Soundness. When tested by ’Le-chateleir’ method (IS: 4301,Part 3-1988) and autoclave method (for cement having a moisture content more than 3%), the cement shall not have an expansion of more than 10mm and 0.8 percent respectively.
Soundness. Let a1,..., an be the children of the ADTree gate A with EAMAS models Ma1 ,..., Man , MA respectively. Let the sequence of actions P { } ··· ?ai1 si1 ?ai2 si2 ?aim sim take MA from its initial state l0 to its final state lA, where sj ok, nok . Then the corresponding ordered success or failure of the children ai1 ,..., aim make the ADTree gate A succeed.
Soundness. When the checks described above have been performed, we are guaranteed that the soundness requirements described in Section 4.5 are satisfied since our anal- yses are conservative. Ultimately, this works to ensure that the exceptions thrown by the template operations will never occur. Notice that the two checks of templates and code are independent, which means that the designer and the programmer are free to work on their own, only bound by the limitations of the contract. Our analyses are of course approximative, which means that they may un- fairly reject programs for which no exceptions would actually be thrown during runtime. However, experiences from the JWIG project [9, 10] indicate that the precision is sufficient for practical use. The analyses are also efficient, handling large programs in mere seconds.
Soundness. Suppose there exists a subset S [2 + 2N + 3m] whose pairwise sum of products is
Soundness. Every non-uniform polynomial-time adversary wins the following experiment with at most negligible probability (in (n, n)):
Soundness. In order to be adopted, a Local Development Plan must be determined ‘Sound’ by the Examination Inspector (S.64 of the 2004 Act). Tests of Soundness tests and checks are identified in PPW (ch2) and the Manual (ch8).
Soundness. In this section we present the soundness of the monitoring mechanism in λCoS, namely the property that in a well-typed program P in which a module p “behaves well”, p cannot be blamed. We proceed according to the following roadmap. First, we introduce the notion of contract entailment to specify when a contract is “more demanding than” another (Section 5.1). Entailment is a natural generalization of subtyping of session types [Gay and Hole 2005]. Using entailment, we formalize the notion of locally correct module p as a module that always honors the contracts of the endpoints it uses. Locality refers to the fact that the correctness of p solely depends on the actions performed by, and on information known to, the module p itself (Section 5.2). Finally, we characterize the soundness of a module p as a set of invariant properties of the (busy) monitors in which the label p occurs. A direct consequence of soundness is that a well-typed, locally correct module p cannot be blamed (Section 5.3).
Soundness. Given a set of honestly generated verification keys, it is difficult to output a verifying SRDS signature (σms, π) on a message m such that the multi-signature σms does not verify on m against any sufficiently large subset of keys. In order to prove that sufficiently many parties agree on a message m, it suffices to certify that there exists an s-size subset of parties (where s is sufficiently large) who agree on the same message m. Therefore, moving forward for SRDS based on multi-signatures, we only focus on proving that exactly s parties agree on a particular message. We now formalize SRDS based on multi-signatures. ∈
Soundness. The soundness definition guarantees that if an uncorrupted verifier receives a valid NIDV proof, then it was created using the private key xP and e ∈ L(XP ). So a prover cannot cheat. Soundness also guarantees that no-one other than P can convince an uncorrupted designated verifier that e ∈ L(XP ). In the context of undeniable signatures, this means that a verifier must cooperate with the real signer in order to verify an undeniable signature since no-one other than the real signer is able to produce an NIDV proof of a valid undeniable signature that will be accepted by an uncorrupted designated verifier. Although not immediately obvious, the soundness definition also guarantees that if PGen is run on (XP , XV , xP , e) where e ∈/ L(XP ), and outputs some π ∈ P, then PVerify on input (XP , XV , e, π) outputs reject. If this is not the case, then E could generate an element e ∈/ L(XP ), generate a proof π using PGen which is accepted by PVerify, and output π. E would win the game since e ∈/ L(XP ). This observation, together with the correctness property, means that an entity with public key XP can determine whether an element e is in L(XP ) or not by running PGen on (XP , XV , xP , e) for some XV and then PVerify. PVerify outputs accept if and only if e ∈ L(XP ). This is in fact used when answering PGen queries. We note that EGen queries allow E to stipulate some “seed” to be used. This is necessary in the context of undeniable signatures where EGen queries correspond to signature queries, and the message to be signed corresponds to the seed. The existence of FakePGen from Section 4.3.2 also enables C to answer FakePGen queries. We consider it important to model such queries since an adversary may have access to such “fake” NIDV proofs that are produced by dishonest verifiers using FakePGen. The model for soundness is multiparty, reflecting the fact that NIDV proofs naturally involve more than one party, and that a party may play different roles at different times.
Soundness. To the best of the Company’s and ORA’s knowledge, the mechanical, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems serving the Improvements are fully operational, there are no structural, electrical, mechanical, plumbing, roof, paving or other defects in the Property, the roofs of the Improvements are free of leaks and in sound structural condition, and the Personalty is in good working order.
