Proof sketch. The proof of this theorem relies on the theory of typical sequences7 and is similar to the proof of Theorem 8, which is a special case of this theorem, but the technical details are omitted from this extended abstract. In order to authenticate a k-bit message by an l = 2k-bit authenticator using m = 4k bits of Xn (or of Y n when Bob is the sender), the described approach based on error correcting codes can be used to select the positions of a subsequence [Xi ; : : : ; Xi ] of Xn. The receiver accepts the message if and only if the sequence of pairs [(Xi1 ; Yi1 ); : : : ; (Xil ; Yil )] is -typical for the distribution PXY for some suitable small . One can prove that for every distribution PXY Z that is neither X-simulatable nor Y -simulatable by ▇▇▇, there exists a positive such that for su ciently large k ▇▇▇'s cheating probability is arbitrarily small. The same argument as in the proof of Theorem 8 can be used to prove that the ratio of bits needed for authentication and of bits used for secret-key agreement vanishes asymptotically.
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Sources: Information Theoretically Secure Secret Key Agreement, Information Theoretically Secure Secret Key Agreement, Information Theoretically Secure Secret Key Agreement