Rehearing. The parties agree that a rehearing shall only be allowed in the event that the chair of the Arbitration Panel is unable or unwilling to continue performance of the duties of an arbitrator.
Rehearing. A party dissatisfied with a decision may file a single re- quest for rehearing without prior au- thorization from the Board. The burden of showing a decision should be modi- fied lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or over- looked, and the place where each mat- ter was previously addressed in a mo- tion, an opposition, or a reply. A re- quest for rehearing does not toll times U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Commerce § 42.74 for taking action. Any request must be filed:
Rehearing. Upon a motion initiated by any member and adopted by the unanimous vote of the members present, but not less than a majority of all the members, the Board of Appeals shall review at a rehearing, held upon notice given upon an original hearing, any order, decision, or determination of the Board not previously reviewed. Upon such rehearing, and provided it shall appear that the rights vested prior thereto in persons acting in good faith in reliance upon the order, decision or determination reviewed will not be prejudiced thereby, the Board may, upon concurring vote of all members present, reverse, modify or annul its original order, decision or determination.
Rehearing. In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in paragraph E of subsection 1 the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with section 5929, or, if the award is vacated on grounds set forth in paragraphs C and D of subsection 1 the court may order a rehearing before the arbitrators who made the award or their successors appointed in accordance with section 5929. The time within which the agreement requires the award to be made is applicable to the rehearing and commences from the date of the order. [PL 1967, c. 430 (NEW).]
Rehearing. EN BANC SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE PANEL DECI- SION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S PRIOR PRECEDENT.The panel decision to affirm the dismissal of Ap- pellants’ Complaint for lack of standing conflicts with decisions of this circuit and consideration by the full court is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions. Specifically, the panel decision to affirm conflicts with Maytag Corp. v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 687 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 2012) and N. Dakota State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 2001).Appellants’ Complaint states a justiciable con- troversy pursuant to controlling circuit precedent, alleging that Appellants suffered (1) a concrete injury (rather than a hypothetical one), (2) that is fairly trace- able to the Board’s challenged action, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by a favorable deci- sion. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In determining whether sufficient facts have been alleged for a declaratory judgment, the court looks to “whether the facts alleged, under all the circum- stances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issu- ance of a declaratory judgment.” Maytag, 687 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). See also Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-27 (2007)(same standard).The Board’s unilateral modifications of Appel- lants’ contracts via adoption of the Revised Policy, along with the Board’s admitted retroactive applica- tion of the unilateral modifications against Appellants, is a concrete injury and violation of Appellants’ consti- tutional rights. This injury has already occurred with- out the need for any further action to be taken. Critically, when Appellants were hired and then ten- ured, Appellants’ tenure contracts did not merely en- compass the right to termination for cause, no matter the meaning of the term – as the Board baldly con- tends. Rather, those contracts included the right to be terminated for cause only as specified in the agree- ment entered into by the parties at the time. The Board’s contention that it can change the definition of the most material term in Appellants’ employment contracts at its discretion without any injury occurring to Appellants is not the law and has never been the law. See Me...
Rehearing. (1) A request for rehearing after a final decision may exceptionally be made to the Court of Appeal on discovery of a fact by the party requesting the rehearing, which is of such a nature as to be a decisive factor and which, when the decision was given, was unknown to the party requesting the rehearing. Such request may only be based on grounds of a fundamental procedural defect or of an act which was held, by a final court decision, to constitute a criminal offence.
Rehearing. For a rehearing the manager/Appeals Committee of the Governing Body will repeat the process for a disciplinary meeting in accordance with the disciplinary procedure and come to their own decision. If an investigation has not already been carried out, the Manager /appeals committee should consider whether one is necessary.