Predictive Significance Clause Samples

Predictive Significance. Aside from having a role in determining meaning, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ argues that intentions can also have predictive significance, as “determinants of the likely consequences of the proposed course of action”113. He argues that this significance is valid114, but is derivative and does not give intention a foundational role. This appears to be correct; a clear intention might not only more reliably cause outcomes as part of the current proposal or plan, intentions might also make future decision making of the same type more likely. Intentions would be seen as good predictors, increasing the chance of success of current plans, and involved in building habits that influence future behavior. It is noteworthy that some have sought to interpret DER as being founded on this kind of consequential significance. In terms of this chapter, the line of argument is that intention does and can have the kind of moral significance 113 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. p87. 114 Ibid. p30. that DER requires, a moral relevance for permissibility that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ denies. In this section on predictive significance, I consider one form of significance that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ accepts, and that I agree is non-foundational, but that others understand to be at the heart of the distinction between intention and foresight. I will consider whether this kind of consequential understanding of the significance of intention could function as a basis for DER’s intention condition. This is interesting territory, since DER is widely understood as an archetypally non-consequentialist approach, and the predictive significance of intention may open up the way for an interpretation of DER that has a consequentialist character. Consequentialists could view intentionally causing effects differently to causing those same effects unintentionally, or accidentally. These effects will be magnified and have more impact on the future, for better or worse, than causing effects unintentionally or as a merely foreseen side effect. Consequentialism, then, could offer an account of intentions in which they carry a special moral significance, but this predictive sense would be only one of a range of ways that intention carries significance. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ argues that H.L.A. ▇▇▇▇ shares this understanding of the distinction between intention and foresight, and adds that ▇▇▇▇ rejects the ethical relevance of double effect reasoning because he believes the distinction between intention and foresight to be based on...