped, with the last known successful attack in May 2012, and the subsequent need for escorts at sea reduced, intelligence collection closer to the Somali shore has become increasingly important to Operation Atalanta in order to understand how piracy is evolving, adapting and regrouping.242 Accordingly, the EUNAVFOR intelligence branches work to establish a baseline for the situation in different areas and, based on these, make assessments of how piracy is developing. The main task of the MINT was thus to support the FHQ and the CO of HNLMS ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ by providing related assessments and intelligence.243 As relatively complex operations mentioned above, the primary tasks LCCT primarily conducted patrols, reconnaissance and surveillance operations, and friendly approaches. Many of the Dutch and Swedish enablers during the mission these activities were ISR operations and FOB operations. The MINT, for its part, was instrumental in planning these operations and specifying the information that was to be collected. More specifically, the MINT would receive a task conducted from the FHQ intelligence branch seaborne forward operating bases (N2FOBs), which it then operationalised into information requirementswas a new modus operandi for Operation Atalanta.181 A FOB would be set up at sea at a predefined location within the area of operations, images and mapspatrols and surveillance missions would be conducted and intelligence collected by smaller units from this location. Depending on these, surveillance and reconnaissance operations were conducted by either For the helicopter unit or the LCCT. According to one interviewee, howeverpurpose of this operation, the Swedish combat boats mainly relied on Dutch intelligence for their operations while LCU was used as a FOB from which the Swedish intelligence cell mainly supported the flight side.244 After a completed operation the units were debriefed by the MINT CB90s and the information collected was 239 Interview 21FRISCs could operate. 240 Interview 21. 241 Interview 21. 242 Interviews 16, 26 A FOB can be operational for several days and 40. 243 Interviews 21 enables the boats to fuel up and 26. 244 Interview 26. FOI-R--4101--SE analysed and put into different intelligence reports. In cases where the images taken during operations were deemed particularly interesting, a separate intelligence report, a so-called reconnaissance exploitation report, would be produced.245 In the next step the reports were sent for approval stay overnight without going back to the Dutch officer in charge of the MINT and subsequently delivered to the FHQ as main operating base (the ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇’▇ joint intelligence products.246 The information collected also constituted ). FOBs therefore have the foundation for distinct advantage of increasing the planning of new surveillance and reconnaissance operations. Initially, according to two Dutch interviewees, the debriefing system differed between the flight side and the boat side, in the sense that the same process was not used for both kinds of operations.247 The process was first harmonised for the Swedish enablers and then later with the Dutch FRISCs. In practice, this meant that the debriefing session became standardised for all the enablers and, most importantly, ensured that information could be more easily and systematically shared between the units. For instance, the information collected during a flight operation was directly transferred to the LCCT, or the other way around if a boat operation had been conducted.248 At the start geographical reach of the missionboats and making it possible to concentrate intelligence collection on a specific area within the area of operations for an extended period.182 The intelligence collected mainly consisted of information about activities in different areas along the Somali coast, the MINT held internal twice-daily meetings to coordinate the work of the team between its Dutch and Swedish parts. As the operation proceeded, however, these meetings were reduced to once a day.249 In addition, as noted above, Intelligence Fusion Boards were held daily together with the FHQ, during which intelligence plans and upcoming operations were managed and coordinated.250 An interviewee who worked for the MINT noted that the Dutch and Swedish cells initially had different formats for their respective intelligence reports. Furthermore, the team initially had a huge output, producing 14 intelligence reports a day which was too many for the FHQ N2 branch to process. Consequently, the production process was tightened and the report format standardised to increase the coherence of the intelligence reports between the respective cells.251 Several interviewees pointed out that the limited number of interpreters on board put significant strains on the ability to collect intelligence during friendly approaches. There was only one Somali interpreter and one who spoke Arabic and Farsi, while several enablers often operated separately. This capability was 245 Interviews 21 and 26. 246 Interviews 24 and 26. 247 Interviews 21 and 29. 248 Interview 21. 249 Interview 21. 250 Interview 21. 251 Interview 21. therefore not adequate for the assigned tasks.252 For example, on one occasion a FOB operation was conducted with the LCU and the combat boats, but the interpreter could not attend because of a conflicting local leader engagement which had higher priority. As a result, according to one interviewee working in the MINT, the FOB operation did not generate any intelligence of value.253 A Dutch officer made a similar point, noting that with more interpreters the operational capacity could have been doubledincluding imagery, for example, of skiffs and dhows. Following FOB operations, the LCCT would be debriefed by enabling a FRISC operation to be carried out in parallel with a FOB operation.254 Thus, an additional capability of one to three interpreters would have increased the output of the combined intelligence section on HNLMS ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇ ▇▇▇▇’▇ operations and, hence, to enable further analysis of the intelligence collected during gathered (see section 4.2.3).183 The general view among the interviewees working in the LCCT was that they were prepared well, commensurate to performing the tasks assigned, and that in the grand scheme of things they were doing what they had expected to do.184 One officer in the LCCT, however, pointed out that the exact nature of the tasks they were to perform was not entirely clear prior to the mission, partly due to the renewal of the OPLAN, and that the number of reconnaissance operations and friendly approaches ended up being considerably higher than expected.185 The friendly approaches were usually carried out by Dutch personnel trained in HUMINT operations. In cases where the HUMINT team and its interpreter were not able to conduct friendly approaches, Swedish personnel did so in English. 180 Interview 27. 181 Swedish Armed Forces, 2015d “Den framskjutna grupperingsplatsen”, ▇▇▇▇://▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇/operationatalanta/2015/04/16/den-framskjutna-grupperingsplatsen/ (accessed 15 June 2015). 182 Swedish Armed Forces, 2015d. 183 Interview 27. 184 Interviews 12, 19 and 27. 185 Interview 12. FOI-R--4101--SE This was not necessarily ideal since the Swedish personnel lacked training in performing HUMINT tasks.186